public interest exception in Kentucky

2026One commonly recognized exception, the public interest exception, “allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case when (1) the question presented is of public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” Id. at 102 (citation omitted).

2025“The public interest exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case when (1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Ky. 2014). “[T]he public interest exception must not only involve public questions and be capable of repetition.

2021Morgan, 441 S.W.3d at 102 (quoting In re Alfred H.H., 910 N.E.2d 74, 80 (Ill. 2009)).

2020Another exception is for questions of “substantial public interest” as explained in Morgan, supra: Unlike the two-element “capable of repetition” exception, the “public interest” exception commonly has three elements, all of which must be clearly shown: The public interest exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case when (1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question. 441 S.W.3d at 102 (quoting In re Alfred H.H.

2025It is within this Court’s discretion to consider a moot case under the public interest exception when we determine that a case involves “matters of the utmost public importance.” Muhammad v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 468 S.W.3d 331, 338 (Ky. 2015).

2025It is within this Court’s discretion to consider a moot case under the public interest exception when we determine a case involves “matters of the utmost public importance.” Muhammad v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 468 S.W.3d 331, 338 (Ky. 2015).

2024We conclude that the appeal is moot and that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply, and therefore dismiss the appeal as moot. 4 ANALYSIS Under the mootness doctrine, an appellate court “must, of course, dismiss an appeal ‘when a change in circumstance renders that court unable to grant meaningful relief to either party.’” Lehmann v. Gibson, 482 S.W.3d 375, 381 (Ky. 2016) (quoting Commonwealth, Kentucky Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan Univ.

2022The Court observed that “we have carefully cabined our review for instance to matters of first impression, such as Lehmann v. Gibson, [ 482 S.W.3d 375 (Ky. 2016)] wherein this Court invoked the ‘public interest’ exception to answer the entirely novel question of staying civil discovery until related criminal prosecutions are concluded.” Id.

2023See Jones v. Bailey, 576 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ky. 2019) (determining that “procedural due process pertaining to the revocation of conditional freedom” was a matter of public interest and that since “the employment of current administrative procedures is a recurrent event in the revocation process” questions pertaining to such were likely to arise again). -4- As to the second element, in Commonwealth v. Collinsworth, 628 S.W.3d 82 , 87 (Ky. 2021), our Supreme Court clarified that the public interest exception must be used only where a demonstrated need justifies a court’s ruling, for example, issue

2023While the question of whether the Board itself must conduct final revocation hearings was arguably answered in Jones, 576 S.W.3d at 135 , the fact that the Board’s revised revocation procedure following the issuance of that opinion allows the Board to delegate the final revocation hearing to an ALJ suggests “there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers” on the issue.4 Therefore, we find the “public interest” exception to mootness applies and proceed to the merits of the appeal.

2025Applying the public interest exception in lieu of dismissing a moot appeal should occur only in “rare” cases involving “great public interest . . . .” Commonwealth by Breckinridge v. Woods, 342 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Ky. 1961).

2025“Our courts have long recognized that ‘[a] ‘moot case’ is one which seeks to get a judgment . . . upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.’” Beshear v. Goodwood Brewing Co., LLC, 635 S.W.3d 788 , 797 (Ky. 2021) (emphasis in original) (citing Benton v. Clay, 233 S.W. 1041, 1042 (Ky. 1921)).

2024Sys., Inc., 433 S.W.3d 341, 344 (Ky. 2014)).

2024Id. (quoting Morgan v. Getter, 441 S.W.3d 94, 102 (Ky. 2014)).

2024In the absence of the City clearly showing and satisfying all of the public interest exception elements, we decline to invoke the exception and “step into the prohibited role of rendering an advisory opinion.” Berger Family Real Estate, LLC v. City of Covington, 464 S.W.3d 160, 169 (Ky. App. 2015).

2024In Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 770, at 774 (Ky. 2016), the Court declined to address an issue after a change in circumstances that rendered all underlying issues moot, noting that any judicial opinion would have been purely advisory because it could have no effect upon any “then existing controversy.” Again, in Bevin v. Beshear, 526 S.W.3d 89 (Ky. 2017), our Supreme Court restated the general rule against courts’ issuing advisory opinions.

2020A third is the collateral consequences exception: An example of the “collateral consequences” exception is where a criminal sentence is expired but this does not render the appeal of the judgment of conviction moot “because there remain consequences of the conviction -5- (such as the loss of various civil rights) deemed sufficient to keep alive the appellant’s personal stake in the outcome of the appeal.” Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ky. App. 2017) (citation omitted).

2017Kentucky follows the rule of statutory construction that the more specific statute controls over the more general statute." Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Ky. 2008); see Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997); City of Bowling Green v. Board of Education of Bowling Green Independent Sch<?ol District, 443 S.W.2d 24 ~ (Ky. 1969)..

2017Kentucky follows the rule of statutory construction that the more specific statute controls over the more general statute." Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Ky. 2008); see Withers v. University of Kentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1997); City of Bowling Green v. Board of Education of Bowling Green Independent Sch<?ol District, 443 S.W.2d 24 ~ (Ky. 1969)..

2014To invoke this exception, therefore, the party asserting justiciability must show, in addition to the public-question and likelihood-of-recurrence elements, that “there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers.” See also, Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d at 210-11 (discussing factors relevant to the public interest exception and noting that an important one is “the assistance that a decision on the merits will provide to public officials in the exercise of their duties”); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d at 1071 (noting that under the public interest exception, in ca

2014To invoke this exception, therefore, the party asserting justiciability must show, in addition to the public-question and likelihood-of-recurrence elements, that “there is a need for an authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers.” See also, Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d at 210-11 (discussing factors relevant to the public interest exception and noting that an important one is “the assistance that a decision on the merits will provide to public officials in the exercise of their duties”); Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d at 1071 (noting that under the public interest exception, in ca