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11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Coloradogreen2 sentences2022See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 463 (7th Cir. 1999). 2022See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 463 (7th Cir. 1999). | 2 | 3 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2022Accordingly, by virtue of Utah Code section 76-2-102, the enticement provision has a scienter provision. ¶44 And in any event, although the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), it “has never suggested that the absence of a mens rea requirement, by itself, renders a statute 20121040-CA 20 2022 UT App 39 State v. Ray unconstitutional,” Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). 2022Accordingly, by virtue of Utah Code section 76-2-102, the enticement provision has a scienter provision. ¶44 And in any event, although the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), it “has never suggested that the absence of a mens rea requirement, by itself, renders a statute unconstitutional,” Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). | 2 | 3 |
Hotel & Motel Ass'n v. City of Oaklandgreen2 sentences2022Accordingly, by virtue of Utah Code section 76-2-102, the enticement provision has a scienter provision. ¶44 And in any event, although the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), it “has never suggested that the absence of a mens rea requirement, by itself, renders a statute 20121040-CA 20 2022 UT App 39 State v. Ray unconstitutional,” Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). 2022Accordingly, by virtue of Utah Code section 76-2-102, the enticement provision has a scienter provision. ¶44 And in any event, although the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), it “has never suggested that the absence of a mens rea requirement, by itself, renders a statute unconstitutional,” Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). | 2 | 2 |
Karlin v. Foustgreen2 sentences2022See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 463 (7th Cir. 1999). 2022See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000); Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 463 (7th Cir. 1999). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Morgan Chase Woodsgreen1 sentence2021See United States v. Woods, 684 F.3d 1045, 1060 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that the scienter requirement “eliminates the possibility that an unwitting downloader of child pornography” would be convicted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Christopher Myersgreen1 sentence2021As a result, federal courts “have reasoned that the mere presence of illicit materials in a computer’s temporary internet cache, standing alone, is insufficient to establish knowing receipt, given that the files could have been saved there without the user’s knowledge.” United States v. Myers, 560 F. App’x 184, 186 (4th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). | 1 | 1 |
LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partnersgreen1 sentence2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 1 |
Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc.green1 sentence2018This interpretation of § 1692e renders § 1692k(c) superfluous. “[B]y immunizing a debt collector for an unintentional violation where reasonable error-avoidance procedures have been employed, § 1692k(c) indicates that a violation of the FDCPA does not have to be intentional in the first place.” 46 So “[a]n interpretation of the FDCPA that required an intentional violation would, of course, render this language pure surplusage.” 47 In other words, “reading a scienter requirement into portions of the FDCPA that do not specify that knowledge or intent is required would render the affirmative bona | 1 | 1 |
cluster 795490green2 sentences2018This interpretation of § 1692e renders § 1692k(c) superfluous. “[B]y immunizing a debt collector for an unintentional violation where reasonable error-avoidance procedures have been employed, § 1692k(c) indicates that a violation of the FDCPA does not have to be intentional in the first place.” 46 So “[a]n interpretation of the FDCPA that required an intentional violation would, of course, render this language pure surplusage.” 47 In other words, “reading a scienter requirement into portions of the FDCPA that do not specify that knowledge or intent is required would render the affirmative bona 2018This interpretation of § 1692e renders § 1692k(c) superfluous. “[B]y immunizing a debt collector for an unintentional violation where reasonable error-avoidance procedures have been employed, § 1692k(c) indicates that a violation of the FDCPA does not have to be intentional in the first place.” 46 So “[a]n interpretation of the FDCPA that required an intentional violation would, of course, render this language pure surplusage.” 47 In other words, “reading a scienter requirement into portions of the FDCPA that do not specify that knowledge or intent is required would render the affirmative bona | 1 | 1 |
Glover v. Federal Deposit Insurancegreen1 sentence2018This interpretation of § 1692e renders § 1692k(c) superfluous. “[B]y immunizing a debt collector for an unintentional violation where reasonable error-avoidance procedures have been employed, § 1692k(c) indicates that a violation of the FDCPA does not have to be intentional in the first place.” 46 So “[a]n interpretation of the FDCPA that required an intentional violation would, of course, render this language pure surplusage.” 47 In other words, “reading a scienter requirement into portions of the FDCPA that do not specify that knowledge or intent is required would render the affirmative bona | 1 | 1 |
McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, LLCgreen1 sentence2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 1 |
Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLCgreen1 sentence2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 1 |
Freytag v. Commissionergreen1 sentence2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 1 |
Chaney v. Dreyfus Service Corp.green1 sentence2015Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 241 (5th Cir.2010) ("[Als a general rule, where an essentially subjective state of mind is an element of a cause of action we have declined to allow this element to be met by a corporation's collective knowledge, instead requiring that the state of mind actually exist in at least one individual. ..." (internal quotation marks omitted)); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F.Supp. 256, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (the collective knowledge of various employees may not be used to satisfy the scienter requirement of a fraud claim against a corporation). 128 Al | 1 | 1 |
