reasonable basis test in California

2018(See Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 675 .) Instead, the equal protection requirement is that the voting scheme "not be '"wholly irrelevant"' to the '"achievement of the [ordinance's] objectives."'" (Ibid.) Plaintiffs' opening brief only analyzes the issue under strict scrutiny and, therefore, Plaintiffs have forfeited the issue of whether the voting scheme violates equal protection under the applicable reasonable basis standard. 26 (See Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [failing to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue].) D.

2018(See Bolen, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 675 .) Instead, the equal protection requirement is that the voting scheme "not be '"wholly irrelevant"' to the '"achievement of the [ordinance's] objectives."'" (Ibid.) Plaintiffs' opening brief only analyzes the issue under strict scrutiny and, therefore, Plaintiffs have forfeited the issue of whether the voting scheme violates equal protection under the applicable reasonable basis standard. 26 (See Roehl v. Ritchie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 338, 352 [failing to raise an issue in the opening brief waives the issue].) D.

2013We agree that A.M.-F.’s educational background, interest, and experience in the field of psychology was a race-neutral reason justifying his excusal. *111 (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 907 [prospective juror’s college courses in psychology and view that someone who commits murder must have “ ‘something wrong with them in their mind’ ” justified peremptory challenge]; People v. Landry (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 785, 790-791 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 ] [that a prospective juror’s educational background and experience in psychiatry or psychology might cause him to favor the defense constituted

2013We agree that A.M.-F.’s educational background, interest, and experience in the field of psychology was a race-neutral reason justifying his excusal. *111 (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 907 [prospective juror’s college courses in psychology and view that someone who commits murder must have “ ‘something wrong with them in their mind’ ” justified peremptory challenge]; People v. Landry (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 785, 790-791 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 ] [that a prospective juror’s educational background and experience in psychiatry or psychology might cause him to favor the defense constituted

2013We agree that A.M.-F.’s educational background, interest, and experience in the field of psychology was a race-neutral reason justifying his excusal. *111 (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 907 [prospective juror’s college courses in psychology and view that someone who commits murder must have “ ‘something wrong with them in their mind’ ” justified peremptory challenge]; People v. Landry (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 785, 790-791 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 824 ] [that a prospective juror’s educational background and experience in psychiatry or psychology might cause him to favor the defense constituted

2011(Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 344 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719 ], italics added.) This conclusion is also suggested by the court’s blanket pronouncement that traffic violations do not provide a reasonable basis for the exception, but drug crimes akin to those at issue in Belton and Thornton do.

2011(Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 344 [ 129 S.Ct. at p. 1719 ], italics added.) This conclusion is also suggested by the court’s blanket pronouncement that traffic violations do not provide a reasonable basis for the exception, but drug crimes akin to those at issue in Belton and Thornton do.

2011(Ibid.) These aspects of Gant suggest a pure “ ‘nature-of-the-offense’ exception, in which a reasonable belief is held to exist whenever the crime of arrest is one for which evidence is possible and might conceivably be found in the arrestee’s vehicle . . . .” (People v. Chamberlain (Colo. 2010) 229 P.3d 1054, 1056-1057 (Chamberlain).) On the other hand, as cogently explained by the Colorado Supreme Court in Chamberlain, Gant’s use of phrases like “ ‘reasonable to believe’ ” and “ ‘reasonable basis to believe’ ” indicates the court “intends some degree of articulable suspicion, a standard whic

2003(See Estate of Falco (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014-1018 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 807 ].) Clients have every right to ask questions of their lawyers as to the basis of a lawsuit, and the asking of such questions is not a reasonable basis to claim a “break down in communications.” If there was any “break down,” it was the lawyers who did not want to answer legitimate questions posed by their clients as to the validity of their clients’ claims against their malpractice carrier. n.

2003(See Estate of Falco (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1004, 1014-1018 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 807 ].) Clients have every right to ask questions of their lawyers as to the basis of a lawsuit, and the asking of such questions is not a reasonable basis to claim a “break down in communications.” If there was any “break down,” it was the lawyers who did not want to answer legitimate questions posed by their clients as to the validity of their clients’ claims against their malpractice carrier. n.

1979(McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745-746 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 ]; McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 398-399 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 ].)” (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 62 .) “A legislative classification may satisfy the traditional equal protection test without being the most precise possible means of accomplishing its legislative purpose.

1979(McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745-746 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 ]; McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 398-399 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 ].)” (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 62 .) “A legislative classification may satisfy the traditional equal protection test without being the most precise possible means of accomplishing its legislative purpose.

1979(McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745-746 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 ]; McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 398-399 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 ].)” (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 62 .) “A legislative classification may satisfy the traditional equal protection test without being the most precise possible means of accomplishing its legislative purpose.

1979(McDonald v. Board of Election (1969) 394 U.S. 802, 809 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 739, 745-746 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 ]; McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 [ 6 L.Ed.2d 393, 398-399 , 81 S.Ct. 1101 ].)” (Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 62 .) “A legislative classification may satisfy the traditional equal protection test without being the most precise possible means of accomplishing its legislative purpose.