reasonable basis inquiry in Washington

2007Generally, evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 must be suppressed. [4] See Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 699 , 92 P.3d 202 . ¶ 18 "When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed." State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 359 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

2007Generally, evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 must be suppressed. 4 See Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 699 . ¶18 “When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 359 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

2007Generally, evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 must be suppressed. [4] See Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 699 , 92 P.3d 202 . ¶ 18 "When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed." State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 359 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

2007Generally, evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 must be suppressed. 4 See Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 699 . ¶18 “When an unconstitutional search or seizure occurs, all subsequently uncovered evidence becomes fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed.” State v. Ladson, 138 Wn.2d 343, 359 , 979 P.2d 833 (1999).

2007An “articulable suspicion of criminal activity” is an “independent basis.” Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 699 . “[A] mere request for identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a reasonable basis for the inquiry.” Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 697 .

2007An “articulable suspicion of criminal activity” is an “independent basis.” Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 699 . “[A] mere request for identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a reasonable basis for the inquiry.” Rankin, 151 Wn.2d at 697 .

2004In Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 531 , 692 N.E.2d 106 (1998), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that an unlawful seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer interrogates “passengers in [a] car unless the [law enforcement officer] has a ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific, articulable facts,’ that a particular passenger in the car is involved in criminal activity or ‘engaged in other suspicious conduct.’” Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 , 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997)).

2004In Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 531 , 692 N.E.2d 106 (1998), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that an unlawful seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer interrogates “passengers in [a] car unless the [law enforcement officer] has a ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific, articulable facts,’ that a particular passenger in the car is involved in criminal activity or ‘engaged in other suspicious conduct.’” Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 , 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997)).

2004In Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 531 , 692 N.E.2d 106 (1998), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that an unlawful seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer interrogates “passengers in [a] car unless the [law enforcement officer] has a ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific, articulable facts,’ that a particular passenger in the car is involved in criminal activity or ‘engaged in other suspicious conduct.’” Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 , 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997)).

2004In Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 531 , 692 N.E.2d 106 (1998), the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that an unlawful seizure occurs when a law enforcement officer interrogates “passengers in [a] car unless the [law enforcement officer] has a ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific, articulable facts,’ that a particular passenger in the car is involved in criminal activity or ‘engaged in other suspicious conduct.’” Alvarez, 692 N.E.2d at 108 (quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 153, 158 , 674 N.E.2d 638 (1997)).

2019“Under the reasonable basis theory, the advertiser must have had some recognizable substantiation for the representation prior to making it an advertisement.” John Beck Amazing Profits, LLC, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 .

2019Mansour, 131 Wn. App. at 263 -20- No. 76463-2-1/2 1 In order to satisfy the CPA, an advertiser must have a reasonable basis for its claim.

2007An "articulable suspicion of criminal activity" is an "independent basis." Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 699 , 92 P.3d 202 . "[A] mere request for identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a reasonable basis for the inquiry." Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 697 , 92 P.3d 202 .

2007An "articulable suspicion of criminal activity" is an "independent basis." Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 699 , 92 P.3d 202 . "[A] mere request for identification from a passenger for investigatory purposes constitutes a seizure unless there is a reasonable basis for the inquiry." Rankin, 151 Wash.2d at 697 , 92 P.3d 202 .

1971See Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, supra; Slattery v. Seattle, 169 Wash. 144 , 13 P.2d 464 (1932); Lasityr v. Olympia, 61 Wash. 651 , 112 P. 752 (1911).

1971See Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, supra; Slattery v. Seattle, 169 Wash. 144 , 13 P.2d 464 (1932); Lasityr v. Olympia, 61 Wash. 651 , 112 P. 752 (1911).

1971See Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, supra; Slattery v. Seattle, 169 Wash. 144 , 13 P.2d 464 (1932); Lasityr v. Olympia, 61 Wash. 651 , 112 P. 752 (1911).

1971See Heitfeld v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Keglers, supra; Slattery v. Seattle, 169 Wash. 144 , 13 P.2d 464 (1932); Lasityr v. Olympia, 61 Wash. 651 , 112 P. 752 (1911).