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29 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chicone v. Statered2 sentences2005As the Florida Supreme Court in Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743-44 (Fla.1996), confirmed, we will ordinarily presume, absent an express indication of a contrary intent, that the Legislature intends a statute defining a criminal violation to contain a mens rea requirement, even when expressly silent on the subject. "[A]n express provision dispensing with guilty knowledge will always control, of course, since in that instance the Legislature will have made its intent clear," but in the absence of such a provision, a criminal statute will be presumed to include a broad applicable scienter re 2005The Court then concluded that the relevant statutes "are more akin to offenses that presume a scienter requirement" because of the substantial criminal penalties imposed, Chicone, 684 So.2d at 742-43 , and held: We believe it was the intent of the legislature to prohibit the knowing possession of illicit items and to prevent persons from doing so by attaching a substantial criminal penalty to such conduct. | 5 | 11 |
MC v. Stategreen2 sentences2003(Emphasis added.) This statute contains a specific scienter requirement and prohibits acts which are "specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede the progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on a school's property." M.C. v. State, 695 So.2d 477, 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (emphasis added); see also T.H. v. State, 797 So.2d at 1292 . 2003(Emphasis added.) This statute contains a specific scienter requirement and prohibits acts which are “specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede the progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on a school’s property.” M.C. v. State, 695 So.2d 477, 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (emphasis added); see also T.H. v. State, 797 So.2d at 1292 . | 3 | 3 |
Screws v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. 1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Giorgettigreen2 sentences2007See State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512 (Fla.2004). 2005State v. Giorgetti, 868 So.2d 512, 516 (Fla.2004); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-252 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)("[a]s the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject [of mens rea or intent], their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. | 2 | 2 |
TH v. Stategreen2 sentences2003(Emphasis added.) This statute contains a specific scienter requirement and prohibits acts which are "specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede the progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on a school's property." M.C. v. State, 695 So.2d 477, 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (emphasis added); see also T.H. v. State, 797 So.2d at 1292 . 2003(Emphasis added.) This statute contains a specific scienter requirement and prohibits acts which are “specifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede the progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on a school’s property.” M.C. v. State, 695 So.2d 477, 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (emphasis added); see also T.H. v. State, 797 So.2d at 1292 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. 1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. | 2 | 2 |
Morissette v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002In United States v. X-Citement Video Inc., 513 U.S. 64 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994), the Court held that the child pornography statute was "more akin to the common-law offenses against the `state, the person, property, or public morals,' [citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ] that presume a scienter requirement in the absence of express contrary intent." 513 U.S. at 71-72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 . 2002In United States v. X-Citement Video Inc., 513 U.S. 64 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994), the Court held that the child pornography statute was "more akin to the common-law offenses against the `state, the person, property, or public morals,' [citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 255 , 72 S.Ct. 240 ] that presume a scienter requirement in the absence of express contrary intent." 513 U.S. at 71-72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 . | 1 | 2 |
CK v. Stategreen1 sentence2017K. v. State, 850 So.2d 636, 637 (Fla. 1st DGA 2003) (“This statute contains a specific scienter requirement ....”) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Schmitt v. Stategreen2 sentences2012In Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 413 (Fla.1991), we concluded that “a due process violation occurs if a criminal statute’s means is not rationally related to its purposes and, as a result, it criminalizes innocuous conduct.” Specifically, we considered a statute prohibiting the possession of a depiction involving “actual physical contact with a [minor] person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.” Id. at 408 (quoting § 827.071(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987)). 2012In Schmitt v. State, 590 So.2d 404, 413 (Fla.1991), we concluded that “a due process violation occurs if a criminal statute’s means is not rationally related to its purposes and, as a result, it criminalizes innocuous conduct.” Specifically, we considered a statute prohibiting the possession of a depiction involving “actual physical contact with a [minor] person’s clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or if such person is a female, breast.” Id. at 408 (quoting § 827.071(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1987)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Confortigreen1 sentence2001See, e.g., State v. Conforti, 688 So.2d 350, 356 (Fla. 4th DCA) (holding that section 796.07(l)(b) is facially constitutional), cert. denied, 697 So.2d 509 (Fla.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Capital City Country Club v. Tuckergreen1 sentence2001See Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla.1993) (“If it is reasonably possible to do so, we are obligated to interpret statutes in such a manner as to uphold their constitutionality.”); State v. Gale Distribs., 349 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla.1977) (“[The courts] ha[ve] a duty, if reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute, in favor of its constitutionality and to construe it so as not to conflict with the Constitution.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gale Distributors, Inc.green1 sentence2001See Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So.2d 448, 452 (Fla.1993) (“If it is reasonably possible to do so, we are obligated to interpret statutes in such a manner as to uphold their constitutionality.”); State v. Gale Distribs., 349 So.2d 150, 153 (Fla.1977) (“[The courts] ha[ve] a duty, if reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the validity of a statute, in favor of its constitutionality and to construe it so as not to conflict with the Constitution.”). | 1 | 1 |
Frank v. Stategreen1 sentence1998The Chicone court also reiterated what Judge Wigginton stated in Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117, 121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967): Scienter ... is not a mere technicality in the law, but a legal principle which must be observed in order to safeguard innocent persons from being made the victims of unlawful acts perpetrated by others, and of which they have no knowledge. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Munozgreen1 sentence1997See id. [8] Indeed, the state candidly concedes in its brief that the absence of a scienter requirement is a necessary law enforcement tool. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colautti v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2001Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the statute is little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.’ United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374, 379 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942).”); Women’s Med. 2001Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the statute is little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.’ United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374, 379 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942).”); Women’s Med. | 3 | 1982–2001 |
