case involving claim in Oregon

1988Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or 337 , 605 P2d 1175 (1980).

1988Inkley v. Forest Fiber Products Co., 288 Or 337 , 605 P2d 1175 (1980).

2025(Def’s Mot at 4 n3.) In a case involving a challenge to the offset of state tax refunds to pay state debts, the court held that due process is satisfied where there is an “opportunity to be heard before the appropriate creditor agency as to the validity and amount of the debt in question.” Brown v. Lobdell, 36 Or App 397, 407 , 585 P2d 4 (1978).

2025(Def’s Mot at 4 n3.) In a case involving a challenge to the offset of state tax refunds to pay state debts, the court held that due process is satisfied where there is an “opportunity to be heard before the appropriate creditor agency as to the validity and amount of the debt in question.” Brown v. Lobdell, 36 Or App 397, 407 , 585 P2d 4 (1978).

2022Linn County Circuit Court 16CV07708; A173658 510 P3d 962 In this case involving a claim for breach of a purported statutory contract, specifically ORS 530.050, defendants appeal a judgment entered in favor of plain- tiffs.

2021We first did so in Withers, a case involving a claim against an attorney for alleged negligence in the drafting of an antenuptial agreement. 67 Or App at 477 .

2021Although the spouses had allegedly intended for the agreement to apply in the event of either divorce or death, the final agreement failed to “provide for the contingency of divorce.” Id.

2020Along similar lines, this court decided City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988), a case involving a challenge to zoning regulations targeted at adult bookstores, which used the content of the publica- tions sold by those establishments as its basis for zoning restrictions.

2020Along similar lines, this court decided City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or 174 , 759 P2d 242 (1988), a case involving a challenge to zoning regulations targeted at adult bookstores, which used the content of the publica- tions sold by those establishments as its basis for zoning restrictions.

2019In discussing the principles of the equitable attor- ney fee doctrine, the court noted three prerequisites for an award: (1) the proceeding must be one in equity; (2) the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party; and (3) “in filing the action, the party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking to ‘vindicat[e] an important consti- tutional right applying to all citizens without any gain pecu- liar to himself,’ Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or [600,] 602[, 841 P2d 633 (1992)], as opposed to vindicating ‘indi- vidualized and different interests,’ Vannatta [v. Keisling]

2019In discussing the principles of the equitable attor- ney fee doctrine, the court noted three prerequisites for an award: (1) the proceeding must be one in equity; (2) the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party; and (3) “in filing the action, the party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking to ‘vindicat[e] an important consti- tutional right applying to all citizens without any gain pecu- liar to himself,’ Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or [600,] 602[, 841 P2d 633 (1992)], as opposed to vindicating ‘indi- vidualized and different interests,’ Vannatta [v. Keisling]

2019In discussing the principles of the equitable attor- ney fee doctrine, the court noted three prerequisites for an award: (1) the proceeding must be one in equity; (2) the party requesting attorney fees must be the prevailing party; and (3) “in filing the action, the party requesting attorney fees must have been seeking to ‘vindicat[e] an important consti- tutional right applying to all citizens without any gain pecu- liar to himself,’ Dennehy v. City of Gresham, 314 Or [600,] 602[, 841 P2d 633 (1992)], as opposed to vindicating ‘indi- vidualized and different interests,’ Vannatta [v. Keisling]

2018In that context, this court has repeatedly stated that a finding that a lawyer has violated the rule prohibiting current or former client conflicts of interest, "standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension." In re Hostetter , 348 Or. 574 , 603, 238 P.3d 13 (2010) ; In re Campbell , 345 Or. 670 , 689, 202 P.3d 871 (2009) (same); In re Hockett , 303 Or. 150 , 164, 734 P.2d 877 (1987) ("By itself, the violation of the conflicts rule *** would justify a 30-day suspension.").

2018In that context, this court has repeatedly stated that a finding that a lawyer has violated the rule prohibiting current or former client conflicts of interest, "standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension." In re Hostetter , 348 Or. 574 , 603, 238 P.3d 13 (2010) ; In re Campbell , 345 Or. 670 , 689, 202 P.3d 871 (2009) (same); In re Hockett , 303 Or. 150 , 164, 734 P.2d 877 (1987) ("By itself, the violation of the conflicts rule *** would justify a 30-day suspension.").

