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8 Indiana opinions name it 1 courts 2005–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Indiana State Ethics Commission, Office of Inspector General, and David Thomas, in his Official Capacity as Inspector General v. Patricia Sanchezgreen1 sentence2017Res judicata “applies where there has been a final adjudication on the merits of the same issue between the same parties.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 45A05-1608-PO-1855 | April 27, 2017 Page 8 of 10 Indiana State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez, 18 N.E.3d 988, 993 (Ind. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [17] At the protective order hearing below, M.G. argued that claim preclusion applied and would bar V.P.’s Third PO Petition because all the allegations in her petition had already been previously “raised, aired, and decided upon at a prior court.” (Tr. 30). | 1 | 1 |
C.V. v. C.R.green1 sentence2017For a trial court to issue a protective order, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking has occurred.3 C.V. v. C.R., 64 N.E.3d 850, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [18] In this case, J.S. was approximately nine years old when B.P.’s course of conduct began, and approximately thirteen years old at the time of the protective order hearing. | 1 | 1 |
David J. Harman v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2014See Harman, 4 N.E.3d at 217 n.9 (concluding that defendant’s counsel did not make a proper offer to prove because, while defendant’s counsel provided the substance of the excluded evidence by submitting the police report and argued that he believed that evidence of the protective order violation was relevant, his counsel did not specifically identify the grounds for the admission of the testimony); see also Arhelger, 714 N.E.2d at 665 (finding defendant did not make a “valid offer of proof” where defendant’s explanation did not make the substance of the evidence clear to the court and did not | 1 | 1 |
Arhelger v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Harman, 4 N.E.3d at 217 n.9 (concluding that defendant’s counsel did not make a proper offer to prove because, while defendant’s counsel provided the substance of the excluded evidence by submitting the police report and argued that he believed that evidence of the protective order violation was relevant, his counsel did not specifically identify the grounds for the admission of the testimony); see also Arhelger, 714 N.E.2d at 665 (finding defendant did not make a “valid offer of proof” where defendant’s explanation did not make the substance of the evidence clear to the court and did not | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tons v. Bley
green
1 sentence2018Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). [8] At the protective order hearing, N.A. testified as follows: that during a supervised visit between Andrews and their sixteen-year-old child (Child), the facilitator ended the visit early and called N.A. because Andrews’s behavior during the visit caused the facilitator to fear for her safety; that following a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1701-PO-209 | March 9, 2018 Page 3 of 4 hearing on parenting time that both N.A. and Andrews attended, Andrews waited in the parking lot for twenty-five minutes until N.A. exited | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Danny L. Young v. Lu Ann S. Young
green
2 sentences2018We thus “remand[ed] for further proceedings on this issue.” Id. at 257 . [8] We then clarified that, on remand, solely on the basis of the Protective Order violation affirmed above, Lu Ann may seek to have Danny held in contempt. 2018We thus “remand[ed] for further proceedings on this issue.” Id. at 257 . [8] We then clarified that, on remand, solely on the basis of the Protective Order violation affirmed above, Lu Ann may seek to have Danny held in contempt. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Justin D. Maurer v. Crystal Cobb-Maurer
green
1 sentence2014In support of this argument, 6 K.M. cites Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 994 N.E.2d at 759 , in which this court found insufficient evidence of stalking in part because the petitioner “offered no testimony at the hearing regarding the effect the contacts had on her.” We note that D.S. proceeded pro se at the protective order hearing. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
McKinney v. McKinney
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 686 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Mathews v. Eldridge
green
2 sentences2005The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). 2005The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.