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012The Supreme Court explained that because nonobscene, sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of seventeen are protected by the First Amendment, “a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts,” and it was “therefore incumbent upon [the court] to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id. at 78 , 115 S.Ct. 464 . 2012The Supreme Court explained that because nonobscene, sexually explicit materials involving persons over the age of seventeen are protected by the First Amendment, “a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the performers would raise serious constitutional doubts,” and it was “therefore incumbent upon [the court] to read the statute to eliminate those doubts so long as such a reading is not plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Id. at 78 , 115 S.Ct. 464 . | 2 | 2002–2012 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Although "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice," Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , there is no need for a specific intent requirement here. 2005Although "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice," Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 , there is no need for a specific intent requirement here. | 2 | 1995–2005 |
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Walter D. Miller
green
2 sentences2001Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 , 206 (6th Cir.1997) ("Without a scienter requirement, the Act does not adequately notify a physician that certain conduct is prohibited; rather, a physician may be held criminally and civilly liable for adhering to his or her own best medical judgment."); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 , 1465 (8th Cir.1995) ("[W]ithout a scienter requirement, this strict criminal-liability statute will have a `profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions.' It thus creates a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to have a p 2001Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 , 206 (6th Cir.1997) (“Without a scienter requirement, the Act does not adequately notify a physician that certain conduct is prohibited; rather, a physician may be held criminally and civilly liable for adhering to his or her own best medical judgment.”); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 , 1465 (8th Cir.1995) (“[Wjithout a scienter requirement, this strict criminal-liability statute will have a ‘profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions.’ It thus creates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a p | 2 | 2001–2001 |
United States v. Ragen
green
2 sentences2001Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the statute is little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.’ United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374, 379 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942).”); Women’s Med. 2001Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“Because of the absence of a scienter requirement in the provision directing the physician to determine whether the fetus is or may be viable, the statute is little more than ‘a trap for those who act in good faith.’ United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374, 379 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942).”); Women’s Med. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich
green
2 sentences2001Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 , 206 (6th Cir.1997) ("Without a scienter requirement, the Act does not adequately notify a physician that certain conduct is prohibited; rather, a physician may be held criminally and civilly liable for adhering to his or her own best medical judgment."); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 , 1465 (8th Cir.1995) ("[W]ithout a scienter requirement, this strict criminal-liability statute will have a `profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions.' It thus creates a substantial obstacle to a woman's right to have a p 2001Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 , 206 (6th Cir.1997) (“Without a scienter requirement, the Act does not adequately notify a physician that certain conduct is prohibited; rather, a physician may be held criminally and civilly liable for adhering to his or her own best medical judgment.”); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 , 1465 (8th Cir.1995) (“[Wjithout a scienter requirement, this strict criminal-liability statute will have a ‘profound chilling effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions.’ It thus creates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a p | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States
green
2 sentences1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. 1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
People v. Pieri
green
2 sentences1997Laws, c.40, was sustained in People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315 , 199 N.E. 495 on the basis of performing the acts forbidden while harboring an evil intent. 1997Laws, c.40, was sustained in People v. Pieri, 269 N.Y. 315 , 199 N.E. 495 on the basis of performing the acts forbidden while harboring an evil intent. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville
green
2 sentences1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. 1997See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 , 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); see also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 , 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2877-78 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978) (upholding federal criminal antitrust statute which had a scienter requirement); Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 , 72 S.Ct. 329, 331-32 , 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952) (commerce regulation not unconstitutionally vague where requirement of culpable intent is necessary element of offense); Cf. Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 163 , 92 S.Ct. 839, 843-44 , 31 L.Ed. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Wolland
green
1 sentence2005As the Florida Supreme Court in Chicone v. State, 684 So.2d 736, 743-44 (Fla.1996), confirmed, we will ordinarily presume, absent an express indication of a contrary intent, that the Legislature intends a statute defining a criminal violation to contain a mens rea requirement, even when expressly silent on the subject. "[A]n express provision dispensing with guilty knowledge will always control, of course, since in that instance the Legislature will have made its intent clear," but in the absence of such a provision, a criminal statute will be presumed to include a broad applicable scienter re | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. DeLeo
green
1 sentence1995In State v. DeLeo, 356 So.2d 306 (Fla. 1978), the defendant was charged with official misconduct under section 839.25(1)(c), Florida Statutes. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1993Before an arrest may be made under the ordinance, the police must establish probable cause that the unlawful intent to engage in prostitution-related activities exists by pointing to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 1993Before an arrest may be made under the ordinance, the police must establish probable cause that the unlawful intent to engage in prostitution-related activities exists by pointing to "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Bailey
green
1 sentence1980State v. Bailey, 360 So.2d 772 (Fla. 1978). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.