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39 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1902–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ford v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences1977They rely on Ford v. Bradford, 213 Md. 534 (1957), a case involving a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code in which the court said: [W]hen submitting [the issue of negligence] to the jury, the Court should inform the jury of [the statutory] requirements . .. and instruct them that if they find as a matter of fact a failure in these requirements, this failure is evidence of negligence; and, if the jury further find that such failure was a proximate cause of the [appellant’s] damages, it constitutes negligence. 1977Id. at 542 . | 1 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance v. Fellnergreen1 sentence2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Prince George's Countyred2 sentences2020In Cox, 296 Md. at 171, 164 , 460 A.2d at 1043, 1039 , a case involving the doctrine of respondent superior, this Court concluded that the officers’ actions in allegedly falsely arresting a person were “within the scope and in furtherance of the [employer]’s business and the harm complained of was foreseeable.” Given this Court’s holdings in Sawyer, Houghton, and Cox, even though the officers engaged in what can only be described as egregious conduct, the circumstance that the misconduct occurred while the officers in the instant cases were making arrests favors concluding that the officers ac 2020In Cox, 296 Md. at 171, 164 , 460 A.2d at 1043, 1039 , a case involving the doctrine of respondent superior, this Court concluded that the officers’ actions in allegedly falsely arresting a person were “within the scope and in furtherance of the [employer]’s business and the harm complained of was foreseeable.” Given this Court’s holdings in Sawyer, Houghton, and Cox, even though the officers engaged in what can only be described as egregious conduct, the circumstance that the misconduct occurred while the officers in the instant cases were making arrests favors concluding that the officers ac | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Oswinklegreen2 sentences2015For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Oswinkle, 364 Md. 182, 185-86 , 772 A.2d 267, 269 (2001), cited by the hearing judge in this case, the attorney failed to respond to repeated letters and phone calls from Bar Counsel between August 1998 and April 1999, and then, after finally contacting Bar Counsel, failed again to respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information. 2015For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Oswinkle, 364 Md. 182, 185-86 , 772 A.2d 267, 269 (2001), cited by the hearing judge in this case, the attorney failed to respond to repeated letters and phone calls from Bar Counsel between August 1998 and April 1999, and then, after finally contacting Bar Counsel, failed again to respond to Bar Counsel’s request for information. | 1 | 1 |
Pair v. Stategreen2 sentences2012In Pair v. State, 202 Md.App. 617, 649, 33 A.3d 1024, 1042 (2011), the Court of Special Appeals declined to apply the fundamental fairness doctrine to a case involving a challenge pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) (addressing correction of an illegal sentence) but decided that, even if fundamental fairness did apply, the convictions for first-degree assault, robbery, and false imprisonment still would not merge. . 2012In Pair v. State, 202 Md.App. 617, 649, 33 A.3d 1024, 1042 (2011), the Court of Special Appeals declined to apply the fundamental fairness doctrine to a case involving a challenge pursuant to Rule 4-345(a) (addressing correction of an illegal sentence) but decided that, even if fundamental fairness did apply, the convictions for first-degree assault, robbery, and false imprisonment still would not merge. . | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Webstergreen2 sentences2011Finally, Petitioner cites to Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473-74 , 937 A.2d 161, 175-76 (2007) and Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 665-66 , 870 A.2d 229, 246 (2005), in which attorneys were disbarred for mishandling client funds. 2011Finally, Petitioner cites to Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473-74 , 937 A.2d 161, 175-76 (2007) and Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 665-66 , 870 A.2d 229, 246 (2005), in which attorneys were disbarred for mishandling client funds. | 1 | 1 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Jamesgreen2 sentences2011Finally, Petitioner cites to Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473-74 , 937 A.2d 161, 175-76 (2007) and Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 665-66 , 870 A.2d 229, 246 (2005), in which attorneys were disbarred for mishandling client funds. 2011Finally, Petitioner cites to Attorney Grievance v. Webster, 402 Md. 448, 473-74 , 937 A.2d 161, 175-76 (2007) and Attorney Grievance v. James, 385 Md. 637, 665-66 , 870 A.2d 229, 246 (2005), in which attorneys were disbarred for mishandling client funds. | 1 | 1 |
Boone v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2006For example, in a case involving a bar fight in which the assailant hit the plaintiff *125 over the head with a beer mug, the Supreme Court of Minnesota declined to find that the tavern owner owed the victim a duty because “[t]he evidence presented on this claim was limited to testimony that [the assailant] looked both like he was obviously intoxicated and angry that night” and that “[a]nother witness also stated that he saw [the assailant] ‘half-slam’ his beer down on the table.” Boone v. Martinez, 567 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn.1997). 2006Relying on Minnesota law that requires a plaintiff to prove, among other facts, that “the proprietor [was] put on notice of the offending party’s vicious or dangerous propensities by some act or threat,” the court concluded “that this evidence was not sufficient to present the jury with a fact question of whether the bar was aware of [the assailant’s] vicious propensities.” Id. at 510-11 . | 1 | 1 |
