III defendant in Connecticut

2008The court aptly observed that “a detective in the case thinks this defendant is guilty is not new to anybody, even fledgling jurors.” For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s claim that the court improperly denied her motion for a mistrial cannot succeed. *698 III The defendant’s third claim is that the court improperly instructed the jury on the element of material fact in § 31-290c (a) (2). 20 In her brief, the defendant acknowledges that this claim was not raised at trial and seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2008The court aptly observed that “a detective in the case thinks this defendant is guilty is not new to anybody, even fledgling jurors.” For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s claim that the court improperly denied her motion for a mistrial cannot succeed. *698 III The defendant’s third claim is that the court improperly instructed the jury on the element of material fact in § 31-290c (a) (2). 20 In her brief, the defendant acknowledges that this claim was not raised at trial and seeks review under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989).

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by improperly admitting into evidence Rivera’s two video-recorded interviews with the police under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by improperly admitting into evidence Rivera’s two video-recorded interviews with the police under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by improperly admitting into evidence Rivera’s two video-recorded interviews with the police under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008Because the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, the third prong of Golding has not been satisfied. *299 III The defendant also claims that the court improperly permitted the state to introduce Casella’s signed, prior inconsistent written statement as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by improperly admitting into evidence Rivera’s two video-recorded interviews with the police under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008Because the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, the third prong of Golding has not been satisfied. *299 III The defendant also claims that the court improperly permitted the state to introduce Casella’s signed, prior inconsistent written statement as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by improperly admitting into evidence Rivera’s two video-recorded interviews with the police under State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2008Because the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial, the third prong of Golding has not been satisfied. *299 III The defendant also claims that the court improperly permitted the state to introduce Casella’s signed, prior inconsistent written statement as substantive evidence at trial pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743 , 513 A.2d 86 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 , 107 S. Ct. 597 , 93 L.

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2019The court referenced defense counsel’s point ‘‘that it is important to not confuse the issue of credibility with admissibility,’’ and stated that it was ‘‘fully cognizant of that’’ and ‘‘kept that in mind . . . in making [its] ruling . . . .’’ On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding from evidence Majmudar’s testimony as to Shyam’s state- ment because it was not trustworthy and, therefore, did not satisfy the requirements of § 8-6 (4).24 III The defendant’s third claim on appeal is that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it denied the defendant’

2024Although the defen- dant acknowledges that it is ‘‘constitutionally permissi- ble to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing under certain circumstances,’’ she cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 , 117 S. Ct. 633 , 136 L.

2024Although the defen- dant acknowledges that it is ‘‘constitutionally permissi- ble to consider acquitted conduct at sentencing under certain circumstances,’’ she cites to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 , 117 S. Ct. 633 , 136 L.

1986III The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in failing to give the Secondino charge requested by him. 5 See Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960).

1986III The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in failing to give the Secondino charge requested by him. 5 See Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960).

2019III The defendant finally asserts that, because a court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce and to modify its injunctive orders, the orders of August 5, 2014, could validly be revisited at any time.19 He relies on cases such as Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., 14 Conn. App. 184 , 540 A.2d 704 (1988), for the proposition that the four month rule does not apply to permanent injunctions.

2019III The defendant finally asserts that, because a court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce and to modify its injunctive orders, the orders of August 5, 2014, could validly be revisited at any time.19 He relies on cases such as Hall v. Dichello Distributors, Inc., 14 Conn. App. 184 , 540 A.2d 704 (1988), for the proposition that the four month rule does not apply to permanent injunctions.

2014III The defendant finally claims that the trial court improperly permitted the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge with respect to J.W.,13 an African- American venireperson, in violation of Batson v. Ken- tucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79 .

2010He argues that the court improperly permitted the state to exercise two of its peremptory challenges to remove two African-American venirepersons, G.C. and B.D., [13] from the jury, thereby depriving him of a fair trial in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).

2000“The allegations are entitled to the same favorable construction as a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them . . . and if facts provable under the allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the demurrer [motion to strike] must fail.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). *185 III The defendants argue that this action may not be maintained because Panjabi and Cholewicki are protected by the doctrine of witness immunity.

