public interest exception in North Carolina

2022App. at 606 , 548 S.E.2d at 752 (first impression, gravity); Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 , 468, 843 S.E.2d 139 , 147 (2020) (public debate). ¶ 33 Here, the public interest exception applies because the issue of banning counsel from being present in-person with their clients during depositions is a matter of first impression with a potentially far-reaching effect.

2022App. at 606 , 548 S.E.2d at 752 (first impression, gravity); Chavez v. McFadden, 374 N.C. 458 , 468, 843 S.E.2d 139 , 147 (2020) (public debate). ¶ 33 Here, the public interest exception applies because the issue of banning counsel from being present in-person with their clients during depositions is a matter of first impression with a potentially far-reaching effect.

2024This Court first acknowledged the public interest exception in North Carolina State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699 (1989) (per curiam), which arose out of an alleged Rules of Professional Conduct violation by a probate attorney who paid himself attorney’s fees using the estate’s funds.

2013However, here, we do not find that the issues raised by petitioner are ones of such “general importance,” id., to justify the application of the public interest exception.

2021“Under the ‘public interest’ exception to mootness, an appellate court may consider a case, even if technically moot, if it involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance, and deserves prompt resolution.” Chavez v. Carmichael, 262 N.C.

2021“Under the ‘public interest’ exception to mootness, an appellate court may consider a case, even if technically moot, if it involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance, and deserves prompt resolution.” Chavez v. Carmichael, 262 N.C.

2021However, because “the public interest exception applies” in this case, we “will proceed to address the merits . . . .” Id. ¶ 17.2 A. Motion for Appropriate Relief ¶9 “Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s MAR is ‘whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.’ ” State v. Peterson, 228 N.C.

2021However, because “the public interest exception applies” in this case, we “will proceed to address the merits . . . .” Id. ¶ 17.2 A. Motion for Appropriate Relief ¶9 “Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s MAR is ‘whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.’ ” State v. Peterson, 228 N.C.

2024See Cape Fear, 368 N.C. at 100 (refusing to invoke the public interest exception because the General Assembly already enacted legislation addressing the parties’ issue).

2024See Cape Fear River Watch, 368 N.C. at 99–100 (withholding public-interest exception in case that involved a narrow subset of coal facilities and raised record- heavy, fact-bound claims).

2026Equal. v. State, 294 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Mo. 2009) (explaining that students “who are no longer in Missouri’s public schools have claims that are not moot because they present claims capable of repetition that otherwise may evade review”); Abbeville Cnty.

2026Opportunity v. State, 129 P.3d 1199, 1206 (Idaho 2005) (declining to moot a lawsuit over the constitutionality of Idaho’s school funding system under the public interest exception, rejecting the state’s argument that factual changes since the original suit “render[ed] many of the district court’s findings moot and are significant enough to warrant reversal of the [trial] court’s conclusion that the Legislature has failed to provide” for constitutionally adequate facilities, because the court saw no evidence of “any commitment to continued funding of the Loan and Grant Fund, or that the amount

2024Accordingly, we hold that the public interest exception applies and will proceed to address the merits of the case.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)) writ of supersedeas and disc. rev. allowed, ___ N.C. ___, 883 S.E.2d 457 (2023); State v. Thomsen, 242 N.C.

2024App. 475, 483 , 776 S.E.2d 41, 47 (2015) (“On 24 February 2015, Defendant submitted to this Court a Motion to Hold Appeal in Abeyance Pending Determination of State v. Stubbs by the North Carolina Supreme Court.

2024Martin v. Sloan, 69 N.C. 128, 128 (1873) (opining that when “neither party has any interest in the case except as to cost[,]” this Court “[is] not in the habit of deciding the case”).

2024See Chavez, 374 N.C. at 468–69 (only invoking the public interest exception at the intersection of contentious disagreement over the application of federal immigration law in the habeas context rather than on the importance of habeas alone); In re Popp, 298 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ohio 1973) (refusing to invoke the public interest exception in a habeas case in that “there [was] no confinement” and “[t]here [were] remedies to attack the collateral issues raised by petitioner, other than this high prerogative writ”), syllabus abrogated by In re Klepper, 361 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1977) (per curiam).

2024See Chavez, 374 N.C. at 468–69 (only invoking the public interest exception at the intersection of contentious disagreement over the application of federal immigration law in the habeas context rather than on the importance of habeas alone); In re Popp, 298 N.E.2d 529, 531 (Ohio 1973) (refusing to invoke the public interest exception in a habeas case in that “there [was] no confinement” and “[t]here [were] remedies to attack the collateral issues raised by petitioner, other than this high prerogative writ”), syllabus abrogated by In re Klepper, 361 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1977) (per curiam).

2023See id. at 13–14, 788 S.E.2d at 188–89.

2023See id. at 13–14, 788 S.E.2d at 188–89.

2017App. 550, 559 , 680 S.E.2d 738, 746 (2009) (holding that an election dispute did not fall under the public-interest exception because the controlling statutes in question had been amended).

2016Comm'n, 329 N.C. 615 , 623, 407 S.E.2d 785 , 790 (1991) ( "Because the process of siting hazardous waste facilities involves the public interest and deserves prompt resolution in view of its general importance, we elect to address it."); State v. Corkum, 224 N.C.App. 129 , 132, 735 S.E.2d 420 , 423 (2012) (holding that an issue of structured sentencing under the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 required review because "all felons seeking confinement credit following revocation of post-release supervision will face similar time constraints when *189 appealing a denial of confinement credit effe

2016Comm'n, 329 N.C. 615 , 623, 407 S.E.2d 785 , 790 (1991) ( "Because the process of siting hazardous waste facilities involves the public interest and deserves prompt resolution in view of its general importance, we elect to address it."); State v. Corkum, 224 N.C.App. 129 , 132, 735 S.E.2d 420 , 423 (2012) (holding that an issue of structured sentencing under the Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011 required review because "all felons seeking confinement credit following revocation of post-release supervision will face similar time constraints when *189 appealing a denial of confinement credit effe

2007See Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914, 918 (W.D.N.C. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that exculpatory contracts between physician and patient are unenforceable because medicine is "heavily regulated by state authorities who have demonstrated the public interest in the activity"); Alston v. Monk, 92 N.C.

2007See Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914, 918 (W.D.N.C. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that exculpatory contracts between physician and patient are unenforceable because medicine is "heavily regulated by state authorities who have demonstrated the public interest in the activity"); Alston v. Monk, 92 N.C.