Coley v. Stategreen2 sentences2004See also McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271, 285 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988) (noting that “the 90-day period runs from the time any sentence is imposed or reimposed upon revocation of probation.”) In Coley v. State, 74 Md.App. 151 , 536 A.2d 1166 , a case involving a violation of probation, this Court stated: [W]hen a probation is revoked, the hearing court is returned “to the same position it occupied at the original sentencing of the defendant with one exception; the court may not impose a sentence greater than that which was originally imposed and suspended.” It follows that if an order revoking a de 2004See also McDonald v. State, 314 Md. 271, 285 , 550 A.2d 696 (1988) (noting that “the 90-day period runs from the time any sentence is imposed or reimposed upon revocation of probation.”) In Coley v. State, 74 Md.App. 151 , 536 A.2d 1166 , a case involving a violation of probation, this Court stated: [W]hen a probation is revoked, the hearing court is returned “to the same position it occupied at the original sentencing of the defendant with one exception; the court may not impose a sentence greater than that which was originally imposed and suspended.” It follows that if an order revoking a de | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor v. Bath Iron Works Corporationgreen1 sentence2004Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 885 F.2d 983, 985 (1st Cir.1989) (explaining that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides automatic COLAs “to protect beneficiaries from inflation”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 , 110 S.Ct. 1838 , 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); Powhatan Corr. | 1 | 1 |
| John O. v. Jane O.green | 1 | 1 |
| Council of Co-Owners Atlantis Condominium, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Modern Drop Forge Company v. Secretary of Laborgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Quality Stamping Products v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Secretary of Labor United States Department of Laborgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fowler v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nicholson v. Pagegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schneider v. Pullen
green
2 sentences1977It held, at 340-41: “The enforcement of such a right seems to fall in the category of ‘an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy * * * recognized or regulated by statute’, rather than ‘a special form of remedy for a specific type of case’, within the meaning of Section 6 of Art. 31A.” 4 That the Tawes and Cambridge cases are in fact distinguishable was demonstrated in Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64 , 81 A. 2d 226 (1951), a case involving a challenge by a barber to an act providing for the certification and regulation of private trade schools. 1977It held, at 340-41: “The enforcement of such a right seems to fall in the category of ‘an equitable remedy, or an extraordinary legal remedy * * * recognized or regulated by statute’, rather than ‘a special form of remedy for a specific type of case’, within the meaning of Section 6 of Art. 31A.” 4 That the Tawes and Cambridge cases are in fact distinguishable was demonstrated in Schneider v. Pullen, 198 Md. 64 , 81 A. 2d 226 (1951), a case involving a challenge by a barber to an act providing for the certification and regulation of private trade schools. | 2 | 1977–1977 |
Glenn v. Clapp
neutral
2 sentences1925Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 402 ; Hubbard v. Jarrell, 23 Md. 66 ; Mahoney v. Mackubin, 52 Md. 366 ; Reeside v. Peter, 33 Md. 126 ; Glenn v. Clapp, 11 G. & J. 1 ; Loeber v. Ecker, 55 Md. 2 ; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 G. 294; Hintze v. Stingel, 1 Md. 1902Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 402 ; Hubbard v. Jarrell, 23 Md. 66 ; Mahoney v. Mackubin, 52 Md. 366 ; Reeside v. Peter, 33 Md. 126 ; Glenn v. Clapp, 11 G. & J. 1 ; Loeber v. Eckes, 55 Md. 2 ; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 G. 294; Hintze v. Stingel, 1 Md. | 2 | 1902–1925 |
Hubbard v. Jarrell
green
2 sentences1925Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 402 ; Hubbard v. Jarrell, 23 Md. 66 ; Mahoney v. Mackubin, 52 Md. 366 ; Reeside v. Peter, 33 Md. 126 ; Glenn v. Clapp, 11 G. & J. 1 ; Loeber v. Ecker, 55 Md. 2 ; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 G. 294; Hintze v. Stingel, 1 Md. 1902Hopper v. Hopper, 79 Md. 402 ; Hubbard v. Jarrell, 23 Md. 66 ; Mahoney v. Mackubin, 52 Md. 366 ; Reeside v. Peter, 33 Md. 126 ; Glenn v. Clapp, 11 G. & J. 1 ; Loeber v. Eckes, 55 Md. 2 ; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 G. 294; Hintze v. Stingel, 1 Md. | 2 | 1902–1925 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde
green
2 sentences2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA 2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Attorney Grievance v. Collins
green
1 sentence2026In Vanderlinde, id. at 413-14 , 773 A.2d at 485 , we determined that generally where attorney misconduct involving intentional dishonesty is concerned, a sanction less than disbarment may be imposed only upon a showing by the attorney of compelling extenuating circumstances that are the “root cause” of the misconduct and that result in the “attorney’s utter inability to confirm [the attorney’s] conduct in accordance with the law and with the M[A]RPC.” - 58 - More recently, in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 477 Md. 482, 529-30 , 270 A.3d 917, 945 (2022)—a case involving a violation of MA | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Bennett v. State