2000“The allegations are entitled to the same favorable construction as a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them . . . and if facts provable under the allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the demurrer [motion to strike] must fail.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferryman v. Groton, 212 Conn. 138, 142 , 561 A.2d 432 (1989). *185 III The defendants argue that this action may not be maintained because Panjabi and Cholewicki are protected by the doctrine of witness immunity.

1982Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22 , 435 A.2d 24 (1980). *347 III The defendants’ final claim is that the trial court excluded evidence pertinent to the equitable defense of nonforfeiture.

1982Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221-22 , 435 A.2d 24 (1980). *347 III The defendants’ final claim is that the trial court excluded evidence pertinent to the equitable defense of nonforfeiture.

2025III The defendant has convinced a majority of this court to discard this precedent and implement a new balanc- ing test forged under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 685–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

2025III The defendant has convinced a majority of this court to discard this precedent and implement a new balanc- ing test forged under State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 , 685–86, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992).

2025For all the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the court’s denial of the defen- dant’s requests for a thirty or fifteen day continuance constituted an abuse of its discretion.18 III The defendant next claims that the court committed plain error when it failed at the November 6, 2014 hear- ing to advise him of the consequences of failing to 18 ‘‘Because we have concluded that the court did not act unreasonably in denying the defendant’s [continuance requests], we need not engage in harmless error analysis.’’ State v. Patel, 186 Conn. App. 814 , 825 n.4, 201 A.3d 459 , cert. denied, 331

2025For all the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the court’s denial of the defen- dant’s requests for a thirty or fifteen day continuance constituted an abuse of its discretion.18 III The defendant next claims that the court committed plain error when it failed at the November 6, 2014 hear- ing to advise him of the consequences of failing to 18 ‘‘Because we have concluded that the court did not act unreasonably in denying the defendant’s [continuance requests], we need not engage in harmless error analysis.’’ State v. Patel, 186 Conn. App. 814 , 825 n.4, 201 A.3d 459 , cert. denied, 331

2025For all the foregoing reasons, we cannot conclude that the court’s denial of the defen- dant’s requests for a thirty or fifteen day continuance constituted an abuse of its discretion.18 III The defendant next claims that the court committed plain error when it failed at the November 6, 2014 hear- ing to advise him of the consequences of failing to 18 ‘‘Because we have concluded that the court did not act unreasonably in denying the defendant’s [continuance requests], we need not engage in harmless error analysis.’’ State v. Patel, 186 Conn. App. 814 , 825 n.4, 201 A.3d 459 , cert. denied, 331

2025III The defendant next claims that the trial court violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation15 under Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 , 144 S. Ct. 1785 , 219 L.

2025We decline to reach this claim because it is not pre- served for appellate review. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial, and [o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will [an appellate] court consider a claim, constitutional or oth- erwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 643 , 224 A.3d 147 (2020).

2025We decline to reach this claim because it is not pre- served for appellate review. ‘‘It is well settled that [o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly raised at trial, and [o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will [an appellate] court consider a claim, constitutional or oth- erwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jobe v. Commissioner of Correction, 334 Conn. 636, 643 , 224 A.3d 147 (2020).

2023III The defendant’s final claim is that a new trial is required with respect to his conviction of sexual assault in the first degree because that charge was duplicitous and violated his sixth amendment right to jury unanim- ity in light of this court’s recent decisions in State v. Douglas C., supra, 345 Conn. 421 , and State v. Joseph V., supra, 345 Conn. 516 .

2021Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that defense counsel was making a missing witness argument under Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960), overruled in part by State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722 , 737 A.2d 442 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170 , 120 S. Ct. 1195 , 145 L.

2021Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that defense counsel was making a missing witness argument under Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960), overruled in part by State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722 , 737 A.2d 442 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170 , 120 S. Ct. 1195 , 145 L.

2021Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that defense counsel was making a missing witness argument under Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147 Conn. 672 , 165 A.2d 598 (1960), overruled in part by State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722 , 737 A.2d 442 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170 , 120 S. Ct. 1195 , 145 L.