judicial notice doctrine in California

1971At the outset we observe that since the judgment entered herein resulted from a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which is used to perform the function of a general demurrer, our consideration of the facts alleged “reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice” (Weil v. Barthel, 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]), with certain exceptions not indicated here.

1968These are: “A demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice” (Weil v. Barthel, 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]; County of Los Angeles v. Security First Nat.

1967Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' etc. Board (1952) 39 Cal.2d 561, 565 [ 247 P.2d 913 ].) [2] Since the motion was used to perform the function of a general demurrer, it "reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice" ( Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]) and "admits all material and issuable facts pleaded." ( Flores v. Arroyo (1961) 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ].) We proceed to set forth the facts in the light of these principles. [2] The Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel is a

1967Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' etc. Board (1952) 39 Cal.2d 561, 565 [ 247 P.2d 913 ].) [2] Since the motion was used to perform the function of a general demurrer, it "reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice" ( Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]) and "admits all material and issuable facts pleaded." ( Flores v. Arroyo (1961) 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ].) We proceed to set forth the facts in the light of these principles. [2] The Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel is a

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1975(Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 ].) “ ‘A demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.’ [Citations]; the material and issuable facts pleaded . . . must be regarded as true [citations]; a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint [citations], or facts impossible in law [citation] or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (Italics added.) (Holmes v. City of Oakla

1975(Uccello v. Laudenslayer (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 504, 514 [ 118 Cal.Rptr. 741 ].) “ ‘A demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.’ [Citations]; the material and issuable facts pleaded . . . must be regarded as true [citations]; a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint [citations], or facts impossible in law [citation] or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.” (Italics added.) (Holmes v. City of Oakla

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1968Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. City of Los Angeles, 143 Cal.App.2d 195, 197 [ 299 P.2d 294 ]), or

1967Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' etc. Board (1952) 39 Cal.2d 561, 565 [ 247 P.2d 913 ].) [2] Since the motion was used to perform the function of a general demurrer, it "reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice" ( Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]) and "admits all material and issuable facts pleaded." ( Flores v. Arroyo (1961) 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ].) We proceed to set forth the facts in the light of these principles. [2] The Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel is a

1967Harney, Inc. v. Contractors' etc. Board (1952) 39 Cal.2d 561, 565 [ 247 P.2d 913 ].) [2] Since the motion was used to perform the function of a general demurrer, it "reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice" ( Weil v. Barthel (1955) 45 Cal.2d 835, 837 [ 291 P.2d 30 ]) and "admits all material and issuable facts pleaded." ( Flores v. Arroyo (1961) 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal. Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ].) We proceed to set forth the facts in the light of these principles. [2] The Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel is a

1965Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]; Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Hopper v. Hopper, 224 Cal.App.2d 446, 447 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 767 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. Cit

1965Bank, 84 Cal.App.2d 575, 579 [ 191 P.2d 78 ]); the material and issuable facts pleaded in the complaint must be regarded as true (Flores v. Arroyo, 56 Cal.2d 492, 497 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 87 , 364 P.2d 263 ]; Hauger v. Gates, 42 Cal.2d 752, 755 [ 269 P.2d 609 ]; Stigall v. City of Taft, 58 Cal.2d 565, 567-568 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 441 , 375 P.2d 289 ]; Hopper v. Hopper, 224 Cal.App.2d 446, 447 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 767 ]); a demurrer does not, however, admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint (Marin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal.App.2d 549, 552 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 880 ]; Howard v. Cit

2026(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1171, fn. 3 [“‘“judicial notice, which is a substitute for formal proof of a matter by evidence, cannot be taken of any matter that is irrelevant”’”].) Auto burglary is the entry into a locked vehicle with the intent to commit a larceny (theft). (§ 459, subd. (a); CALCRIM No. 1700 (Burglary) 8 [“To prove that the defendant is guilty of [auto burglary], the People must prove that: [¶] 1.

2021We disagree. “[A] demurrer reaches not only the contents of the complaint, but also such matters as may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. ‘The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary . . . .’ [Citation.] It is not enough that, absent any reference to [her] earlier action [or the original complaint in her second action], appellant[’s] new pleading might be facially sufficient.” (Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & M

2021We disagree. “[A] demurrer reaches not only the contents of the complaint, but also such matters as may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. ‘The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary . . . .’ [Citation.] It is not enough that, absent any reference to [her] earlier action [or the original complaint in her second action], appellant[’s] new pleading might be facially sufficient.” (Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & M

2021We disagree. “[A] demurrer reaches not only the contents of the complaint, but also such matters as may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. ‘The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary . . . .’ [Citation.] It is not enough that, absent any reference to [her] earlier action [or the original complaint in her second action], appellant[’s] new pleading might be facially sufficient.” (Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & M

2021We disagree. “[A] demurrer reaches not only the contents of the complaint, but also such matters as may be properly considered under the doctrine of judicial notice. ‘The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary . . . .’ [Citation.] It is not enough that, absent any reference to [her] earlier action [or the original complaint in her second action], appellant[’s] new pleading might be facially sufficient.” (Ricard v. Grobstein, Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & M

2010We resist the temptation to do so.’ [Citation.]” (Plumley; supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050, fn. 7 .) “ ‘It is the consequence of judicial notice that the “fact” noticed is, in effect, treated as true for purposes of proof. . . .

2010We resist the temptation to do so.' [Citation.]" ( Plumley, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1050, fn. 7 .) "`It is the consequence of judicial notice that the "fact" noticed is, in effect, treated as true for purposes of proof ....

