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27 California opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in the 2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in th | 2 | 2 |
People v. Anzalonegreen2 sentences2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in the 2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in th | 2 | 2 |
People v. Sivongxxaygreen2 sentences2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in the 2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in th | 2 | 2 |
Los Angeles County Department of Children & Family Services v. Ashlee R.green2 sentences2022The rationale that ICWA demands certainty appears to rest on three interlocking premises: (1) our Supreme Court held in Isaiah W. that the interest of the tribes in the proper determination of a dependent child’s status as an Indian child is 15 paramount and trumps all other competing policy considerations (see Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 12 [“the federal and state [ICWA] statutes were clearly written to protect the integrity and stability of Indian tribes despite the potential for delay in placing the child,” italics added]; see A.C. 2022, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1016, 1019); (2) a 2022The rationale that ICWA demands certainty appears to rest on three interlocking premises: (1) our Supreme Court held in Isaiah W. that the interest of the tribes in the proper determination of a dependent child’s status as an Indian child is 15 paramount and trumps all other competing policy considerations (see Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 12 [“the federal and state [ICWA] statutes were clearly written to protect the integrity and stability of Indian tribes despite the potential for delay in placing the child,” italics added]; see A.C. 2022, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1016, 1019); (2) a | 2 | 2 |
People v. Cantrellgreen2 sentences1986In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ We believe that, in an appropriate case, the United States Supreme Court would accept this exception to the automatic reversal standard.” The Garcia court also noted (at p. 556) that a meaningless retrial might be avoided by *406 permitting an exception to the per se reversal rule in those “. . . cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their co 1986In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ We believe that, in an appropriate case, the United States Supreme Court would accept this exception to the automatic reversal standard.” The Garcia court also noted (at p. 556) that a meaningless retrial might be avoided by *406 permitting an exception to the per se reversal rule in those “. . . cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their co | 2 | 2 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1995Citing United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 509 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106 , 103 S.Ct. 1974 ], the United States Supreme Court noted in Rose that, “[W]hile there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule.” (Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 578 [ 92 L.Ed.2d at p. 471 ].) The language from Hasting , a case involving improper prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, which was cited to in Rose , is as follows: “Chapman reflected the concern, later noted by Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, that wh 1995Citing United States v. Hasting (1983) 461 U.S. 499, 509 [ 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106 , 103 S.Ct. 1974 ], the United States Supreme Court noted in Rose that, “[W]hile there are some errors to which Chapman does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule.” (Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 578 [ 92 L.Ed.2d at p. 471 ].) The language from Hasting , a case involving improper prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s failure to testify, which was cited to in Rose , is as follows: “Chapman reflected the concern, later noted by Chief Justice Roger Traynor of the Supreme Court of California, that wh | 1 | 4 |
People v. Watsongreen2 sentences2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in the 2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in th | 1 | 3 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences1991Nevertheless, “the Chapman [harmless error] test should apply here, for the error is not so serious as to invoke an automatic-reversal rule.” (People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 674 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 738 P.2d 752 ], citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ].) “[T]he conflicting instructions did not affect the composition of the record nor preclude the admission of relevant evidence bearing on the . . . issue. 1991Nevertheless, “the Chapman [harmless error] test should apply here, for the error is not so serious as to invoke an automatic-reversal rule.” (People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 674 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 738 P.2d 752 ], citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 708-709 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ].) “[T]he conflicting instructions did not affect the composition of the record nor preclude the admission of relevant evidence bearing on the . . . issue. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Thorntongreen2 sentences1986In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ We believe that, in an appropriate case, the United States Supreme Court would accept this exception to the automatic reversal standard.” The Garcia court also noted (at p. 556) that a meaningless retrial might be avoided by *406 permitting an exception to the per se reversal rule in those “. . . cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their co 1986In such cases the issue should not be deemed to have been removed from the jury’s consideration since it has been resolved in another context, and there can be no prejudice to the defendant . . . .’ We believe that, in an appropriate case, the United States Supreme Court would accept this exception to the automatic reversal standard.” The Garcia court also noted (at p. 556) that a meaningless retrial might be avoided by *406 permitting an exception to the per se reversal rule in those “. . . cases where the parties recognized that intent to kill was in issue, presented all evidence at their co | 1 | 2 |