2018In that context, this court has repeatedly stated that a finding that a lawyer has violated the rule prohibiting current or former client conflicts of interest, "standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension." In re Hostetter , 348 Or. 574 , 603, 238 P.3d 13 (2010) ; In re Campbell , 345 Or. 670 , 689, 202 P.3d 871 (2009) (same); In re Hockett , 303 Or. 150 , 164, 734 P.2d 877 (1987) ("By itself, the violation of the conflicts rule *** would justify a 30-day suspension.").

2018In that context, this court has repeatedly stated that a finding that a lawyer has violated the rule prohibiting current or former client conflicts of interest, "standing alone, typically justifies a 30-day suspension." In re Hostetter , 348 Or. 574 , 603, 238 P.3d 13 (2010) ; In re Campbell , 345 Or. 670 , 689, 202 P.3d 871 (2009) (same); In re Hockett , 303 Or. 150 , 164, 734 P.2d 877 (1987) ("By itself, the violation of the conflicts rule *** would justify a 30-day suspension.").

2014Rodriguez also involved a warrantless search, 317 Or at 29 , but one conducted when the defendant spontaneously volunteered consent to a search of his apartment after he was arrested, had received Miranda warnings, and was asked whether he had any guns or drugs in his apartment, id. at 30 .

2014Rodriguez also involved a warrantless search, 317 Or at 29 , but one conducted when the defendant spontaneously volunteered consent to a search of his apartment after he was arrested, had received Miranda warnings, and was asked whether he had any guns or drugs in his apartment, id. at 30 .

2014As we recently observed in State v. Marshall, 254 Or App 419 , 428 n 10, 295 P3d 128 (2013), although a case involving a waiver of constitutional rights in the search and seizure context under Article I, section 9, can have some commonality with a case involving a waiver of rights against self-incrimination in the Article I, section 12, context, it is important to remember a significant difference between the two: “valid waiver of an accused’s right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution must be both knowing and voluntary, whereas valid consent to se

2014As we recently observed in State v. Marshall, 254 Or App 419 , 428 n 10, 295 P3d 128 (2013), although a case involving a waiver of constitutional rights in the search and seizure context under Article I, section 9, can have some commonality with a case involving a waiver of rights against self-incrimination in the Article I, section 12, context, it is important to remember a significant difference between the two: “valid waiver of an accused’s right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution must be both knowing and voluntary, whereas valid consent to se

2011In it, the court quoted Monroe in stating that “[b]eaver are animals ferae naturae, ‘and while in a state of freedom their ownership, so far as a right of property can be asserted, is in the state, not as a proprietor, but in its sovereign capacity for the benefit of and in trust for its people in common.’ ” Id. at 498 (quoting Monroe, 84 Or at 334-35 ).

2011Our understanding of section 39-201 is confirmed by Fields v. Wilson, 186 Or 491 , 207 P2d 153 (1949), a case involving a challenge to a program giving certain individuals exclusive rights to trap beaver.

2011Our understanding of section 39-201 is confirmed by Fields v. Wilson, 186 Or 491 , 207 P2d 153 (1949), a case involving a challenge to a program giving certain individuals exclusive rights to trap beaver.

2009We construe “representation” under section 1692e to include direct or indirect communications to the debtor and indirect communications to include communications to the debtor through the debtor’s attorney. 7 Our conclusion is supported by the result reached by the Supreme Court in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 US 291, 293 , 115 S Ct 1489 , 131 L Ed 2d 395 (1995), a case involving a claim under the Act for communications between the creditor’s attorney and the debtor’s attorney.

2009We construe “representation” under section 1692e to include direct or indirect communications to the debtor and indirect communications to include communications to the debtor through the debtor’s attorney. 7 Our conclusion is supported by the result reached by the Supreme Court in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 US 291, 293 , 115 S Ct 1489 , 131 L Ed 2d 395 (1995), a case involving a claim under the Act for communications between the creditor’s attorney and the debtor’s attorney.

1994Plaintiffs respond that injunctive as well as declaratory relief is appropriate in cases involving challenges to agency rules, citing Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611 , 625 P2d 123 (1981).

1994Plaintiffs respond that injunctive as well as declaratory relief is appropriate in cases involving challenges to agency rules, citing Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611 , 625 P2d 123 (1981).

