automatic reversal rule in Connecticut

2005The Mickens court next examined Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2005The Mickens court next examined Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2025We agree with the petitioner and conclude that, assuming that the respondent had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of coun- sel at the termination hearing; see In re Jonathan M., supra, 255 Conn. 225 (noting that parent ‘‘is constitu- tionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel only if he had a constitutional right to appointed counsel in the termination proceeding’’);11 Cronic’s presumption 11 The parties agree that whether the respondent had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution d

2025We agree with the petitioner and conclude that, assuming that the respondent had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of coun- sel at the termination hearing; see In re Jonathan M., supra, 255 Conn. 225 (noting that parent ‘‘is constitu- tionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel only if he had a constitutional right to appointed counsel in the termination proceeding’’);11 Cronic’s presumption 11 The parties agree that whether the respondent had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution d

2003Because the defendant raised the issue of the extent to which the United State Supreme Court abandoned the automatic reversal rule in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S. Ct. 1237 , 152 L.

2003Because the defendant raised the issue of the extent to which the United State Supreme Court abandoned the automatic reversal rule in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S. Ct. 1237 , 152 L.

2003To the extent that the court in Mickens nevertheless discussed the automatic reversal rule as framed by Hol loway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475 , and subsequent cases, the court left Holloway’s holding intact.

2000None carries the heavy weight of the automatic reversal rule fashioned by this court in State v. Suplicki, 33 Conn. App. 126, 130 , 634 A.2d 1179 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 920 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994).

2000None carries the heavy weight of the automatic reversal rule fashioned by this court in State v. Suplicki, 33 Conn. App. 126, 130 , 634 A.2d 1179 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 920 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994).

2000None carries the heavy weight of the automatic reversal rule fashioned by this court in State v. Suplicki, 33 Conn. App. 126, 130 , 634 A.2d 1179 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 920 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994).

2000None carries the heavy weight of the automatic reversal rule fashioned by this court in State v. Suplicki, 33 Conn. App. 126, 130 , 634 A.2d 1179 , cert. denied, 229 Conn. 920 , 642 A.2d 1216 (1994).

1998The majority states as follows: “There was no other evidence in the record from which the trial court was or should have been aware of a conflict of interest so as to compel the invocation of the extraordinary remedy of automatic reversal without a showing of prejudice to the defendant.” Although the majority does not cite United States v. Levy, supra, 25 F.3d 146 , for this proposition, I conclude that its use of the phrase “automatic reversal” is meant to reference Levy’s discussion of this doctrine.

1998There would be no need to analyze the propriety of the attorney’s trial strategy in the manner that alleged attorney errors are analyzed under the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 12 In applying the automatic reversal rule, appellate courts must concern themselves with whether the trial court was sufficiently apprised of a possible conflict, not with why the trial court may not have conducted its constitutionally mandated inquiry.

1998There would be no need to analyze the propriety of the attorney’s trial strategy in the manner that alleged attorney errors are analyzed under the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 12 In applying the automatic reversal rule, appellate courts must concern themselves with whether the trial court was sufficiently apprised of a possible conflict, not with why the trial court may not have conducted its constitutionally mandated inquiry.

1998Although the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that when counsel has brought a possible conflict to the attention of the court, and the court fails to inquire about the nature of the possible conflict, the automatic reversal rule is applied; Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 484 ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.

1998Although the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that when counsel has brought a possible conflict to the attention of the court, and the court fails to inquire about the nature of the possible conflict, the automatic reversal rule is applied; Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 484 ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 , 62 S. Ct. 457 , 86 L.