case involving claim in Florida

2013Similar reasoning was rejected by the fifth district in State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 21 So.3d 904 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), a case involving a claim under a homeowner’s policy.

2011Similar reasoning was rejected by the fifth district in State Farm Florida Insurance Co. v. Nichols, 21 So.3d 904 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), a case involving a claim under a homeowner’s policy.

1964In that clarifying opinion, we read the following interesting reference to Winner v. Sharp on page 861— “In referring to our opinion in Winner v. Sharp, Fla. 1950, 43 So.2d 634 , a case involving the defense of contributory negligence of a third party custodian of a minor child, we pointed out that we were not intending to hold that the mother occupies the position of a third party custodian whose contributory negligence might bind the parents who employ her” (Italics added.) This is all dicta, but it appears to me that the court was attempting to clarify the Winner v. Sharp dicta and the Klep

1957In referring to our opinion in Winner v. Sharp, Fla. 1950, 43 So.2d 634 , a case involving the defense of contributory negligence of a third party custodian of a minor child, we pointed out that we were not intending to hold that the mother occupies the position of a third party custodian whose contributory negligence might bind the parents who employ her.

2018As the Supreme Court explained in Hosanna- Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012), a case involving a claim of improper termination of a school minister: [The minister] no longer seeks reinstatement, having abandoned that relief before this Court.

2011De Ferrari does discuss the insured’s analogy to breach of cooperation clause cases, but rejected that argument and the prejudice requirement. 613 So.2d at 103 .

2011De Ferrari does discuss the insured's analogy to breach of cooperation clause cases, but rejected that argument and the prejudice requirement. 613 So.2d at 103 .

2011In Lorenzo-Martinez v. Safety Insurance Co., 58 Mass.App.Ct. 359 , 790 N.E.2d 692 (2003), the court considered the examination clause in a case involving a claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

2011In Lorenzo-Martinez v. Safety Insurance Co., 58 Mass.App.Ct. 359 , 790 N.E.2d 692 (2003), the court considered the examination clause in a case involving a claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

2011The court held that the failure to attend an IME was a breach of a condition precedent to coverage, citing to Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.Fla.1972), affirmed, 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.1973), which is a case involving a claim for uninsured motorists benefits.

2011The court held that the failure to attend an IME was a breach of a condition precedent to coverage, citing to Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.Fla.1972), affirmed, 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.1973), which is a case involving a claim for uninsured motorists benefits.

2011The court held that the failure to attend an IME was a breach of a condition precedent to coverage, citing to Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.Fla.1972), affirmed, 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.1973), which is a case involving a claim for uninsured motorists benefits.

2011The court held that the failure to attend an IME was a breach of a condition precedent to coverage, citing to Orozco v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 360 F.Supp. 223 (S.D.Fla.1972), affirmed, 480 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.1973), which is a case involving a claim for uninsured motorists benefits.

2010The petition is denied on authority of United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Santa Fe Medical Center, 21 So.3d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (en banc), petition for review pending, No. SC09-2100, proceedings stayed (Fla. Jan. 5, 2010), and United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Metro Injury & Rehab Center, 16 So.3d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), petition for review pending, No. SC09-1946, proceedings stayed (Fla. Jan. 5, 2010).

2010The petition is denied on authority of United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Santa Fe Medical Center, 21 So.3d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (en banc), petition for review pending, No. SC09-2100, proceedings stayed (Fla. Jan. 5, 2010), and United Automobile Insurance Co. v. Metro Injury & Rehab Center, 16 So.3d 897 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), petition for review pending, No. SC09-1946, proceedings stayed (Fla. Jan. 5, 2010).

2008The trial court expressed some concern over the "reasonable precaution" language in the waiver: "I kind of think it is a little misleading when it reads: `I understand that even when every reasonable precaution is taken, accidents can sometimes [still] happen.'" Murphy then pointed the trial court to Goyings v. Jack & Ruth Eckerd Foundation, 403 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), a case involving a waiver that was in some respects similar to the waiver obtained by the YMCA here.

2007The other case was Goldman v. Campbell, 920 So.2d 1264 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), which although recognizing the bright-line trend, did not apply it to a case involving some unique circumstances surrounding Rule 1.442 and the law related to proposals for settlement.

