case involving claim in Michigan

2017A bit of the difficulty in analyzing this case is that there is no evidence specifically indicating why hospital personnel did not respond to Rogers’ room after he repeatedly pressed the call button preceding the two falls, assuming that he actually did so.2 In Trowell, 316 Mich App at 699-700 , a case involving a claim that a nurse’s aide twice dropped the plaintiff while assisting her in walking to a hospital bathroom and where the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint were all that could be considered because no documentary evidence was submitted for purposes of summary disposition, this

2017A bit of the difficulty in analyzing this case is that there is no evidence specifically indicating why hospital personnel did not respond to Rogers’ room after he repeatedly pressed the call button preceding the two falls, assuming that he actually did so.2 In Trowell, 316 Mich App at 699-700 , a case involving a claim that a nurse’s aide twice dropped the plaintiff while assisting her in walking to a hospital bathroom and where the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint were all that could be considered because no documentary evidence was submitted for purposes of summary disposition, this

2026Thus, for example, in Wikman, our Supreme Court concluded that the Tax Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over a case involving a challenge to special assessments “levied pursuant to a home-rule city’s charter.” Id.

2026Later, in Hillsdale Co Senior Servs, Inc v Hillsdale Co, 494 Mich 46 ; 832 NW2d 728 (2013), the Court explained that under MCL 205.731(a), four elements must be satisfied for the Tax Tribunal to have exclusive jurisdiction: (1) a proceeding for direct review of a final decision, finding, ruling, determination, or order; (2) of an agency; (3) relating to an assessment, valuation, rate, special assessment, allocation, or equalization; (4) under the property tax laws.

2015Id. at 664 , quoting Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 177 ; 87 S Ct 903 ; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967).

2015Id. at 664 , quoting Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 177 ; 87 S Ct 903 ; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967).

2015In Goolsby, a case involving a claim that the union failed to fully process member grievances against the city regarding newly-imposed employment physicals, our Supreme Court recognized a union’s duty of fair representation: In conclusion, we hold that: (1) PERA impliedly imposes on labor organizations representing public sector employees a duty of fair representation; (2) bad-faith conduct is not always required to make out a breach of that duty; (3) the conduct prohibited by the duty of fair representation includes (a) impulsive, irrational or unreasoned conduct, (b) inept conduct undertaken

2015Id. at 664 , quoting Vaca v Sipes, 386 US 171, 177 ; 87 S Ct 903 ; 17 L Ed 2d 842 (1967).

2000In Murray v Giarratano, 492 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 2765 ; 106 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), 25 a case involving a claim by indigent death row inmates for appointed counsel for state postconviction proceedings, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [ 82 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963),] and an indigent defendant is similarly entitled as a matter of right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

2000In Murray v Giarratano, 492 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 2765 ; 106 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), 25 a case involving a claim by indigent death row inmates for appointed counsel for state postconviction proceedings, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [ 82 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963),] and an indigent defendant is similarly entitled as a matter of right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

2000Douglas v California, [supra]; Griffin v Illinois, [supra].

2000Douglas v California, [supra]; Griffin v Illinois, [supra].

2000In Murray v Giarratano, 492 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 2765 ; 106 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), 25 a case involving a claim by indigent death row inmates for appointed counsel for state postconviction proceedings, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [ 82 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963),] and an indigent defendant is similarly entitled as a matter of right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

2000In Murray v Giarratano, 492 US 1 ; 109 S Ct 2765 ; 106 L Ed 2d 1 (1989), 25 a case involving a claim by indigent death row inmates for appointed counsel for state postconviction proceedings, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution assure the right of an indigent defendant to counsel at the trial stage of a criminal proceeding, Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335 [ 82 S Ct 792 ; 9 L Ed 2d 799 (1963),] and an indigent defendant is similarly entitled as a matter of right to counsel for an initial appeal from the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

2000Douglas v. California, [ supra ]; Griffin v. Illinois, [ supra ]; But we held in Ross v. Moffitt, supra at 610 [ 94 S.Ct. 2437 ], that the right to counsel at these earlier stages of a criminal procedure did not carry over to a discretionary appeal provided by North Carolina law from the intermediate appellate court to the Supreme Court of North Carolina. [ Murray, supra at 7 , 109 S.Ct. 2765 .] Two points are apparent.

1994Dennis v Robbins Funeral Home, 428 Mich 698, 704 ; 411 NW2d 156 (1987).

1994Dennis v Robbins Funeral Home, 428 Mich 698, 704 ; 411 NW2d 156 (1987).

1992Also see People v Wiggins, 151 Mich App 622, 625-626 ; 390 NW2d 740 (1986), and People v Baldwin, 130 Mich App 653, 655 ; 344 NW2d 37 (1983).

1992Also see People v Wiggins, 151 Mich App 622, 625-626 ; 390 NW2d 740 (1986), and People v Baldwin, 130 Mich App 653, 655 ; 344 NW2d 37 (1983).

1992Also see People v Wiggins, 151 Mich App 622, 625-626 ; 390 NW2d 740 (1986), and People v Baldwin, 130 Mich App 653, 655 ; 344 NW2d 37 (1983).

1992Also see People v Wiggins, 151 Mich App 622, 625-626 ; 390 NW2d 740 (1986), and People v Baldwin, 130 Mich App 653, 655 ; 344 NW2d 37 (1983).

1989State v Frazier, 683 SW2d 346 (Tenn Crim App, 1984).

1984Scott, supra. In the present case, at the time this testimony was admitted, defendants’ claim of fraud was viable and had not yet been dismissed by the court by directed verdict.

1977Thus the only authority supporting the rule that trespass is a basic requirement of an attractive nuisance is Royston v City of Charlotte, 278 Mich 255 ; 270 NW 288 (1936), decided during an era when the Michigan Supreme Court hewed to a decidedly conservative approach to claims founded on attractive nuisance.

1977Thus the only authority supporting the rule that trespass is a basic requirement of an attractive nuisance is Royston v City of Charlotte, 278 Mich 255 ; 270 NW 288 (1936), decided during an era when the Michigan Supreme Court hewed to a decidedly conservative approach to claims founded on attractive nuisance.

1919The authorities upon this subject are thoroughly discussed in Mollica v. Railroad Co., 170 Mich. 96 .

1901A case involving this principle is Ducker v. Rapp, 67 N. Y. 464 .