III issue in California

2023(People v. Babylon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 719, 722 [“absent a saving clause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of his appeal”].) III At issue in this case is what constitutes finality for purposes of a juvenile delinquency case.

2023In an adult criminal proceeding, finality occurs for purposes of the Estrada rule “when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5 ; People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“an amendatory statute applies in ‘ “any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it” ’ ”]; see also Clay v. United States (2003) 537 U.S. 522, 527 [recognizing that “[f]

2023In an adult criminal proceeding, finality occurs for purposes of the Estrada rule “when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5 ; People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“an amendatory statute applies in ‘ “any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it” ’ ”]; see also Clay v. United States (2003) 537 U.S. 522, 527 [recognizing that “[f]

2023In an adult criminal proceeding, finality occurs for purposes of the Estrada rule “when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5 ; People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“an amendatory statute applies in ‘ “any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it” ’ ”]; see also Clay v. United States (2003) 537 U.S. 522, 527 [recognizing that “[f]

2023In an adult criminal proceeding, finality occurs for purposes of the Estrada rule “when the availability of an appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 876, fn. 5 ; People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 [“an amendatory statute applies in ‘ “any [criminal] proceeding [that], at the time of the supervening legislation, has not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it” ’ ”]; see also Clay v. United States (2003) 537 U.S. 522, 527 [recognizing that “[f]

2014(Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1235 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 878 ] (Romadka).) But in this case, we need not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion because the voluntary dismissal is not void. 4 (Cruz, at pp. 495-496.) III The issue before us is whether real parties in interest’s voluntary dismissal of this action is “void” under section 473, subdivision (d).

2014(Romadka v. Hoge (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1231, 1235 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 878 ] (Romadka).) But in this case, we need not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion because the voluntary dismissal is not void. 4 (Cruz, at pp. 495-496.) III The issue before us is whether real parties in interest’s voluntary dismissal of this action is “void” under section 473, subdivision (d).

2013(See People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 565 [holding that the prosecution in a capital murder case ―should allege only one multiple-murder 6 special circumstance,‖ no matter the number of murder counts it brings against the defendant].) III At issue here is whether defendant was twice placed in jeopardy with respect to the multiple-victim allegation.

2004III The issue that primarily divides the majority opinion from this separate opinion and from the Ninth Circuit decisions in Brewster v. Shasta County, supra, 275 F.3d 803 , and Streit v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 236 F.3d 552 , is one of federal, rather than California, law.

2004I believe that under the United States Supreme Court's decisions establishing state sovereign immunity from section 1983 liability, the state's potential legal liability for torts of a local government office is a critical factor in deciding whether or not that office is an arm of the state. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 789 , 117 S.Ct. 1734 ; Hess, supra, 513 U.S. at p. 48 , 115 S.Ct. 394 ; Will, supra, 491 U.S. at p. 70 , 109 S.Ct. 2304 ; see also Brewster v. Shasta County, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 808 ; Streit v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 236 F.3d at p. 562 .) The majority opinion doe

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

2000III The issue that we address on review is whether the California Plum Marketing Program, issued by the California Secretary of Food and Agriculture pursuant to the CMA, implicates Gerawan's right to freedom of speech under either the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I of the California Constitution by compelling funding of generic advertising. [3] A In the Bill of Rights, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution has stated since its ratification in 1791: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press...." (U.S. Const.,

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter "large-scale" crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great. ( People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 949, 959 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 1 ]; People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 452, 459 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 364 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d 529 .) Here, the county paid codefendant Ac

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter "large-scale" crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great. ( People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 949, 959 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 1 ]; People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 452, 459 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 364 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d 529 .) Here, the county paid codefendant Ac

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter “large-scale” crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great.

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter “large-scale” crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great.

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter "large-scale" crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great. ( People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 949, 959 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 1 ]; People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 452, 459 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 364 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d 529 .) Here, the county paid codefendant Ac

1993(See generally, People v. Ramirez (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 529, 539 [ 167 Cal. Rptr. 174 ]; Cassou & Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers Game (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 5, 44-45.) Decisions construing the statute have concluded that its purpose is to deter "large-scale" crime by imposing an increase in punishment when the property loss is great. ( People v. Kellett (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 949, 959 [ 185 Cal. Rptr. 1 ]; People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 452, 459 [ 169 Cal. Rptr. 364 ]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 109 Cal. App.3d 529 .) Here, the county paid codefendant Ac

1987In analyzing whether the abandonment breaks the causal connection between the detention and the act of abandonment, courts have examined the facts to determine whether the action was “ ‘ “sufficiently an act of free will.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 314, 319 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 ].) That is, “‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ [Citation.]” (Wong Sun v. Unite

1987In analyzing whether the abandonment breaks the causal connection between the detention and the act of abandonment, courts have examined the facts to determine whether the action was “ ‘ “sufficiently an act of free will.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 314, 319 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 ].) That is, “‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ [Citation.]” (Wong Sun v. Unite

1987In analyzing whether the abandonment breaks the causal connection between the detention and the act of abandonment, courts have examined the facts to determine whether the action was “ ‘ “sufficiently an act of free will.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 314, 319 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 ].) That is, “‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ [Citation.]” (Wong Sun v. Unite

1987In analyzing whether the abandonment breaks the causal connection between the detention and the act of abandonment, courts have examined the facts to determine whether the action was “ ‘ “sufficiently an act of free will.” ’ ” (Taylor v. Alabama (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 314, 319 , 102 S.Ct. 2664 ].) That is, “‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ [Citation.]” (Wong Sun v. Unite

1979(Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 370 [ 110 P.2d 58 ]; see also Gray v. Robinson (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 182 [ 91 P.2d 194 ].) III The defendant contends that the award of $90,000 exemplary damages to Ms. Zhadan is excessive since it does not bear a reasonable relation either to actual damage or to the defendant’s wealth and therefore must have resulted solely from the passion or prejudice of the jury.

1979(Walling v. Kimball (1941) 17 Cal.2d 364, 370 [ 110 P.2d 58 ]; see also Gray v. Robinson (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 177, 182 [ 91 P.2d 194 ].) III The defendant contends that the award of $90,000 exemplary damages to Ms. Zhadan is excessive since it does not bear a reasonable relation either to actual damage or to the defendant’s wealth and therefore must have resulted solely from the passion or prejudice of the jury.