Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.green2 sentences2023Following the Supreme Court’s lead, this court, sitting en banc, has made clear that “‘[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent 27 conduct.’” Perez Hernandez v. United States, 286 A.3d 990 , 1001 (D.C. 2022) (en banc) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Carrell, 165 A.3d at 321 . 2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). | 5 | 7 |
Elonis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). 2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). | 4 | 4 |
Staples v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement ... applies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (“[Different elements of the same offense can require different mental states.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405-06 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement ... applies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (“[Different elements of the same offense can require different mental states.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405-06 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 | 2 | 3 |
Nelson v. Carrollgreen2 sentences2022See also Nelson v. Carroll, 735 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Md. 1999) (civil action for battery; “a purely accidental touching, or one caused by mere inadvertence, is not enough to establish the intent requirement for battery”); Model Penal Code § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”). 15 Of course, as discussed above, the statute itself does not specify the elements of assault. 2022See also Nelson v. Carroll, 735 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Md. 1999) (civil action for battery; “a purely accidental touching, or one caused by mere inadvertence, is not enough to establish the intent requirement for battery”); Model Penal Code § 2.01(1) (“A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.”). 15 Of course, as discussed above, the statute itself does not specify the elements of assault. | 2 | 2 |
Frye v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). 2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, ―[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement . . . appl[ies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.‖ Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994) (―[D]ifferent elements of the same offense can require different mental states.‖); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 405–06 (1980) (―Clear analysis requires that the question of the kind 15 See also Liparota 2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, ―[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement . . . appl[ies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.‖ Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994) (―[D]ifferent elements of the same offense can require different mental states.‖); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 405–06 (1980) (―Clear analysis requires that the question of the kind 15 See also Liparota | 2 | 2 |
Liparota v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, ―[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement . . . appl[ies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.‖ Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994) (―[D]ifferent elements of the same offense can require different mental states.‖); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 405–06 (1980) (―Clear analysis requires that the question of the kind 15 See also Liparota 2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, ―[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement . . . appl[ies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.‖ Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 (1994) (―[D]ifferent elements of the same offense can require different mental states.‖); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 , 405–06 (1980) (―Clear analysis requires that the question of the kind 15 See also Liparota | 2 | 2 |
Lee Carrell v. United States (Revised Version)green1 sentence2023Following the Supreme Court’s lead, this court, sitting en banc, has made clear that “‘[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent 27 conduct.’” Perez Hernandez v. United States, 286 A.3d 990 , 1001 (D.C. 2022) (en banc) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994)); see also Carrell, 165 A.3d at 321 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCallumgreen2 sentences2012See State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451 , 583 A.2d 250, 252 (1991) (“[W]e reach the conclusion that driving while suspended is not one of those ‘public welfare’ offenses where the Legislature intended to eliminate the requirement of scienter”). 2012See State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451 , 583 A.2d 250, 252 (1991) (“[W]e reach the conclusion that driving while suspended is not one of those ‘public welfare’ offenses where the Legislature intended to eliminate the requirement of scienter”). | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.green2 sentences2005See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed”) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 , 65 S.Ct. 1031 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[the] requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid .... 2005See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed”) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 , 65 S.Ct. 1031 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[the] requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid .... | 1 | 1 |
Screws v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2005See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed”) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 , 65 S.Ct. 1031 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[the] requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid .... 2005See Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499 , 102 S.Ct. 1186 (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed”) (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-03 , 65 S.Ct. 1031 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[the] requirement of a specific intent to do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise render a vague or indefinite statute invalid .... | 1 | 1 |
