public interest exception in Maryland

2024Cnty., 206 Md. 36, 43 (1954), and the four factors a court should consider when determining whether the public interest exception applies: [1] If the public interest clearly will be hurt if the question is not immediately decided, [2] if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and [3] its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and [4] upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being h[e]ard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for decidi

2024The Cosgroves next cite to Lloyd v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore County, 206 Md. 36 (1954), which articulates the second exception to the mootness doctrine: the public interest exception.

2025Comm’rs, 170 Md. 183, 192 (1936). 13 A State grant satisfies the public interest exception if it protects the public 12F v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Harford Cnty., Inc., 258 Md. 419 , 424 n.2 (1970).

2025See supra State’s Appeal Section I.B.2.b.i, ii; see also Salisbury Beauty Schs. v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 56 (1973) (“That [a] statute may undertake indirectly to control prices and affect competition does not per se render it invidious or unconstitutional[.]”) To be sure, regulating the price of psychoactive cannabis products was one topic considered by the General Assembly and in the Demand Study that the General Assembly commissioned.

2025This exception applies “when ‘[t]he urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest[.]’” Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79, 91 (2007) (quoting Lloyd v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43 (1954)).

2025See, e.g., Gipson v. Morley, 233 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Ark. 1950) (upholding liquor price controls and stating “Arkansas … ha[s] sustained these monopolistic grants … on the ground that it is within the competency of the [L]egislature … in controlling a type of business fraught with perils to public peace, health, and safety as is the liquor business.”); Favaloro v. Comm’n for Law.

2024State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 585 [(1994)].” The Tax Court found that the Cosgroves did not have a reasonable expectation that they “will be subjected to an assessment for foreign earned income for later years,” and the fact that the Comptroller issued them refunds “shows there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the Comptroller will not assess for foreign earned income in other years.” Next, the Tax Court assessed whether the second exception to mootness, the public interest exception, applied.

2024App. 289, 305 (2003), the ACLU’s initial challenge was, in fact, “in the nature of an administrative mandamus action.” Open Justice Balt., 485 Md. at 645–46 (“as to the denial of [a] fee waiver, there [i]s ‘both a lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and an allegation that the action complained of is illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable’” (quoting Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. ProVen Mgmt., Inc., 472 Md. 642 , 669 n.9 (2021))).

2024First, “in every case where a custodian is considering a public interest waiver under subsection (e)(2)(ii), the custodian must at least consider whether there would be any public benefit to disclosure of the requested records.” Id. at 651 (emphasis added).

2024Whether remand to the Sheriff for a third opportunity to consider the ACLU’s request for a fee waiver would prejudice the ACLU given the lapse of time and the Sher[]iff’s prior failures to give any meaningful consideration to the public interest factors. 9 Although the underlying judgment was decided on the ACLU’s motion for summary judgment, which would be subject to de novo review, Prince George’s County v. The Wash. Post Co., 149 Md.

2013Judge Bollinger, rather, relied upon a final catch-all category of the public interest exception to the validity of exculpatory clause, which he recognized was not easily defined, opining that: “While ... the Maryland Court of Appeals has intended to create a public interest exception, without further guidance, [I am] not capable of evaluating ‘the totality of the circumstances’ against ‘a backdrop of current societal expectations.’ ” In Wolf , we attempted to define the contours of this category of the public interest exception by dissecting Winterstein , in which the Court of Special Appeals

2013Judge Bollinger, rather, relied upon a final catch-all category of the public interest exception to the validity of exculpatory clause, which he recognized was not easily defined, opining that: “While ... the Maryland Court of Appeals has intended to create a public interest exception, without further guidance, [I am] not capable of evaluating ‘the totality of the circumstances’ against ‘a backdrop of current societal expectations.’ ” In Wolf , we attempted to define the contours of this category of the public interest exception by dissecting Winterstein , in which the Court of Special Appeals

2001The Law of Torts, supra, § 413, at 1158 (footnote omitted); see also Hanrahan, 269 Md. at 29 , 305 A.2d at 156 (“Mutual interest in the subject matter is but one type of qualified privilege recognized in the law of defamation.” (citing Stevenson v. Baltimore Club, 250 Md. 482, 486 , 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968))); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 593-597.

2001The Law of Torts, supra, § 413, at 1158 (footnote omitted); see also Hanrahan, 269 Md. at 29 , 305 A.2d at 156 (“Mutual interest in the subject matter is but one type of qualified privilege recognized in the law of defamation.” (citing Stevenson v. Baltimore Club, 250 Md. 482, 486 , 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968))); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 593-597.

2001The Law of Torts, supra, § 413, at 1158 (footnote omitted); see also Hanrahan, 269 Md. at 29 , 305 A.2d at 156 (“Mutual interest in the subject matter is but one type of qualified privilege recognized in the law of defamation.” (citing Stevenson v. Baltimore Club, 250 Md. 482, 486 , 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968))); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 593-597.

2001The Law of Torts, supra, § 413, at 1158 (footnote omitted); see also Hanrahan, 269 Md. at 29 , 305 A.2d at 156 (“Mutual interest in the subject matter is but one type of qualified privilege recognized in the law of defamation.” (citing Stevenson v. Baltimore Club, 250 Md. 482, 486 , 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968))); Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 593-597.