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27 Kansas opinions name it 3 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leiker Ex Rel. Leiker v. Gaffordgreen2 sentences1997"Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Leiker, 245 Kan. at 363-64 . 1997“Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.” Leiker, 245 Kan. at 363-64 . | 4 | 5 |
Peden v. STATE, KANSAS DEPT. OF REVENUEgreen2 sentences2018In Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 261 Kan. 239 , 253-54, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229 , 117 S.Ct. 1821 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997), our Supreme Court held that such an after-the-fact rationalization of the Legislature's action was permissible: " 'Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any , in establishing the challenged [statute]....' "... [B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the con 2018In Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 261 Kan. 239 , 253-54, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229 , 117 S.Ct. 1821 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997), our Supreme Court held that such an after-the-fact rationalization of the Legislature's action was permissible: " 'Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any , in establishing the challenged [statute]....' "... [B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the con | 2 | 8 |
Farley v. Engelkengreen2 sentences1991McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425-26 [ 81 S.Ct. at 1104-05 ]; Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. at 669 [ 740 P.2d 1058 ]; State ex rel. 1991McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425-26 ; Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. at 669 ; State ex rel. | 2 | 2 |
Bair v. Peckgreen2 sentences1997This may be true; however, it does not matter. "`"Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any, in establishing the challenged [statute]."' [Quoting Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 834 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991).] ... "[B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, `it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [statute] actually motivated the legislature.' [ F.C.C. v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 124 L. 1997This may be true; however, it does not matter. "`"Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any, in establishing the challenged [statute]."' [Quoting Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 834 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991).] ... "[B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, `it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [statute] actually motivated the legislature.' [ F.C.C. v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 124 L. | 1 | 5 |
Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklingreen2 sentences2005Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ ” Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 847 , 942 P.2d 591 (1997). 2005Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ ” Injured Workers of Kansas v. Franklin, 262 Kan. 840, 847 , 942 P.2d 591 (1997). | 1 | 4 |
McGowan v. Marylandgreen2 sentences1985The reasonable basis test was originally set forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 (1961), as follows: "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. 1985The reasonable basis test was originally set forth in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 (1961), as follows: "The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. | 1 | 4 |
Stephenson v. Sugar Creek Packing & Hartford Insurancegreen2 sentences2007Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. [Citations omitted.]” “Relevance is the only relationship required between the classification and the [legislature’s] objective.” Stephenson v. Sugar Creek Packing, 250 Kan. 768, 774 , 830 P.2d 41 (1992). 2007Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. [Citations omitted.]” “Relevance is the only relationship required between the classification and the [legislature’s] objective.” Stephenson v. Sugar Creek Packing, 250 Kan. 768, 774 , 830 P.2d 41 (1992). | 1 | 2 |
Mudd v. Neosho Memorial Regional Medical Centergreen1 sentence2004See Mudd, 275 Kan. at 198 (“ ‘ “Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may he conceived to justify it.” ’ ” [Emphasis added.]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ochoa v. Federal Communications Commission
green
2 sentences2018In Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 261 Kan. 239 , 253-54, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229 , 117 S.Ct. 1821 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997), our Supreme Court held that such an after-the-fact rationalization of the Legislature's action was permissible: " 'Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any , in establishing the challenged [statute]....' "... [B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the con 2004Under the reasonable basis test, a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ Syl. ¶ 5. “ ‘A plaintiff asserting the unconstitutionality of a statute under the rational basis standard has the burden to negate every conceivable basis which might support the classification.’ Syl. ¶ 6. “ ‘In taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.’ Syl. ¶ 7.” In re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc., 265 Kan. 510, 522 , 962 P.2d 435 (1998) (quoting Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, | 6 | 1997–2018 |
