reasonable basis standard in Pennsylvania

1983Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604 , 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967): “[C]ounsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” The initial factor which must be considered in applying this reasonable basis standard is whether the claim which post-trial counsel is charged with not pursuing had some reasonable basis....

1983Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 604 , 235 A.2d 349, 352 (1967): “[C]ounsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” The initial factor which must be considered in applying this reasonable basis standard is whether the claim which post-trial counsel is charged with not pursuing had some reasonable basis....

1979Therefore, “[t]he initial factor which must be considered in applying this reasonable basis standard is whether the claim which [trial] counsel is charged with not pursuing had some reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 277 , 372 A.2d 687, 695 (1977).

1979Therefore, “[t]he initial factor which must be considered in applying this reasonable basis standard is whether the claim which [trial] counsel is charged with not pursuing had some reasonable basis.” Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 277 , 372 A.2d 687, 695 (1977).

2023If the defendant is able 415,422 to demonstrate the witness is willing to testify, the Court must apply a reasonable basis test to determine if counsel's chosen course was designed to effectuate the client's kl "If [the Court] conclude[s] that tthe interests. ld. he particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed v. Weiss, 530 Pa. 1, 5-6 , 606 A.2d 439, 441-442 (1992) effective." Commonwealth y. (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

2023If the defendant is able 415,422 to demonstrate the witness is willing to testify, the Court must apply a reasonable basis test to determine if counsel's chosen course was designed to effectuate the client's kl "If [the Court] conclude[s] that tthe interests. ld. he particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed v. Weiss, 530 Pa. 1, 5-6 , 606 A.2d 439, 441-442 (1992) effective." Commonwealth y. (citing Commonwealth ex rel.

2021The elements of the offense of receiving stolen property are: “(1) intentionally acquiring possession, control or title, retaining, disposing, or lending on the security of movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was probably stolen; and (3) intent to deprive permanently.” Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 807 (Pa. Super. 2012); see 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925.

2020“With regard to the reasonable basis prong of [the ineffective assistance of counsel] test, it is incumbent on the petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s chosen course of action had no reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Weiss, 81 A.3d 767, 798 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

2014See Prince, supra. -5- J-S64006-14 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Stackhouse had to prove there was arguable merit to his claim that Tuttle’s consent to the search of the house was invalid.

2013See also, Office of Lieutenant Governor v. Mohn, 67 A.3d 123 , 134 n. 14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (denying request for counsel fees by requester who claimed that agency lacked “a reasonable basis in the law” to assert a statutory exemption from disclosure); Office of Governor v. Raffle, 65 A.3d 1105 , 1111 n. 6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (rejecting counsel fee request, and holding that “[g]iven the fact that the [agency] had recently dismissed similar requests as disruptive, it had a reasonable basis for warning Requester about the RTKL’s disruptive requester provisions, and did not display any bias against

2006A chosen strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven “that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266 , 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998).

2006A chosen strategy will not be found to have lacked a reasonable basis unless it is proven “that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266 , 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998).

1979Since the complaint in this case was filed on January 16, 1975, the Commonwealth had 180 days, or until July 15, 1975, to bring appellant to trial in accord with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). 5 Trial did not commence, however, until February 10, 1976, 390 days after the complaint was filed. 6 It is well settled that all periods of delay beyond the mandatory period for trial’s commencement “ ‘. must be either excluded from the computation [of the peri od, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth

1979Since the complaint in this case was filed on January 16, 1975, the Commonwealth had 180 days, or until July 15, 1975, to bring appellant to trial in accord with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). 5 Trial did not commence, however, until February 10, 1976, 390 days after the complaint was filed. 6 It is well settled that all periods of delay beyond the mandatory period for trial’s commencement “ ‘. must be either excluded from the computation [of the peri od, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth

1979Since the complaint in this case was filed on January 16, 1975, the Commonwealth had 180 days, or until July 15, 1975, to bring appellant to trial in accord with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). 5 Trial did not commence, however, until February 10, 1976, 390 days after the complaint was filed. 6 It is well settled that all periods of delay beyond the mandatory period for trial’s commencement “ ‘. must be either excluded from the computation [of the peri od, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth

1979Since the complaint in this case was filed on January 16, 1975, the Commonwealth had 180 days, or until July 15, 1975, to bring appellant to trial in accord with Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2). 5 Trial did not commence, however, until February 10, 1976, 390 days after the complaint was filed. 6 It is well settled that all periods of delay beyond the mandatory period for trial’s commencement “ ‘. must be either excluded from the computation [of the peri od, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)] or justified by an order granting an extension pursuant to the terms of the rule [Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(c)] if the Commonwealth

1978Thus we noted in Commonwealth v. Kulp, 225 Pa.Super. 345 , 348 n. 2, 310 A.2d 399 , 401 n. 2 (1973): “Competent evidence to establish reasonable ground is not necessarily evidence sufficient to convict, nor only such as can pass technical rules governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials.” U. S. v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1967).

1978If we were conducting a trial to determine appellant’s guilt or innocence, we might find the variance in evidence from the date alleged in the indictment sufficient to require amendment of the indictment or a new trial, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 234 Pa.Super. 21, 30-31 , 335 A.2d 521, 525 (1975), but this is an extradition proceeding and the evidence of appellant’s presence in the demanding state is sufficient if it *38 provides a reasonable basis for the hearing judge’s finding.

1978If we were conducting a trial to determine appellant’s guilt or innocence, we might find the variance in evidence from the date alleged in the indictment sufficient to require amendment of the indictment or a new trial, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 234 Pa.Super. 21, 30-31 , 335 A.2d 521, 525 (1975), but this is an extradition proceeding and the evidence of appellant’s presence in the demanding state is sufficient if it *38 provides a reasonable basis for the hearing judge’s finding.

1978Thus we noted in Commonwealth v. Kulp, 225 Pa.Super. 345 , 348 n. 2, 310 A.2d 399 , 401 n. 2 (1973): “Competent evidence to establish reasonable ground is not necessarily evidence sufficient to convict, nor only such as can pass technical rules governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials.” U. S. v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1967).

1978Thus we noted in Commonwealth v. Kulp, 225 Pa.Super. 345 , 348 n. 2, 310 A.2d 399 , 401 n. 2 (1973): “Competent evidence to establish reasonable ground is not necessarily evidence sufficient to convict, nor only such as can pass technical rules governing the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials.” U. S. v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1967).