green
1 sentence2020Bennett v. State, 236 Md. 562, 568 , 188 A.2d 142 (1963) was a case involving an error in jury instructions. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Boitnott v. Mayor of Baltimore
green
2 sentences2019In Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Balt. , 356 Md. 226 , 228, 234, 738 A.2d 881 , 882 (1999), a case involving a challenge to the validity of a Baltimore City ordinance amending an urban renewal plan, this Court observed that the plaintiffs had successfully alleged taxpayer standing. 2019In Boitnott v. Mayor and City Council of Balt. , 356 Md. 226 , 228, 234, 738 A.2d 881 , 882 (1999), a case involving a challenge to the validity of a Baltimore City ordinance amending an urban renewal plan, this Court observed that the plaintiffs had successfully alleged taxpayer standing. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Edgewood Management Corp. v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2016In Edgewood, 212 Md.App. at 199 , 66 A.3d 1152 , a case involving a claim of retaliation under MCC § 27-19, this Court explained: “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on retaliation, a plaintiff must produce evidence that she [ (1) ] engaged in a protected activity; [ (2) ] her employer took an adverse action against her; and [ (3) ] her employer’s adverse action was causally connected to her protected activity.” If the plaintiff meets his or her burden of production in this regard, “the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to offer a non-retaliatory reason for 2016In Edgewood, 212 Md.App. at 199 , 66 A.3d 1152 , a case involving a claim of retaliation under MCC § 27-19, this Court explained: “To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on retaliation, a plaintiff must produce evidence that she [ (1) ] engaged in a protected activity; [ (2) ] her employer took an adverse action against her; and [ (3) ] her employer’s adverse action was causally connected to her protected activity.” If the plaintiff meets his or her burden of production in this regard, “the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to offer a non-retaliatory reason for | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Faya v. Almaraz
green
2 sentences2013A Reasonable and Objective Fear of Disease Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435 , 620 A.2d 327 (1993), 50 a case involving a claim for emotional distress damages based on a fear of contracting the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), determines the appropriate standard in this case. 2013A Reasonable and Objective Fear of Disease Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435 , 620 A.2d 327 (1993), 50 a case involving a claim for emotional distress damages based on a fear of contracting the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), determines the appropriate standard in this case. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs
green
2 sentences2012In Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md.App. 403, 427 , 762 A.2d 991 (2000), cert. denied, 363 Md. 206 , 768 A.2d 54 (2001), a case involving a claim of conversion of mining products, as to damages generally, we stated: As a general rule, the evidence to warrant damages must show that the plaintiff has sustained some injury and must establish sufficient data from which the court or jury can properly estimate the extent of the damages. 2012In Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md.App. 403, 427 , 762 A.2d 991 (2000), cert. denied, 363 Md. 206 , 768 A.2d 54 (2001), a case involving a claim of conversion of mining products, as to damages generally, we stated: As a general rule, the evidence to warrant damages must show that the plaintiff has sustained some injury and must establish sufficient data from which the court or jury can properly estimate the extent of the damages. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Layton v. Howard County Board of Appeals
green
1 sentence2010Id. 14 *164 We revisited the Yorkdale rule most recently in Grasslands, a case involving a challenge to a subdivision application by an adjacent property owner. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hacker v. Shofer
green
2 sentences2008In Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77 , 248 A.2d 351 (1968), a case involving a claim for breach of implied warranty based on a defective bicycle that led to an accident, the Court held that, in order to prevail on a theory of breach of express or implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove that the product did not conform to the representations of the warranty at the time it left the seller’s control. 20 “[T]o allow the jury to decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probab 2008In Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77 , 248 A.2d 351 (1968), a case involving a claim for breach of implied warranty based on a defective bicycle that led to an accident, the Court held that, in order to prevail on a theory of breach of express or implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove that the product did not conform to the representations of the warranty at the time it left the seller’s control. 20 “[T]o allow the jury to decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probab | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
green