Washington v. Recuencogreen2 sentences2015(Sullivan, at p. 281.) But in subsequent cases, the high court has distanced itself from some of the very broad language and reasoning in Sullivan (see, e.g., Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 10-15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ]), and has declined to apply an automatic reversal rule in somewhat analogous situations, including a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of a charged offense (ibid.) and a trial court’s failure to submit a sentencing factor for determination by a jury (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2 2015(Sullivan, at p. 281.) But in subsequent cases, the high court has distanced itself from some of the very broad language and reasoning in Sullivan (see, e.g., Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 10-15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ]), and has declined to apply an automatic reversal rule in somewhat analogous situations, including a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of a charged offense (ibid.) and a trial court’s failure to submit a sentencing factor for determination by a jury (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2 | 1 | 1 |
Neder v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015(Sullivan, at p. 281.) But in subsequent cases, the high court has distanced itself from some of the very broad language and reasoning in Sullivan (see, e.g., Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 10-15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ]), and has declined to apply an automatic reversal rule in somewhat analogous situations, including a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of a charged offense (ibid.) and a trial court’s failure to submit a sentencing factor for determination by a jury (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2 2015(Sullivan, at p. 281.) But in subsequent cases, the high court has distanced itself from some of the very broad language and reasoning in Sullivan (see, e.g., Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 10-15 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ]), and has declined to apply an automatic reversal rule in somewhat analogous situations, including a trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on an element of a charged offense (ibid.) and a trial court’s failure to submit a sentencing factor for determination by a jury (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218-222 [ 165 L.Ed.2d 466 , 126 S.Ct. 2 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2015(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1331-1333 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ].) The majority does not deny that it is applying an automatic or reversible per se rule to a trial court’s failure to obtain an explicit, on-the-record personal waiver of a jury trial by defendant (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1135), but maintains that it is not applying an automatic reversal rule when the trial court’s error is solely in failing to advise a defendant of the right to a jury trial (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1136). 2015(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1331-1333 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ].) The majority does not deny that it is applying an automatic or reversible per se rule to a trial court’s failure to obtain an explicit, on-the-record personal waiver of a jury trial by defendant (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1135), but maintains that it is not applying an automatic reversal rule when the trial court’s error is solely in failing to advise a defendant of the right to a jury trial (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1136). | 1 | 1 |
People v. O'Bryangreen2 sentences2009In 1911, just two years after the Disperati decision, California's voters amended the state Constitution to preclude reversal in a criminal case for any error that was not prejudicial. ( People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55, 66 [ 130 P. 1042 ].) The amendment provided: " No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal case . . . for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. " (Cal. Const., f 2009In 1911, just two years after the Disperati decision, California's voters amended the state Constitution to preclude reversal in a criminal case for any error that was not prejudicial. ( People v. O'Bryan (1913) 165 Cal. 55, 66 [ 130 P. 1042 ].) The amendment provided: " No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted in any criminal case . . . for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless, after an examination of the entire cause including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. " (Cal. Const., f | 1 | 1 |
| Greenberg v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Satchellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Garciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lilliockgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hendersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Mechanikgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Hastinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Leegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Rebecca R.