In Re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2006In concluding that the taxpayers failed to meet their burden of establishing an equal protection violation, the court set forth the applicable standards enumerated in In re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc., 265 Kan. 510, 522 , 962 P.2d 435 (1998): “ ‘Equal protection is implicated when a statute treats “arguably indistinguishable’ classes of people differently. . . .” Syl. ¶ 3. “ ‘The rational basis standard (sometimes referred to as the reasonable basis test) applies to laws which result in some economic inequality. 2006In concluding that the taxpayers failed to meet their burden of establishing an equal protection violation, the court set forth the applicable standards enumerated in In re Tax Appeal of Alsop Sand Co., Inc., 265 Kan. 510, 522 , 962 P.2d 435 (1998): “ ‘Equal protection is implicated when a statute treats “arguably indistinguishable’ classes of people differently. . . .” Syl. ¶ 3. “ ‘The rational basis standard (sometimes referred to as the reasonable basis test) applies to laws which result in some economic inequality. | 2 | 2004–2006 |
City of New Orleans v. Dukes
green
2 sentences1996New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 49 L. 1996New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 49 L. | 2 | 1983–1996 |
Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley
green
2 sentences1983In Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20 , 643 P.2d 87 (1982), we reviewed at some length the application of the reasonable basis test and we need not repeat what was said there. 1983In Manhattan Buildings, Inc. v. Hurley, 231 Kan. 20 , 643 P.2d 87 (1982), we reviewed at some length the application of the reasonable basis test and we need not repeat what was said there. | 2 | 1983–1985 |
Vickers v. Wichita State University
green
1 sentence2024"Absolute certainty in proving loss of future profits is not required," but the fact-finder must be "guided by some rational standard." Vickers, 213 Kan. at 620 . 10 The district court found Harden's report did not provide a reasonable basis or standard for computing Strategic's damages because it ignored relevant facts and relied on unfounded assumptions. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McKissick v. Frye
green
2 sentences2024And "[r]ecovery may not be had where the alleged damages are too conjectural or speculative to form a basis for measurement." McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, 591 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994). "'[S]peculative damages'" are "'[p]rospective or anticipated damages from the same acts or facts constituting the present cause of action, but which depend upon future developments which are contingent, conjectural, or improbable.'" CoreFirst Bank & Trust v. JHawker Capital, 47 Kan. 2024And "[r]ecovery may not be had where the alleged damages are too conjectural or speculative to form a basis for measurement." McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, 591 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994). "'[S]peculative damages'" are "'[p]rospective or anticipated damages from the same acts or facts constituting the present cause of action, but which depend upon future developments which are contingent, conjectural, or improbable.'" CoreFirst Bank & Trust v. JHawker Capital, 47 Kan. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
CoreFirst Bank & Trust v. JHawker Capital, LLC
neutral
1 sentence2024And "[r]ecovery may not be had where the alleged damages are too conjectural or speculative to form a basis for measurement." McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566, 591 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994). "'[S]peculative damages'" are "'[p]rospective or anticipated damages from the same acts or facts constituting the present cause of action, but which depend upon future developments which are contingent, conjectural, or improbable.'" CoreFirst Bank & Trust v. JHawker Capital, 47 Kan. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange
green
1 sentence2018In Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 261 Kan. 239 , 253-54, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229 , 117 S.Ct. 1821 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997), our Supreme Court held that such an after-the-fact rationalization of the Legislature's action was permissible: " 'Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any , in establishing the challenged [statute]....' "... [B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the con | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018In Peden v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue , 261 Kan. 239 , 253-54, 930 P.2d 1 (1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1229 , 117 S.Ct. 1821 , 137 L.Ed.2d 1029 (1997), our Supreme Court held that such an after-the-fact rationalization of the Legislature's action was permissible: " 'Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any , in establishing the challenged [statute]....' "... [B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, 'it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the con | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997This may be true; however, it does not matter. "`"Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any, in establishing the challenged [statute]."' [Quoting Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 834 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991).] ... "[B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, `it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [statute] actually motivated the legislature.' [ F.C.C. v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 124 L. 1997This may be true; however, it does not matter. "`"Under the reasonable basis test, it is unnecessary to ascertain the specific purpose the Kansas Legislature espoused, if any, in establishing the challenged [statute]."' [Quoting Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824, 834 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991).] ... "[B]ecause a legislature is not required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute, `it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged [statute] actually motivated the legislature.' [ F.C.C. v Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 , 124 L. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Risjord
green
1 sentence1993Risjord , supra , at 503. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences1991State v. Moore, 237 Kan. 523, 530 , 701 P.2d 684 (1985). 1991State v. Moore, 237 Kan. 523, 530 , 701 P.2d 684 (1985). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.