1997Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1474, 1485 [ 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 698 ].) "[N]either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding...[;] `[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.' (1 Witkin, Cal. *591 Evidence (3d ed. 1986) [Judicial Notice,] ง 80[, p. 74].) Taking judicial notice of the truth of a judge's factual finding [is] tantamount to tak

1997Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal. App.4th 1474, 1485 [ 35 Cal. Rptr.2d 698 ].) "[N]either a finding of fact made after a contested adversary hearing nor a finding of fact made after any other type of hearing can be indisputably deemed to have been a correct finding...[;] `[u]nder the doctrine of judicial notice, certain matters are assumed to be indisputably true, and the introduction of evidence to prove them will not be required.' (1 Witkin, Cal. *591 Evidence (3d ed. 1986) [Judicial Notice,] ง 80[, p. 74].) Taking judicial notice of the truth of a judge's factual finding [is] tantamount to tak

1992“The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary. . . .” (Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 39, 47 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) It is not enough that, absent any reference to their earlier action, appellants’ new pleading might be facially sufficient.

1992“The pleading must be read as if it contained all matters of which the court could properly take judicial notice even in the face of allegations in the pleading to the contrary. . . .” (Weiner v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 39, 47 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 533 ].) It is not enough that, absent any reference to their earlier action, appellants’ new pleading might be facially sufficient.

1985Proc., §§ 430.30, subd. (a), 430.70; El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946, 950, fn. 6 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 663 P.2d 893 ]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 , 41 A.L.R.3d 1187 ]) and that the scope of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), which provides that judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state in the United States,” includes judicial notice of official acts of a county.

1985Proc., §§ 430.30, subd. (a), 430.70; El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946, 950, fn. 6 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 663 P.2d 893 ]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 , 41 A.L.R.3d 1187 ]) and that the scope of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), which provides that judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state in the United States,” includes judicial notice of official acts of a county.

1985Proc., §§ 430.30, subd. (a), 430.70; El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946, 950, fn. 6 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 663 P.2d 893 ]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 , 41 A.L.R.3d 1187 ]) and that the scope of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), which provides that judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state in the United States,” includes judicial notice of official acts of a county.

1985Proc., §§ 430.30, subd. (a), 430.70; El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Education Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 946, 950, fn. 6 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 123 , 663 P.2d 893 ]; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 601 , 487 P.2d 1241 , 41 A.L.R.3d 1187 ]) and that the scope of Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (c), which provides that judicial notice may be taken of “[o]fficial acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state in the United States,” includes judicial notice of official acts of a county.

1983“Like the demurrer, the motion ... is confined to the face of the pleading under attack. ” ’ ” (Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 957 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ]; italics in original.) This unqualified statement may be misleading, however, “[a]s . . . various outside matters may be looked to under the doctrine of judicial notice . . . .” (Ibid., citing 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, pp. 2817-2818.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted where it is possible to amend the pleadings to state a cause of action (Tiffany v. Sierr

1983“Like the demurrer, the motion ... is confined to the face of the pleading under attack. ” ’ ” (Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 957 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ]; italics in original.) This unqualified statement may be misleading, however, “[a]s . . . various outside matters may be looked to under the doctrine of judicial notice . . . .” (Ibid., citing 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, pp. 2817-2818.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted where it is possible to amend the pleadings to state a cause of action (Tiffany v. Sierr

1983“Like the demurrer, the motion ... is confined to the face of the pleading under attack. ” ’ ” (Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 957 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ]; italics in original.) This unqualified statement may be misleading, however, “[a]s . . . various outside matters may be looked to under the doctrine of judicial notice . . . .” (Ibid., citing 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, pp. 2817-2818.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted where it is possible to amend the pleadings to state a cause of action (Tiffany v. Sierr

1983“Like the demurrer, the motion ... is confined to the face of the pleading under attack. ” ’ ” (Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 957 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ]; italics in original.) This unqualified statement may be misleading, however, “[a]s . . . various outside matters may be looked to under the doctrine of judicial notice . . . .” (Ibid., citing 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, § 162, pp. 2817-2818.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted where it is possible to amend the pleadings to state a cause of action (Tiffany v. Sierr

1983(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 556 P.2d 737 ].) *150 There is in every contract of insurance an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.

1983(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 375 , 556 P.2d 737 ].) *150 There is in every contract of insurance an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.

1977In sustaining a general demurrer as in granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court in addition to accepting the allegations in the pleadings as true may look into various outside matters under the doctrine of judicial notice ( Alford v. Hesse (1929) 100 Cal. App. 66 [ 279 P. 831 ]) including court files ( Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 626, 630 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 ], cert. den. by Supreme Ct. Feb. 23, 1972; see also 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, §§ 161, 162, 176, 177, pp. 2816-2818, and 2828-2830). *186 Moreover, "[I]t is the rul

1977In sustaining a general demurrer as in granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the trial court in addition to accepting the allegations in the pleadings as true may look into various outside matters under the doctrine of judicial notice ( Alford v. Hesse (1929) 100 Cal. App. 66 [ 279 P. 831 ]) including court files ( Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal. App.3d 626, 630 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 393 ], cert. den. by Supreme Ct. Feb. 23, 1972; see also 4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Proceedings Without Trial, §§ 161, 162, 176, 177, pp. 2816-2818, and 2828-2830). *186 Moreover, "[I]t is the rul