judicial notice doctrine in Texas

2015Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241 , 244 n.2 (Tex. Crim.

1999The Emerson opinion avoided reversing the conviction by inquiring, on its own motion, into the reliability of the scientific theory and technique “pursuant to the doctrine of judicial notice.” 880 S.W.2d at 764 .

1997First holding that the term “common knowledge” encompasses “those facts that are so well known to the community as to be beyond dispute,” id., we then noted: Because Seagram is asking this court to determine common knowledge as a matter of law, we find the judicial notice rule helpful in providing a standard.

1997First holding that the term "common knowledge" encompasses "those facts that are so well known to the community as to be beyond dispute," id., we then noted: Because Seagram is asking this court to determine common knowledge as a matter of law, we find the judicial notice rule helpful in providing a standard.

1994Through the doctrine of judicial notice, the majority incorporates such evidence into the record as it deems necessary to satisfy the State's burden for the admission of a "vitally contested bit of imperative proof." Urban, *776 387 S.W.2d at 398 .

1994Through the doctrine of judicial notice, the majority incorporates such evidence into the record as it deems necessary to satisfy the State’s burden for the admission of a “vitally contested bit of imperative proof.” Urban, 387 S.W.2d at 398 .

1980(All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.) [3] E. g., Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); O'Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)-" Bradley I. " [4] In note 1 of its opinion the Court rejects criticism that the rule goes beyond proper limits of judicial notice and concludes, "The rule of Barrientez ... now has an established place within the doctrine of judicial notice." [5] "I recall the trial and I recall th

1980(All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.) [3] E. g., Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); O'Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)-" Bradley I. " [4] In note 1 of its opinion the Court rejects criticism that the rule goes beyond proper limits of judicial notice and concludes, "The rule of Barrientez ... now has an established place within the doctrine of judicial notice." [5] "I recall the trial and I recall th

1980(All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.) [3] E. g., Stephenson v. State, 500 S.W.2d 855 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); O'Hern v. State, 527 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Green v. State, 528 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) and Bradley v. State, 564 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App.1978)-" Bradley I. " [4] In note 1 of its opinion the Court rejects criticism that the rule goes beyond proper limits of judicial notice and concludes, "The rule of Barrientez ... now has an established place within the doctrine of judicial notice." [5] "I recall the trial and I recall th

1973The court takes judicial notice of matters of common knowledge in the community where it sits; therefore the relative positions of the corner of Seventeenth and Champa streets and 1522 Glenarm Place, both in an old and well-known part of the city, are known to the court . . . ” The Supreme Court of Texas traced the development in this state of the doctrine of judicial notice in Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481 , 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961), where it held that despite the fact that the district court was not formally requested to take judicial notice of the fact, and did not announce formally that it

1973The court takes judicial notice of matters of common knowledge in the community where it sits; therefore the relative positions of the corner of Seventeenth and Champa streets and 1522 Glenarm Place, both in an old and well-known part of the city, are known to the court . . . ” The Supreme Court of Texas traced the development in this state of the doctrine of judicial notice in Harper v. Killion, 162 Tex. 481 , 348 S.W.2d 521 (1961), where it held that despite the fact that the district court was not formally requested to take judicial notice of the fact, and did not announce formally that it

1942As pointed out by appellee’s attorney upon oral argument, the result of such legal legerdemain would be a holding that a suit upon a note reciting that it was payable in Corpus, Christi could be maintained in Nueces County, Hambel and Heasty v. Davis, 89 Tex. 256 , 34 S.W. 439 , 59 Am.St.Rep. 46 ,. while suit upon a note payable in Robstown; Texas, could not be maintained in said county, although the record of the evidence introduced upon the hearing of the plea of' privilege showed conclusively that Robs-, town, was in fact located in Nueces County.

1942As pointed out by appellee’s attorney upon oral argument, the result of such legal legerdemain would be a holding that a suit upon a note reciting that it was payable in Corpus, Christi could be maintained in Nueces County, Hambel and Heasty v. Davis, 89 Tex. 256 , 34 S.W. 439 , 59 Am.St.Rep. 46 ,. while suit upon a note payable in Robstown; Texas, could not be maintained in said county, although the record of the evidence introduced upon the hearing of the plea of' privilege showed conclusively that Robs-, town, was in fact located in Nueces County.