public interest exception in Texas

2023The public-interest exception “allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public but for some reason evades appellate review.” University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no writ); see also Federal Deposit Ins.

2023Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, no pet.) (recognizing the public interest exception).

2023The common element of the public interest exception and the capable of repetition exception “is that the complained of action be capable of repetition yet not effectively reviewable.” Id. (quoting Nueces Cnty., 886 S.W.2d at 767 ).

2023The public interest exception “permits judicial review of questions of considerable public importance if the nature of the action makes it capable of repetition and yet prevents effective judicial review.” Id. at 400 (quoting Nueces Cnty., 886 S.W.2d at 767 ).

2023See, e.g., In re Smith Cnty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.) (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Houston Chronicle II, 196 S.W.3d at 400 (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Securtec, Inc. v. Cnty. of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 , 810–11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing the public interest exception); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (recognizing the public interest exception); State Farm Mut.

2018See Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Thomas, 196 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“until and unless the Texas Supreme Court recognizes the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, it is not a viable legal theory in our jurisdiction”); In re Smith Cty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig. proceeding) (also declining to follow the public interest exception until recognized by the Texas Supreme Court).

2015Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09 , 67 S.Ct. at 843 ; Quixtar, 315 S.W.3d at 33-34 .

2015See id. at 35 (noting that court of appeals, in concluding that dismissal was not appropriate, “apparently reasoned that Quixtar’s failure to demonstrate any choice of law issues or docket congestion problems weighed against Michigan as a more favorable forum” and ultimately holding that court of appeals “did not give the trial court’s decision appropriate deference”).

2023See, e.g., In re Smith Cnty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.) (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Houston Chronicle II, 196 S.W.3d at 400 (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Securtec, Inc. v. Cnty. of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 , 810–11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing the public interest exception); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (recognizing the public interest exception); State Farm Mut.

2015Public Interest Exception The public interest exception “allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review.” 11 Securtec, Inc. v. County of Greg, 106 S.W.3d 803, 810-811 (Tex.App.–Texarkana 2003, pet. denied).

2023See, e.g., In re Smith Cnty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.) (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Houston Chronicle II, 196 S.W.3d at 400 (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Securtec, Inc. v. Cnty. of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 , 810–11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing the public interest exception); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (recognizing the public interest exception); State Farm Mut.

2021“The public-interest exception allows appellate review of an issue of considerable public importance if that issue is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other 16 members of the public, but for some reason evades appellate review.” 7 Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Pub.

2010See, e.g. , In re Guerra , 235 S.W.3d 392 , 432 n.198 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2007, orig. proceeding) (acknowledging that the supreme court had not yet recognized the public interest exception but applying the exception to hold that a case was not moot); Houston Chronicle Pub.

2010See, e.g., In re Guerra, 235 S.W.3d 392 , 432 n. 198 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2007, orig. proceeding) (acknowledging that the supreme court had not yet recognized the public interest exception but applying the exception to hold that a case was not moot); Houston Chronicle Pub.

2023Vinmar, 336 S.W.3d at 676 (citing Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508–09).

2018But “the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be required to ‘untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.’” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 ).

2023See, e.g., In re Smith Cnty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, no pet.) (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Houston Chronicle II, 196 S.W.3d at 400 (refusing to recognize the public interest exception); Securtec, Inc. v. Cnty. of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803 , 810–11 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (recognizing the public interest exception); Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (recognizing the public interest exception); State Farm Mut.

2018See Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Thomas, 196 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (“until and unless the Texas Supreme Court recognizes the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, it is not a viable legal theory in our jurisdiction”); In re Smith Cty., 521 S.W.3d 447, 454 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, orig. proceeding) (also declining to follow the public interest exception until recognized by the Texas Supreme Court).

