scienter requirement in Maryland

2006By the act, Congress amended certain provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to `add a scienter requirement as a condition to the imposition of penalties for most of the unlawful acts defined in § 922.' Id. at 187-88[, 118 S.Ct. at 1943 , 141 L.Ed.2d at 197 ].

2006By the act, Congress amended certain provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 to `add a scienter requirement as a condition to the imposition of penalties for most of the unlawful acts defined in § 922.' Id. at 187-88[, 118 S.Ct. at 1943 , 141 L.Ed.2d at 197 ].

2022In a question of first impression, did the [circuit] court err by giving a jury instruction that omitted a scienter requirement for the offenses charged, contrary to the holding of Rehaif v. United States, [ 588 U.S. ____ ,] 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), on the presumptions in law in the equivalent Federal Statute, the Rule of Lenity, and this Court’s decisions in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 [, 547 A.2d 1041 ] (1988) and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 [, 903 A.2d 388 ] (2006)? 2.

2022In a question of first impression, did the [circuit] court err by giving a jury instruction that omitted a scienter requirement for the offenses charged, contrary to the holding of Rehaif v. United States, [ 588 U.S. ____ ,] 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), on the presumptions in law in the equivalent Federal Statute, the Rule of Lenity, and this Court’s decisions in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 [, 547 A.2d 1041 ] (1988) and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 [, 903 A.2d 388 ] (2006)? 2.

2022In a question of first impression, did the [circuit] court err by giving a jury instruction that omitted a scienter requirement for the offenses charged, contrary to the holding of Rehaif v. United States, [ 588 U.S. ____ ,] 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), on the presumptions in law in the equivalent Federal Statute, the Rule of Lenity, and this Court’s decisions in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 [, 547 A.2d 1041 ] (1988) and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 [, 903 A.2d 388 ] (2006)? 2.

2022In a question of first impression, did the [circuit] court err by giving a jury instruction that omitted a scienter requirement for the offenses charged, contrary to the holding of Rehaif v. United States, [ 588 U.S. ____ ,] 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), on the presumptions in law in the equivalent Federal Statute, the Rule of Lenity, and this Court’s decisions in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 [, 547 A.2d 1041 ] (1988) and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 [, 903 A.2d 388 ] (2006)? 2.

2022In a question of first impression, did the [circuit] court err by giving a jury instruction that omitted a scienter requirement for the offenses charged, contrary to the holding of Rehaif v. United States, [ 588 U.S. ____ ,] 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), on the presumptions in law in the equivalent Federal Statute, the Rule of Lenity, and this Court’s decisions in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638 [, 547 A.2d 1041 ] (1988) and Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431 [, 903 A.2d 388 ] (2006)? 2.

2022Under the facts of [Petitioner Howling’s] case, in which no evidence was adduced that [Petitioner Howling] was previously notified by government authorities that he was prohibited from possessing a regulated firearm in Maryland, did the [circuit] court err in giving the pre-Rehaif pattern jury instructions lacking scienter requirements? 3 [3.] In a matter of first impression, did [the Court of Special Appeals] err by holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict Petitioner [Abongnelah] of illegally possessing a regulated firearm where the State failed to prove he had knowledge of his pro

2019In applying this precedent, Mr. Junek posited in his brief that "[c]hild neglect has been described as a form of child abuse[,]" and that "it is illogical to impose a scienter requirement for child abuse but not for child neglect." In support of this contention, Mr. Junek further points to Owens v. Prince George's County Department of Social Services , in which the Court of Special Appeals upheld a finding of indicated child neglect based on a guardian's intentional act of ordering the child from the home and refusing to allow the child to return. 182 Md.

2019App. 31 , 54, 957 A.2d 191 , 204 (2008).

2016Citing to Larocca, 164 Md.App. at 485 , 883 A.2d at 1001 , the State asserts that “it is not whether the witness is a party that makes the difference, rather it is whether the witness is ‘neutral,’ ie.[,] whether the witness has an established bias or relationship with the parties.” The Corroboration Rule and Sufficiency of Evidence There was insufficient evidence on the record to submit this case to the jury for a trial.

2016Citing to Larocca, 164 Md.App. at 485 , 883 A.2d at 1001 , the State asserts that “it is not whether the witness is a party that makes the difference, rather it is whether the witness is ‘neutral,’ ie.[,] whether the witness has an established bias or relationship with the parties.” The Corroboration Rule and Sufficiency of Evidence There was insufficient evidence on the record to submit this case to the jury for a trial.