Colautti v. Franklingreen2 sentences2005Although the absence of a scienter requirement may be a factor considered when testing a statute for constitutional vagueness, see, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942) (stating that in the absence of a scienter requirement, a statute may become little more than “a trap for t 2005Although the absence of a scienter requirement may be a factor considered when testing a statute for constitutional vagueness, see, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942) (stating that in the absence of a scienter requirement, a statute may become little more than “a trap for t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re LR
green
2 sentences1996Moreover, in In re L.R., 640 A.2d 697 (D.C.1994), we declined to adopt a scienter requirement for DR 1-102(A)(5) and concluded that the conduct of the respondent in that case was prejudicial to the administration of justice “whether [it] was reckless or somewhat less blameworthy.” Id. at 701 . 1996Moreover, in In re L.R., 640 A.2d 697 (D.C.1994), we declined to adopt a scienter requirement for DR 1-102(A)(5) and concluded that the conduct of the respondent in that case was prejudicial to the administration of justice “whether [it] was reckless or somewhat less blameworthy.” Id. at 701 . | 2 | 1996–2023 |
In Re JS
green
2 sentences2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). 2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Buchanan v. United States
green
2 sentences2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). 2022Our examination of mens rea cannot end here, however. “[T]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994). 15 In circumstances like these, what makes the contact a crime is the offensive nature of the touch. 16 Cf. Elonis, 575 U.S. at 737 (“Here 14 See, e.g., Buchanan v. United States, 32 A.3d 990 (D.C. 2011); In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 334 (D.C. 2011); Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1100 (D.C. 2005). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement ... applies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (“[Different elements of the same offense can require different mental states.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405-06 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 2017Second, as the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he presumption in favor of a scienter requirement ... applies] to each of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise innocent conduct.” Elonis, 135 S.Ct. at 2011 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 , 115 S.Ct. 464 , 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994)); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 609 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 , 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (“[Different elements of the same offense can require different mental states.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405-06 , 100 S.Ct. 624 , 62 | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Santos v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2012Finding Santos v. District of Columbia, 940 A.2d 113 (D.C.2007), to be controlling, the trial court denied the motion to vacate “because the OAS statute does not have a scienter requirement.” II. 2012Finding Santos v. District of Columbia, 940 A.2d 113 (D.C.2007), to be controlling, the trial court denied the motion to vacate “because the OAS statute does not have a scienter requirement.” II. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Ragen
green
2 sentences2005Although the absence of a scienter requirement may be a factor considered when testing a statute for constitutional vagueness, see, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942) (stating that in the absence of a scienter requirement, a statute may become little more than “a trap for t 2005Although the absence of a scienter requirement may be a factor considered when testing a statute for constitutional vagueness, see, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 , 99 S.Ct. 675 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979) (“This Court has long recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.”) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 524 , 62 S.Ct. 374 , 86 L.Ed. 383 (1942) (stating that in the absence of a scienter requirement, a statute may become little more than “a trap for t | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Stanton
green
1 sentence1983This court adopted the Board's recommendation, In re Stanton, 470 A.2d 281 (D.C.1981) ( Stanton I ), ordering a 60-day suspension to be served concurrently with the year and a day suspension in Stanton II, supra . [19] Recently, we also imposed a year and a day suspension in the civil context where the respondent in four cases had been found responsible for one or more of the following: intentionally failing to carry out commitments to the client, DR 7-101(A), neglecting legal matters, DR 1-102(A)(4), and misrepresenting to the client that work had been done which had not been done. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
In re the Claim of Bunzl
neutral
2 sentences1978Hebert v. State, supra; Dawkins v. Florida Industrial Commission, 155 So.2d 153 (Fla.App.1963); Bunzl v. Lubin, 1 A.D.2d 46 , 146 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dept. 1955). 1978Hebert v. State, supra; Dawkins v. Florida Industrial Commission, 155 So.2d 153 (Fla.App.1963); Bunzl v. Lubin, 1 A.D.2d 46 , 146 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dept. 1955). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hebert v. State
green
1 sentence1978Hebert v. State, supra; Dawkins v. Florida Industrial Commission, 155 So.2d 153 (Fla.App.1963); Bunzl v. Lubin, 1 A.D.2d 46 , 146 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dept. 1955). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Dawkins v. Florida Industrial Commission
green
1 sentence1978Hebert v. State, supra; Dawkins v. Florida Industrial Commission, 155 So.2d 153 (Fla.App.1963); Bunzl v. Lubin, 1 A.D.2d 46 , 146 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dept. 1955). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.