green
2 sentences2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst 2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst | 3 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Memro
green
2 sentences2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in the 2024Instead, for state law error, we have, for almost seven decades, quite logically gone on to ask if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ; see, e.g., People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 , 973 [Watson applies to trial court’s failure to appoint counsel in hearing on resentencing petition as required by statute]; People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 187 [Watson applies when the trial court fails to expressly reference the special circumstance allegation in th | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In Re Hb
green
2 sentences2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst 2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst | 2 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Nieves
green
2 sentences2022(E.g., People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 451 .) The automatic reversal rule perverts that incentive: If parents know that they are guaranteed an automatic remand based on an agency’s failure to engage in a full inquiry as required by ICWA, they have every incentive not to object when they observe deficiencies in the agency’s inquiry. 2022(E.g., People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 451 .) The automatic reversal rule perverts that incentive: If parents know that they are guaranteed an automatic remand based on an agency’s failure to engage in a full inquiry as required by ICWA, they have every incentive not to object when they observe deficiencies in the agency’s inquiry. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Marilyn H
green
2 sentences2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst 2022(In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115 , 122; Rebecca R., supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1431 .) In this respect, the automatic reversal rule gives rise to the “very evil the Legislature intended to correct”—namely, “lengthy and unnecessary delay in providing permanency for children.” (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 310 .) Second, the rule—in conjunction with the breadth of the duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2—may yield a seemingly endless feedback loop of remand, appeal, and remand. 18 Section 224.2 does not limit the duty of initial inquiry to “extended family members.” Inst | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Holloway v. Arkansas
green
2 sentences1993Therefore, contrary to defendant’s assertions, the automatic reversal rule enunciated in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475 (Holloway), is inapplicable to this case. 1993Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertions, the automatic reversal rule enunciated in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475 ( Holloway ), is inapplicable to this case. ( People v. Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 724; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 ].) Further, defendant's assertions of an actual conflict with Massini during her campaign are unpersuasive. | 2 | 1993–2013 |
In Re CG
green
2 sentences2008Because of the "strict time lines" that govern dependency proceedings, the Court of Appeal stated, the juvenile court was not required to "wait for an indefinite period of time for [the mother] to sufficiently regain her mental faculties to be able to appreciate notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing or the hearing to appoint a guardian ad litem." ( Id. at p. 914, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) Then came In re C.G. (2005) 129 Cal. App.4th 27 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 , another decision from Division Four of the Second Appellate District, and the first to apply an automatic reversal standard. 2008Because of the "strict time lines" that govern dependency proceedings, the Court of Appeal stated, the juvenile court was not required to "wait for an indefinite period of time for [the mother] to sufficiently regain her mental faculties to be able to appreciate notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing or the hearing to appoint a guardian ad litem." ( Id. at p. 914, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) Then came In re C.G. (2005) 129 Cal. App.4th 27 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 , another decision from Division Four of the Second Appellate District, and the first to apply an automatic reversal standard. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
In Re JN
green
1 sentence2022(Antonio R., supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 461 .) Under the automatic reversal rule, reversal is required “no matter how ‘slim’ the odds are that further inquiry on remand might lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Burgener
green
1 sentence2020(See id. at 244-245 .) Appellant urges us to apply the automatic-reversal standard, while the People urge us to apply either or both of the harmless-error standards. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hosner
green
2 sentences2017The denial of a transcript, we reasoned, "infects" the entire second trial, and an appellate court could only "hypothesize" what effect the transcript of a previous trial would have on the defendant's retrial. ( Hosner , 15 Cal.3d at p. 70 , 123 Cal.Rptr. 381 , 538 P.2d 1141 .) Moreover, an automatic reversal rule was required to ensure that the prosecution had an incentive to challenge-before trial-the defendant's right to a transcript. ( Ibid . ) And the defendant's right would be undermined by allowing the prosecution to wait until an appeal to litigate the need for a transcript "disguised 2017The denial of a transcript, we reasoned, "infects" the entire second trial, and an appellate court could only "hypothesize" what effect the transcript of a previous trial would have on the defendant's retrial. ( Hosner , 15 Cal.3d at p. 70 , 123 Cal.Rptr. 381 , 538 P.2d 1141 .) Moreover, an automatic reversal rule was required to ensure that the prosecution had an incentive to challenge-before trial-the defendant's right to a transcript. ( Ibid . ) And the defendant's right would be undermined by allowing the prosecution to wait until an appeal to litigate the need for a transcript "disguised | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Mroczko
green