2010DELIVERED: May 27, 2010 FOOTNOTES 1: See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 551.041 (Vernon 2004) (requiring governmental bodies to “give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental body”). 2: Meeker subsequently non-suited his claims against de la Garza. 3: To the extent Meeker arguably seeks relief concerning future meetings not relating to de la Garza, Meeker seeks an advisory opinion “that lies outside [our] judicial power.” See Cornyn v. City of Garland , 994 S.W.2d 258, 267 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). 4: In FDIC , the supreme court stated, This

2010DELIVERED: May 27, 2010 [1] See Tex. Gov = t Code Ann. ' 551.041 (Vernon 2004) (requiring governmental bodies to A give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental body @ ). [2] Meeker subsequently non-suited his claims against de la Garza. [3] To the extent Meeker arguably seeks relief concerning future meetings not relating to de la Garza, Meeker seeks an advisory opinion A that lies outside [our] judicial power. @ See Cornyn v. City of Garland , 994 S.W.2d 258, 267 (Tex. App. C Austin 1999, no pet.). [4] In FDIC , the supreme court stated, T

2007See majority opinion, Part VI subpart 8. [5] See majority opinion note 198. [6] See id. [7] Id. [8] See FDIC v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994). [9] Houston Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. Thomas, 196 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ("The Texas Supreme Court has not yet recognized the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine and judicial restraint compels us to wait until that court decides to resolve the split in authority in the intermediate appellate courts."). [10] See Ngo v. Ngo, 133 S.W.3d 688, 692 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); Nue

2007At this time, the Texas Supreme Court has as yet not recognized the public-interest exception. (3) In Nueces County v. Whitley Trucks, Inc ., 865 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, 1993), (4) rev'd sub nom. , FDIC v. Nueces County , 886 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1994), (5) we recognized the public-interest exception, stating: "[T]he present questions concerning the attachment and priority of, and ability to foreclose upon, tax liens when the FDIC holds a lien against the same property in its capacity as a receiver is of considerable public importance. . . ." Id . at 126.

2023The public-interest exception “expands the capable-of-repetition exception to include parties other than those involved in the current case” and “allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public but for some reason evades appellate review.” City of Austin, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2651 , at *19 (citing University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.— Austin 1993, no writ)); see also Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (stating th

2023The public-interest exception “expands the capable-of-repetition exception to include parties other than those involved in the current case” and “allows appellate review of a question of considerable public importance if that question is capable of repetition between either the same parties or other members of the public but for some reason evades appellate review.” City of Austin, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2651 , at *19 (citing University Interscholastic League v. Buchanan, 848 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.— Austin 1993, no writ)); see also Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (stating th

2021Safety v. LaFleur, 32 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)).

2007See Fiske v. City of Dallas , 220 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); (6) Tex. Dept. of Public Safety v. LaFleur , 32 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.); (7) but see Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg , 106 S.W.3d 803, 810-11 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (court reviewed the merits pursuant to the public-interest exception, stating: "This case is . . . a matter of public interest because Gregg County is a governmental body that is required to follow the Texas Local Government Code when accepting bids for construction contracts. . . .").

2014See Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1165 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Swiss law appears to apply . . . .

2014See Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1165 (2d Cir.1978) (“Swiss law appears to apply ....

2007Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (recognizing public interest exception to the mootness doctrine); In re Guardianship of Keller, 171 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005), rev’d on other grounds, Zipp v. Wuemling, 218 S.W.3d 71 (Tex.2007) (same); Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803, 810-11 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (same); Univ.

2007Cockerham v. Cockerham , 218 S.W.3d 298, 302 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (recognizing public interest exception to the mootness doctrine); In re Guardianship of Keller , 171 S.W.3d 498, 501 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005), rev'd on other grounds, Zipp v. Wuemling , 218 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2007) (same); Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg , 106 S.W.3d 803, 810-11 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (same); Univ.

2020While Texas –12– courts can apply foreign law, “the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be required to untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.” See Rasul, 2018 WL 6599018 , at *6 (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 251 ).

2018But “the public interest factors point towards dismissal where the court would be required to ‘untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself.’” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251 (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509 ).

2023See City of Austin, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 2651 , at *18–21 (concluding that State’s claims did not fall within public-interest exception to mootness); see, e.g., Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 , 789 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (“Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute.”).

2021“We do not have power to decide moot cases, whether they ‘involve a matter of public concern’ or not.” Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785 , 789 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam) (“Indeed, the need for courts to mind their jurisdictional bounds is perhaps at its greatest in cases involving questions of public importance, where the potential for undue interference with the other two branches of government is most acute.”). 15 Therefore, because a justiciable controversy between the parties no longer exists as to the State’s requests for temporary injunctive relief to require the local officials to “stop, or

2019ENSCO Offshore Int’l, 311 S.W.3d at 927 ; Mantle Oil & Gas, 426 S.W.3d at 194 . 23 a.

2016See In re ENSCO, 311 S.W.3d at 928 ; In re BPZ Res., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 866, 876 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding).