III defendant in Alabama

1987III The defendant argues that the City's failure to provide him with photographs of the car in which he was arrested constituted a suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

1987III The defendant argues that the City's failure to provide him with photographs of the car in which he was arrested constituted a suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).

1982Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981); Thompson v. State , 405 So.2d 717 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 721 (1981)." III This issue pertains to the introduction in evidence of a knife that was found by Military Policeman John Turner, who had arrested defendant for DUI at Fort Rucker, prior to having any information that he was wanted as a suspect in the instant robbery case.

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).

1982Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App. 1980), cert. denied 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981); Thompson v. State , 405 So.2d 717 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 721 (1981)." III This issue pertains to the introduction in evidence of a knife that was found by Military Policeman John Turner, who had arrested defendant for DUI at Fort Rucker, prior to having any information that he was wanted as a suspect in the instant robbery case.

1990III The defendant also argues that the second sentencing was, in effect, a revocation of probation which did not comply with the due process requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Armstrong v. State , 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975).

1990III The defendant also argues that the second sentencing was, in effect, a revocation of probation which did not comply with the due process requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Armstrong v. State , 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975).

1990III The defendant also argues that the second sentencing was, in effect, a revocation of probation which did not comply with the due process requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Armstrong v. State , 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975).

1990III The defendant also argues that the second sentencing was, in effect, a revocation of probation which did not comply with the due process requirements of Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U.S. 778 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 , 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), and Armstrong v. State , 294 Ala. 100 , 312 So.2d 620 (1975).

1990Felton v. State , 526 So.2d 635 , 636-37 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), affirmed, Ex parte Felton , 526 So.2d 638 (Ala. 1988).

1990Felton v. State , 526 So.2d 635 , 636-37 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), affirmed, Ex parte Felton , 526 So.2d 638 (Ala. 1988).

1989III The defendant also filed a pro se "Motion for Exclusion of Involuntary Admissions and Confessions," with a request for a hearing under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

1989III The defendant also filed a pro se "Motion for Exclusion of Involuntary Admissions and Confessions," with a request for a hearing under Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District , 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State , 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District, 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State, 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking t

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District , 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State , 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District, 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State, 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking t

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District , 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State , 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking

1989III The doctrine has not been applied, however, in the following cases: Fosselman v. Waterloo Community School District, 229 N.W.2d 280 (Iowa 1975) (personal injuries sustained by a ninth grade physical education student while playing a game); Rella v. State, 117 A.D.2d 591 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986) (State not liable for an injury to claimant who was visiting a patient at a psychiatric center, even though there was evidence that a geriatric patient, known to have been assaultive in the past, was absent from the building immediately after the accident, where there was no other evidence linking t

1988An essential element of the offense of rape is "sexual intercourse" which is "the actual penetration [however slight] of the male sexual organ into the sexual organ of the female." Reynolds v. State , 274 Ala. 171 , 172 , 146 So.2d 85 (1962).

1988An essential element of the offense of rape is "sexual intercourse" which is "the actual penetration [however slight] of the male sexual organ into the sexual organ of the female." Reynolds v. State , 274 Ala. 171 , 172 , 146 So.2d 85 (1962).

1988App.1982), affirmed, Ex parte Lokos, 434 So.2d 831 (Ala.1983)." Gamble v. State, 480 So.2d 38, 40-41 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).

1988III The defendant argues that the following sentence contained in the court's supplemental oral charge foreclosed a finding of fact in his favor by the jury: "[I]n this case the defendant was charged with using a knife and you've got to believe that the knife was a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." "`[T]he portion of the charge here excepted to should be construed in connection with the whole charge of the court.' Ex parte Cowart, 201 Ala. 525 , 78 So. 879 (1918).... `While a particular remark by the trial judge may be open to question, in order for it to amount to the grossly improper

1988III The defendant argues that the following sentence contained in the court's supplemental oral charge foreclosed a finding of fact in his favor by the jury: "[I]n this case the defendant was charged with using a knife and you've got to believe that the knife was a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument." "`[T]he portion of the charge here excepted to should be construed in connection with the whole charge of the court.' Ex parte Cowart, 201 Ala. 525 , 78 So. 879 (1918).... `While a particular remark by the trial judge may be open to question, in order for it to amount to the grossly improper

1988These charges were properly refused "because they failed to define the meaning of the word 'accidentally.' " Wakefield v. State , 447 So.2d 1325 , 1327 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

1987Willis , supra. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the defendant and two other men came to Alabama to rob a particular store.

1985III The defendant alleges that his trial counsel was incompetent because he "totally failed to prepare for trial, as evidenced by a last minute request for a continuance", and because he "failed to contact or subpoena *Page 1373 eyewitnesses whose testimony would have exonerated Petitioner." Under the standards and tests of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. ___ , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we find that the defendant has not proven that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

1985III The defendant alleges that his trial counsel was incompetent because he "totally failed to prepare for trial, as evidenced by a last minute request for a continuance", and because he "failed to contact or subpoena *Page 1373 eyewitnesses whose testimony would have exonerated Petitioner." Under the standards and tests of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. ___ , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we find that the defendant has not proven that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

1985The observations of this Court in Wright , 441 So.2d at 996-97 , clearly indicate that action by the trial judge — if requested — could have cured any prejudicial qualities present in the prosecutor's argument. "[I]t is to be observed that injection of the matter into the case by either party for either purpose can often be effectively answered by the other party for the opposite purpose." * * * * * * "Whatever advantage one party in a criminal case may have as to the jury's being informed as to the permissible or likely punishment that the defendant will receive if convicted is offset by the

1983We have carefully examined the judge's complained of remarks and find they fall within the "long-observed rule" that "(i)n the interest of justice, a trial judge is given the authority to pose questions to a witness for the purpose of clarifying the issues for the jury's consideration and to aid in the orderly conduct of the trial process." Richardson v. State , *Page 1331 403 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he solemn and sacred duty of a trial judge — is the development and establishment of the truth, and in this connection it is always permissible for the court, . . . to propound to witnesses suc

1983We have carefully examined the judge's complained of remarks and find they fall within the "long-observed rule" that "(i)n the interest of justice, a trial judge is given the authority to pose questions to a witness for the purpose of clarifying the issues for the jury's consideration and to aid in the orderly conduct of the trial process." Richardson v. State , *Page 1331 403 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he solemn and sacred duty of a trial judge — is the development and establishment of the truth, and in this connection it is always permissible for the court, . . . to propound to witnesses suc

1983III The defendant argues that under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the State was under a constitutional duty to disclose that "the `stocking mask' found by police, if one was found, was not legal evidence." From the record the facts supporting this argument are not abundantly clear.

1983III The defendant argues that under Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Agurs , 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the State was under a constitutional duty to disclose that "the `stocking mask' found by police, if one was found, was not legal evidence." From the record the facts supporting this argument are not abundantly clear.

1983We have carefully examined the judge's complained of remarks and find they fall within the "long-observed rule" that "(i)n the interest of justice, a trial judge is given the authority to pose questions to a witness for the purpose of clarifying the issues for the jury's consideration and to aid in the orderly conduct of the trial process." Richardson v. State , *Page 1331 403 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he solemn and sacred duty of a trial judge — is the development and establishment of the truth, and in this connection it is always permissible for the court, . . . to propound to witnesses suc

1983We have carefully examined the judge's complained of remarks and find they fall within the "long-observed rule" that "(i)n the interest of justice, a trial judge is given the authority to pose questions to a witness for the purpose of clarifying the issues for the jury's consideration and to aid in the orderly conduct of the trial process." Richardson v. State , *Page 1331 403 So.2d 297 (Ala. 1981). "(T)he solemn and sacred duty of a trial judge — is the development and establishment of the truth, and in this connection it is always permissible for the court, . . . to propound to witnesses suc

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).

1983Coleman v. State , 344 So.2d 1249 , 1250 (Ala.Cr.App. 1977).

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).

1983This argument was decided adversely in Watson v. State , 392 So.2d 1274 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 392 So.2d 1280 (Ala. 1981), wherein this Court held that "where two or more convictions occur at the same time and in the same court, they are separate `convictions' within the meaning of the Habitual Offender Statute." See also Chambers v. State , 418 So.2d 948 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Bates v. State , 405 So.2d 1334 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 405 So.2d 1339 (Ala. 1981); Seritt v. State , 401 So.2d 248 *Page 614 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 251 (Ala. 1981).