2006This is not a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and thus our analysis is not governed by the standards announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2006This is not a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and thus our analysis is not governed by the standards announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

1998In Lambrix v. State, 698 So.2d 247 (Fla. 1996), a case involving a claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective in not appealing the trial judge's denial of Lambrix's request to represent himself in his original motion for post-conviction relief, our supreme court held that claims of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel do not present a valid basis for relief under rule 3.850. [2] But the court did not consider an issue such as the one before us.

1998The Lambrix holding, since Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 2765 , 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) was cited as authority, seems to be based on the proposition that because one is not entitled to appointed counsel in post-conviction matters, he has no right to relief if counsel is in fact appointed for him or if he obtains his own counsel and suffers a disadvantage because of his counsel's incompetence.

1998The Lambrix holding, since Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 , 109 S.Ct. 2765 , 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) was cited as authority, seems to be based on the proposition that because one is not entitled to appointed counsel in post-conviction matters, he has no right to relief if counsel is in fact appointed for him or if he obtains his own counsel and suffers a disadvantage because of his counsel's incompetence.

1996In Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1990), our supreme court held that a defendant represented by counsel may orally waive a jury trial "if a full explanation of the consequences is given by the trial judge." See also State v. Upton, 658 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1995).

1996In Tucker v. State, 559 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1990), our supreme court held that a defendant represented by counsel may orally waive a jury trial "if a full explanation of the consequences is given by the trial judge." See also State v. Upton, 658 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1995).

1994A notice was published to inform the "unknown father." [1] *86 Our supreme court in Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So.2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, Roe v. Doe, 493 U.S. 964 , 110 S.Ct. 405 , 107 L.Ed.2d 371 (1989), decided a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the consent provision in the adoption statute and reached a result consistent with the per curiam affirmance in this case.

1994A notice was published to inform the "unknown father." [1] *86 Our supreme court in Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So.2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, Roe v. Doe, 493 U.S. 964 , 110 S.Ct. 405 , 107 L.Ed.2d 371 (1989), decided a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the consent provision in the adoption statute and reached a result consistent with the per curiam affirmance in this case.

1994A notice was published to inform the "unknown father." [1] *86 Our supreme court in Matter of Adoption of Doe, 543 So.2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, Roe v. Doe, 493 U.S. 964 , 110 S.Ct. 405 , 107 L.Ed.2d 371 (1989), decided a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of the consent provision in the adoption statute and reached a result consistent with the per curiam affirmance in this case.

1988In so saying, we observe that it is possible that the question certified to the Florida Supreme Court in Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1984), may have influenced appellants' belief that the two terms, comparative negligence and mitigation of damages, involve disparate theories.

1987We need not labor over the meaning of “benefits otherwise due” because this court, in International Bankers Insurance Company v. Govan, 502 So.2d 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), a case involving a claim for medical expenses only, held that: In our view “benefits otherwise due” means the total amount of the medical expenses payable under the policy before application of the deductible.

1984More recently, in Heritage Casket and Vault Inc. v. Sunshine Bank, 428 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), this court refused to apply the harmless error doctrine in a case involving a violation of Rule 1.440.

1984In Miami Dolphins Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1981), a case involving a challenge to a tourist development tax referendum held in Dade County under the statute here involved, this Court quoted the foregoing language from Hill v. Milander with approval, after first saying: While there certainly are many details of the plan not explained on the ballot, we do not require that every aspect of a proposal be explained in the voting booth. 394 So.2d at 987 .

1984In Miami Dolphins Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394 So.2d 981 (Fla. 1981), a case involving a challenge to a tourist development tax referendum held in Dade County under the statute here involved, this Court quoted the foregoing language from Hill v. Milander with approval, after first saying: While there certainly are many details of the plan not explained on the ballot, we do not require that every aspect of a proposal be explained in the voting booth. 394 So.2d at 987 .

1982Tamiami had relied upon Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 , 181 So. 403 (1938), a case involving a violation of a statute prohibiting the employment of children under the age of 16.

1982Tamiami had relied upon Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Corporation v. Adams, 132 Fla. 419 , 181 So. 403 (1938), a case involving a violation of a statute prohibiting the employment of children under the age of 16.