1989Dept. v. Knox, 20 Or App 455 , 532 P2d 245 (1975), a case involving a claim of double jeopardy.

1989Dept. v. Knox, 20 Or App 455 , 532 P2d 245 (1975), a case involving a claim of double jeopardy.

1989After reviewing United States Supreme Court cases on the subject of the due process rights of juveniles, we noted: “The principle which emerges is that any procedure constitutionally required in criminal proceedings which is one of the ‘essentials of due process and fair treatment,’ will be required in juvenile proceedings, where loss of liberty is at stake, particularly if that procedure will not impair the benefits which the state seeks to promote by the establishment of separate juvenile court systems.” 20 Or App at 462 .

1987In McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437 , 578 P2d 1259 (1978), a case involving immunity of police in placing a child in protective custody, this court stated: “* * * Discretion, as this court has noted in other contexts, involves ‘room for policy judgment’ or the responsibility for deciding ‘the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the *588 course pursued.’ It involves the delegated responsibility for ‘assessment and ranking of the policy objectives explicit or implicit in the statute’ and for the judgment that one or more of the

1987In McBride v. Magnuson, 282 Or 433, 437 , 578 P2d 1259 (1978), a case involving immunity of police in placing a child in protective custody, this court stated: “* * * Discretion, as this court has noted in other contexts, involves ‘room for policy judgment’ or the responsibility for deciding ‘the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the *588 course pursued.’ It involves the delegated responsibility for ‘assessment and ranking of the policy objectives explicit or implicit in the statute’ and for the judgment that one or more of the

1981Douglas Const. v. Mazama Timber, 256 Or 107 , 110- 111, 471 P2d 768 (1970).

1981Douglas Const. v. Mazama Timber, 256 Or 107 , 110- 111, 471 P2d 768 (1970).

1970Thus, the question presented by this case is whether the opinion of an experienced contractor that a profit of 60 cents per cubic yard of gravel would have been made on 14,000 cubic yards of gravel if plaintiff had been permitted to complete the contract, unsupported by evidence of actual costs or other supporting facts, is alone sufficient to support a verdict and judgment for alleged loss of profits, particularly in a case in which plaintiff concedes that “it would have been a simple matter” to provide such an “itemization” as “may have been required.” Plaintiff also concedes that “proof in

1970Thus, the question presented by this case is whether the opinion of an experienced contractor that a profit of 60 cents per cubic yard of gravel would have been made on 14,000 cubic yards of gravel if plaintiff had been permitted to complete the contract, unsupported by evidence of actual costs or other supporting facts, is alone sufficient to support a verdict and judgment for alleged loss of profits, particularly in a case in which plaintiff concedes that “it would have been a simple matter” to provide such an “itemization” as “may have been required.” Plaintiff also concedes that “proof in

1961In Springer v. Durette, 217 Or 196, 200-201 , 342 P2d 132 (1959), a case involving claim to title by adverse possession, we recognized that the grazing of livestock upon wild land was sufficient to constitute possession.

1961In Springer v. Durette, 217 Or 196, 200-201 , 342 P2d 132 (1959), a case involving claim to title by adverse possession, we recognized that the grazing of livestock upon wild land was sufficient to constitute possession.

1960In a case involving the claim of a deserted wife, Re Moorehead’s Estate, *340 289 Pa 542, 137 A 802, 806, 52 ALR 1251 (1927), the basis for this obligation is well described as follows: “* * * In every civilized country is recognized the obligation, sacred as well as lawful, of a husband to protect and provide for his family, and to sustain the claim of the husband in the case at bar would be to invest him with a right to be both a faithless husband and a vicious citizen.

1922Enneberg v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 88 Or. 436 ( 167 Pac. 310 , 171 Pac. 765 ), was a case involving a claim which had been determined by the Industrial Accident Commission.

1922Enneberg v. State Industrial Acc. Com., 88 Or. 436 ( 167 Pac. 310 , 171 Pac. 765 ), was a case involving a claim which had been determined by the Industrial Accident Commission.

1892(Doolan v. Carr, 125 U. S. 618 .) In the latter case the court held that in an action at law such extrinsic facts may be proven as tend to show the patent is void.

1892Foss v. Hinkell, supra, was a case involving this principle, and it was held that the claimant stood in such relation to the land that he might attack a void patent which had been issued to the railroad company, through which the adverse party claimed title.