First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Standard & Poor's Corp.green1 sentence2015Corp., 595 F.3d 219, 241 (5th Cir.2010) ("[Als a general rule, where an essentially subjective state of mind is an element of a cause of action we have declined to allow this element to be met by a corporation's collective knowledge, instead requiring that the state of mind actually exist in at least one individual. ..." (internal quotation marks omitted)); First Equity Corp. of Fla. v. Standard & Poor's Corp., 690 F.Supp. 256, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (the collective knowledge of various employees may not be used to satisfy the scienter requirement of a fraud claim against a corporation). 128 Al | 1 | 1 |
Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc.green1 sentence2000See 974 P.2d at 294 . | 1 | 1 |
Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commissiongreen2 sentences1999See 446 U.S. at 699-700 , 100 S.Ct. 1945 . 1999See 446 U.S. at 699-700 , 100 S.Ct. 1945 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. MacGuire
green
2 sentences2022Additionally, “because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 32 , 84 P.3d 1171 . ¶42 Ray contends that Gallegos is distinguishable because our Supreme Court also noted that “any concern about lack of notice is ameliorated by the fact that [Utah Code section 76-4-401] contains a scienter requirement, i.e., that the person must ‘knowingly’ solicit a minor,” 2009 UT 42 , ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified), and because the statute at issue in that case “prohibits an in 2022Additionally, “because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 32 , 84 P.3d 1171 . ¶42 Ray contends that Gallegos is distinguishable because our Supreme Court also noted that “any concern about lack of notice is ameliorated by the fact that [Utah Code section 76-4-401] contains a scienter requirement, i.e., that the person must ‘knowingly’ solicit a minor,” 2009 UT 42 , ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified), and because the statute at issue in that case “prohibits an in | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Gallegos
green
2 sentences2022Additionally, “because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 32 , 84 P.3d 1171 . ¶42 Ray contends that Gallegos is distinguishable because our Supreme Court also noted that “any concern about lack of notice is ameliorated by the fact that [Utah Code section 76-4-401] contains a scienter requirement, i.e., that the person must ‘knowingly’ solicit a minor,” 2009 UT 42 , ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified), and because the statute at issue in that case “prohibits an in 2022Additionally, “because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 32 , 84 P.3d 1171 . ¶42 Ray contends that Gallegos is distinguishable because our Supreme Court also noted that “any concern about lack of notice is ameliorated by the fact that [Utah Code section 76-4-401] contains a scienter requirement, i.e., that the person must ‘knowingly’ solicit a minor,” 2009 UT 42 , ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified), and because the statute at issue in that case “prohibits an in | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Ray
green
2 sentences2022The Court merely added in a footnote that “moreover, any concern about lack of notice is 20121040-CA 21 2022 UT App 95 State v. Ray ameliorated by the fact that the [statute] contains a scienter requirement.” Id. ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified). ¶45 Second, turning to Ray’s assertions that Gallegos is distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the enticement provision does not require “enticement to engage in illegal sex,” Ray does not elaborate on this argument other than to reiterate that “underlying crimes are absent” in the enticement provision. 2022Additionally, “because the meaning of the term is readily ascertainable, its inclusion does not encourage or facilitate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, ¶ 32 , 84 P.3d 1171 . ¶42 Ray contends that Gallegos is distinguishable because our Supreme Court also noted that “any concern about lack of notice is ameliorated by the fact that [Utah Code section 76-4-401] contains a scienter requirement, i.e., that the person must ‘knowingly’ solicit a minor,” 2009 UT 42 , ¶ 16 n.1 (quotation simplified), and because the statute at issue in that case “prohibits an in | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Ray
green
1 sentence2022Accordingly, by virtue of Utah Code section 76-2-102, the enticement provision has a scienter provision. ¶44 And in any event, although the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness,” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982), it “has never suggested that the absence of a mens rea requirement, by itself, renders a statute 20121040-CA 20 2022 UT App 39 State v. Ray unconstitutional,” Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 973 (9th Cir. 2003). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou 2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Thornton
green
1 sentence2018Fla. 2000) (citation omitted). 49 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 877 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 11 , 368 P.3d 846 (“[W]e avoid ‘[a]ny interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous’ in order to ‘give effect to every word of a statute.’” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 50See, e.g., Stratton v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 770 F.3d 443 , 448–49 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The FDCPA is a strict-liability statute: A plaintiff does not need to prove knowledge or intent.”); McCollou | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Madsen v. Borthick
green
1 sentence2001Such an interpretation "ignore[s] our fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute." Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 , 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
New York v. Ferber
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 765 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 . 18 With this guidance in mind, we now turn to the issue before us. 2001Id. at 765 , 102 S.Ct. 3348 . 18 With this guidance in mind, we now turn to the issue before us. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Temby
green
1 sentence1993As a policy argument for his position, Larsen argues that without a scienter requirement section 61-1-1(2) raises the specter of follow [Hochfelder].” Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.