1 sentence2013Id., at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173 ('[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic')." (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 168 , italics added.) Mickens defined an "actual conflict of interest" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as a conflict of interest that adversely affects defense counsel's performance, not "a mere theoretical division of loyalties." (Id. at p. 171, see id. at p. 172, fn. 5.) It rejected the "[p]etitioner's proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mickens v. Taylor
green
1 sentence2013Id., at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173 ('[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic')." (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 168 , italics added.) Mickens defined an "actual conflict of interest" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as a conflict of interest that adversely affects defense counsel's performance, not "a mere theoretical division of loyalties." (Id. at p. 171, see id. at p. 172, fn. 5.) It rejected the "[p]etitioner's proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Doolin
green
2 sentences2013Id., at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173 ('[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic')." (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 168 , italics added.) Mickens defined an "actual conflict of interest" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as a conflict of interest that adversely affects defense counsel's performance, not "a mere theoretical division of loyalties." (Id. at p. 171, see id. at p. 172, fn. 5.) It rejected the "[p]etitioner's proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's 2013Id., at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173 ('[W]henever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic')." (Mickens, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 168 , italics added.) Mickens defined an "actual conflict of interest" for purposes of the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel as a conflict of interest that adversely affects defense counsel's performance, not "a mere theoretical division of loyalties." (Id. at p. 171, see id. at p. 172, fn. 5.) It rejected the "[p]etitioner's proposed rule of automatic reversal when there existed a conflict that did not affect counsel's | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ross v. Oklahoma
green
1 sentence2012(Id. at pp. 87-88.) Given the high court’s conclusion that the Gray majority’s “ ‘ “composition ... as a whole” ’ ” language “is too sweeping to be applied literally” (Ross, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 87 ), and its limitation of the Gray holding to an improper exclusion under Witherspoon-Witt, it appears the Gray court’s automatic reversal rule lacks any agreed-upon rationale for its application. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Disperati
green
2 sentences2009(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 149-150.) Whatever legal justifications may have existed for this automatic reversal rule at the time of the Court of Appeal's decision in People v. Disperati, supra, 11 Cal.App. 469 , those grounds no longer make sense. 2009(Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 149-150.) Whatever legal justifications may have existed for this automatic reversal rule at the time of the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Disperati, supra, 11 Cal.App. 469 , those grounds no longer make sense. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Arizona v. Fulminante green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Daniel S.
green
1 sentence2008Because of the "strict time lines" that govern dependency proceedings, the Court of Appeal stated, the juvenile court was not required to "wait for an indefinite period of time for [the mother] to sufficiently regain her mental faculties to be able to appreciate notice of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing or the hearing to appoint a guardian ad litem." ( Id. at p. 914, 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 646 .) Then came In re C.G. (2005) 129 Cal. App.4th 27 , 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 , another decision from Division Four of the Second Appellate District, and the first to apply an automatic reversal standard. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Enrique G.
green
2 sentences2008In that dependency case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court had erred in appointing a guardian ad litem for the mother without explaining to her the purpose *367 and consequences of the appointment, and without adequate inquiry into her mental competence. ( Id. at pp. 32-33, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 .) The court concluded that "in the circumstances of this case" the error was structural "as explained in Arizona v. Fulminante [(1991) 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ]," requiring automatic reversal of the order placing the dependent child under legal guardianship, because the erroneou 2008In that dependency case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court had erred in appointing a guardian ad litem for the mother without explaining to her the purpose *367 and consequences of the appointment, and without adequate inquiry into her mental competence. ( Id. at pp. 32-33, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 872 .) The court concluded that "in the circumstances of this case" the error was structural "as explained in Arizona v. Fulminante [(1991) 499 U.S. 279 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ]," requiring automatic reversal of the order placing the dependent child under legal guardianship, because the erroneou | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| People v. Elliot green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Pompa-Ortiz green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Valenzuela green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. McNiece green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Hamilton green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Sheffield green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Birreuta green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Reynolds green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Flood green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Hernandez green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Jackson v. Denno green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Connecticut v. Johnson green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.