2 sentences2008In Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77 , 248 A.2d 351 (1968), a case involving a claim for breach of implied warranty based on a defective bicycle that led to an accident, the Court held that, in order to prevail on a theory of breach of express or implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove that the product did not conform to the representations of the warranty at the time it left the seller’s control. 20 “[T]o allow the jury to decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probab 2008In Hacker v. Shofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77 , 248 A.2d 351 (1968), a case involving a claim for breach of implied warranty based on a defective bicycle that led to an accident, the Court held that, in order to prevail on a theory of breach of express or implied warranty, the plaintiff must prove that the product did not conform to the representations of the warranty at the time it left the seller’s control. 20 “[T]o allow the jury to decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probab | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Lane v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
green
2 sentences2008In Lane v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 321 Md. 165 , 582 A.2d 501 (1990), which was a case involving a claim by an insured against its insurer for uninsured motorist benefits, the Court of Appeals rejected the insurer’s contention that limitations began to run as soon as the insured learned that the tortfeasers were uninsured. 2008In Lane v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 321 Md. 165 , 582 A.2d 501 (1990), which was a case involving a claim by an insured against its insurer for uninsured motorist benefits, the Court of Appeals rejected the insurer’s contention that limitations began to run as soon as the insured learned that the tortfeasers were uninsured. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Marvin Martin v. James H. Rose William Leech
green
1 sentence2005In *269 Warner , the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245 (6th Cir.1984). 14 In Warner , the Eleventh Circuit considered a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a case involving defense counsel’s silence during the defendant’s trial. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Jackson v. Benson green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2004Cl. 148, 164 (2001) (noting in a case involving a claim for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act that a COLA offsets the decrease in value of attorney’s fees due to inflation), rev’d, on other grounds, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 , 123 S.Ct. 871 , 154 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003); Director, Office of Workers' Comp. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States
green
1 sentence2004Cl. 148, 164 (2001) (noting in a case involving a claim for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act that a COLA offsets the decrease in value of attorney’s fees due to inflation), rev’d, on other grounds, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed.Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 , 123 S.Ct. 871 , 154 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003); Director, Office of Workers' Comp. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
First National Bank v. Huffman Independent School District
green
1 sentence2004Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 885 F.2d 983, 985 (1st Cir.1989) (explaining that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides automatic COLAs “to protect beneficiaries from inflation”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 , 110 S.Ct. 1838 , 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); Powhatan Corr. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Superior Roll Forming Co. v. InterRoyal Corp.
green
1 sentence2004Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 885 F.2d 983, 985 (1st Cir.1989) (explaining that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides automatic COLAs “to protect beneficiaries from inflation”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 , 110 S.Ct. 1838 , 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); Powhatan Corr. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
County of Los Angeles v. Cabrales
green
1 sentence2004Programs, United States Dep’t of Labor v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 885 F.2d 983, 985 (1st Cir.1989) (explaining that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act provides automatic COLAs “to protect beneficiaries from inflation”), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091 , 110 S.Ct. 1838 , 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990); Powhatan Corr. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Lussier v. Maryland Racing Commission green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Viereck v. United States green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Jacques v. First National Bank green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Archway Motors, Inc. v. Herman green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Taylor v. Wahby green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ace Sheeting and Repair Company v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission and F. Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Dean v. Redmiles green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| NSC Contractors, Inc. v. Borders green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Shaw v. City of Auburn green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| City of Niagara Falls v. Rudolph green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Stauffer Construction Co. v. Board of Education green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| King v. THOMPSON & McKINNON, AUCHINCLOSS, ETC. green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Mason v. Wrightson green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Beane v. McMullen green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Loscomb green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Loscomb v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Sun Cab Co., Inc. v. Hall green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Mumford v. Staton, Whaley & Price green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.