case involving claim in Pennsylvania

2025This Court, quoting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, has explained: A court is bound to decide the case before it based upon the evidence presented to it by the parties; it has no authority to seek out additional testimony in the records of unrelated cases on the matters at issue before it. [The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court, in a case involving a claim of res judicata, noted that [“]a court may not ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of the records in another case even though the case arose in the same court and the contents of those records are known to the court.[”] Callery v. Mun[.] A

2014This Court, in a case involving a claim of res judicata, noted that “a court may not ordinarily take judicial notice in one case of the records in another case even though the case arose in the same court and the contents of those records are known to the court.” Callery v. Municipal Authority of Township of Blythe, 432 Pa. 307, 309 , 243 A.2d 385, 386 (1968).

2005In addition to lacking arguable merit, appellee’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as a matter of law for the narrower reason ultimately deemed dispositive by the Majority Opinion, i.e., he has not demonstrated Strickland/Pierce prejudice. 6 I am aware that, in Commonwealth v. Clark, 533 Pa. 579 , 626 A.2d 154 (1993)—a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance in failing to object to a classic Doyle violation involving impeachment of the accused with his post-arrest silence—this Court found improper references to post-arrest silence to be “innately prejudicial,” in the proc

2005In addition to lacking arguable merit, appellee’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails as a matter of law for the narrower reason ultimately deemed dispositive by the Majority Opinion, i.e., he has not demonstrated Strickland/Pierce prejudice. 6 I am aware that, in Commonwealth v. Clark, 533 Pa. 579 , 626 A.2d 154 (1993)—a case involving a claim of ineffective assistance in failing to object to a classic Doyle violation involving impeachment of the accused with his post-arrest silence—this Court found improper references to post-arrest silence to be “innately prejudicial,” in the proc

2025See id. at 34- 38. -6- J-A12040-25 absence of case law addressing the scope of permission in a case involving a claim for a prescriptive easement.

2019Appellant’s argument ends with a citation to a case involving a claim of prosecutorial misconduct.12 Id. at 31 (citing Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 114 (Pa. 2004), for the proposition that the Commonwealth’s closing argument should be limited to the evidence and legitimate inferences from the evidence).

2019See Johnson’s Brief at 10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167 (Pa. 1993)).

2016Helvetia Coal Company v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Learn), 913 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

2015This presents a challenge to the sufficiency, rather than the weight, of the evidence presented at his adjudication hearing.2 B.L.A. has failed to preserve such a challenge for our ____________________________________________ 2 Indeed, the only relevant case law B.L.A. cites in his appellate brief is In Interest of D.S., 622 A.2d 954, 961 (Pa. Super. 1993), a case involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. -6- J-S45021-15 review.

2014Sokolsky v. Eidelman, 93 A.3d 858, 868-871 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2007In a subsequent case involving a claim by prison guards for reimbursement of attorney fees, this Court referred to “Executive Board regulations at 4 Pa. Code §§ 39.1-4 , which indeed do create a conditional entitlement in state employees to reimbursement for counsel fees.” Burroughs v. Zimmerman, 94 Pa.Cmwlth. 307 , 503 A.2d 1014, 1015 (1986) (emphasis added).

2007In a subsequent case involving a claim by prison guards for reimbursement of attorney fees, this Court referred to “Executive Board regulations at 4 Pa. Code §§ 39.1-4 , which indeed do create a conditional entitlement in state employees to reimbursement for counsel fees.” Burroughs v. Zimmerman, 94 Pa.Cmwlth. 307 , 503 A.2d 1014, 1015 (1986) (emphasis added).

2005Id. at 158. 7 The Majority Opinion is wise to explicitly reject an “innate prejudice” test in this instance, not only because Clark involved a post-arrest silence scenario, but more fundamentally because the vitality of Clark’s broad and unexplained pronouncement on ineffectiveness prejudice is obviously wrong given controlling federal law, as well as subsequent decisions by this Court such as Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307-08 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553 , 782 A.2d 517, 524-25 (2001), which have recognized the crucial distinction in the tests.

2005Id. at 158. 7 The Majority Opinion is wise to explicitly reject an “innate prejudice” test in this instance, not only because Clark involved a post-arrest silence scenario, but more fundamentally because the vitality of Clark’s broad and unexplained pronouncement on ineffectiveness prejudice is obviously wrong given controlling federal law, as well as subsequent decisions by this Court such as Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307-08 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553 , 782 A.2d 517, 524-25 (2001), which have recognized the crucial distinction in the tests.

2005Id. at 158. 7 The Majority Opinion is wise to explicitly reject an “innate prejudice” test in this instance, not only because Clark involved a post-arrest silence scenario, but more fundamentally because the vitality of Clark’s broad and unexplained pronouncement on ineffectiveness prejudice is obviously wrong given controlling federal law, as well as subsequent decisions by this Court such as Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307-08 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553 , 782 A.2d 517, 524-25 (2001), which have recognized the crucial distinction in the tests.

2005Id. at 158. 7 The Majority Opinion is wise to explicitly reject an “innate prejudice” test in this instance, not only because Clark involved a post-arrest silence scenario, but more fundamentally because the vitality of Clark’s broad and unexplained pronouncement on ineffectiveness prejudice is obviously wrong given controlling federal law, as well as subsequent decisions by this Court such as Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86 , 645 A.2d 1300, 1307-08 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Williams, 566 Pa. 553 , 782 A.2d 517, 524-25 (2001), which have recognized the crucial distinction in the tests.

2000The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application; otherwise it does not apply.” Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa. 523, 528 , 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 250-51 , 701 A.2d 176, 181 (1997)). ¶ 10 “The legal identification of a father, however, even in a case involving the presumption of paternity, may also involve the question of estoppel.” Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 248 , 701 A.2d at 179 (1997).

2000The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application; otherwise it does not apply.” Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa. 523, 528 , 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 250-51 , 701 A.2d 176, 181 (1997)). ¶ 10 “The legal identification of a father, however, even in a case involving the presumption of paternity, may also involve the question of estoppel.” Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 248 , 701 A.2d at 179 (1997).

2000The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application; otherwise it does not apply.” Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa. 523, 528 , 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 250-51 , 701 A.2d 176, 181 (1997)). ¶ 10 “The legal identification of a father, however, even in a case involving the presumption of paternity, may also involve the question of estoppel.” Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 248 , 701 A.2d at 179 (1997).

2000The presumption only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application; otherwise it does not apply.” Fish v. Behers, 559 Pa. 523, 528 , 741 A.2d 721, 723 (1999) (emphasis supplied) (quoting Brinkley v. King, 549 Pa. 241, 250-51 , 701 A.2d 176, 181 (1997)). ¶ 10 “The legal identification of a father, however, even in a case involving the presumption of paternity, may also involve the question of estoppel.” Brinkley, 549 Pa. at 248 , 701 A.2d at 179 (1997).