2014Appel *278 lant cites to Taylor v. Harford County Department of Social Services, in which the Court of Appeals determined that, “where an act by a parent or caregiver is injurious to that person’s child, and the injury was unintentional, under Title 5 of the Family Law Article and COMAR 07.02.07.12, the injurious act should not constitute ‘indicated’ child physical abuse unless it can be shown to have been reckless conduct.” 384 Md. 213, 216 , 862 A.2d 1026 (2004) (emphasis added).

2014Appel *278 lant cites to Taylor v. Harford County Department of Social Services, in which the Court of Appeals determined that, “where an act by a parent or caregiver is injurious to that person’s child, and the injury was unintentional, under Title 5 of the Family Law Article and COMAR 07.02.07.12, the injurious act should not constitute ‘indicated’ child physical abuse unless it can be shown to have been reckless conduct.” 384 Md. 213, 216 , 862 A.2d 1026 (2004) (emphasis added).

2014Appellant claims that without a scienter requirement, the sphere of parental action that could cause abuse by mental injury would become unconscionably vast: Likewise, the parent’s choice of the wrong school, public or private, or insistence on home schooling, could be indicated child abuse if some agency-appointed physician, psychologist, or social worker disagreed and opined that such had caused an “impairment” of the child’s “mental or psychological ability to function.” Appellant asserts that, under In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003), such a broad application of the State’s p

2014Appellant claims that without a scienter requirement, the sphere of parental action that could cause abuse by mental injury would become unconscionably vast: Likewise, the parent’s choice of the wrong school, public or private, or insistence on home schooling, could be indicated child abuse if some agency-appointed physician, psychologist, or social worker disagreed and opined that such had caused an “impairment” of the child’s “mental or psychological ability to function.” Appellant asserts that, under In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551 , 819 A.2d 1030 (2003), such a broad application of the State’s p

2013Id. at 549-53, 817 A.2d 885 .

2012Multiple constitutional issues and other arguments were raised by pit bull advocates 21 in a challenge to a pit bull strict liability statute in the case of The Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. et al. v. The City and County of Denver, 820 P.2d 644 (Colo.1991).

2012The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed and upheld the conviction, and noted further, as related to the basic scienter requirement under the statute, that all that was required to be shown was that the pit bulls had attacked without provocation and the owner knew “that the dogs he owned were pit bulls.” Id.

2008Chief Judge Robert Murphy, writing for the Court, contrasted the Section under scrutiny, Section 419A (c), with Sections 419A (b) and (d) of Article 27, penalizing, respectively, soliciting, causing to induce, or permitting a minor to engage, as the subject, in the production of. any obscene matter, and promoting, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute any matter depicting a minor engaged, as a subject, in sexual *431 conduct, which each contained knowingly requirements and concluded that the absence of such a scienter requirement reflected a “purposeful design.” Id. at 44 ,

2008Chief Judge Robert Murphy, writing for the Court, contrasted the Section under scrutiny, Section 419A (c), with Sections 419A (b) and (d) of Article 27, penalizing, respectively, soliciting, causing to induce, or permitting a minor to engage, as the subject, in the production of. any obscene matter, and promoting, distributing, or possessing with the intent to distribute any matter depicting a minor engaged, as a subject, in sexual *431 conduct, which each contained knowingly requirements and concluded that the absence of such a scienter requirement reflected a “purposeful design.” Id. at 44 ,

1994Id.

1994Id.

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F.Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla.1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, “does not concern the age of the child”); United States v. Reedy, 632 F.Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla.1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that “the' federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age”).

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F. Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla. 1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, "does not concern the age of the child"); United States v. Reedy, 632 F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla. 1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that "the federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age").

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F.Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla.1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, “does not concern the age of the child”); United States v. Reedy, 632 F.Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla.1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that “the' federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age”).

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F. Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla. 1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, "does not concern the age of the child"); United States v. Reedy, 632 F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla. 1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that "the federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age").

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F.Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla.1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, “does not concern the age of the child”); United States v. Reedy, 632 F.Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla.1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that “the' federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age”).

1994See United States v. Kleiner, 663 F. Supp. 43, 44 (S.D.Fla. 1987) (holding that the knowledge element, located in the federal crime that prohibits the shipment or transportation of child pornography in interstate commerce, "does not concern the age of the child"); United States v. Reedy, 632 F. Supp. 1415, 1422 (W.D.Okla. 1986), aff'd, 845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 , 109 S.Ct. 1318 , 103 L.Ed.2d 587 (1989) (stating that "the federal child pornography law does not require that a defendant intend to or knowingly employ ... a child below eighteen years of age").

1988Even though the statutes are silent as to a scienter requirement, most of these jurisdictions have, by judicial decision, determined that knowledge is an element *647 of the crime of possession. 7 For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama in Walker v. State, supra, 356 So.2d at 673-674 , held that knowledge was an element of the crime of possession under the Alabama Controlled Substances Act.