Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
26 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1906–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turkett v. Central of Georgia Railway Co.green2 sentences2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w 2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w | 1 | 1 |
Edmondson v. Brooks County Board of Educationgreen1 sentence2016Ga. 2000) (acknowledging that this Court uses a four-part test, and reciting test so as to make clear that defendant must have “actual knowledge” as to the first three prongs); Ex parte City of Geneva, 707 So2d 626, 629 n.2 (Ala. 1997) (construing Alabama’s recreational-use statute and observing that “the four-part ‘actual knowledge’ test of [Ala. Code] § 35-15-24 [(which applies ‘actual knowledge’ to the first three prongs of test)] appears likely to be a codification of the test employed by the state courts of Georgia when determining whether a noncommercial recreational landowner may be lia | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w 2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w | 1 | 1 |
Trammell v. Matthewsgreen2 sentences2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w 2016Co., 117 Ga. App. 617, 617 ( 161 SE2d 362 ) (1968) (holding that court erred in dismissing petition alleging negligence when plaintiff collided with warning device placed in roadway by defendant while traveling in the dark, in the rain, and under circumstances of poor visibility; and obstruction was unlighted, obscured from plaintiff’s vision by its placement, and could not be.seen until within 10 feet); Rogers v. Johnson, 94 Ga.App. 666, 666 (syllabus), 677 (1), 678 (3) ( 96 SE2d 285 ) (1956) (sustaining verdict for plaintiff when decedent was traveling roadway at night in car that collided w | 1 | 1 |
SOUTH GWINNETT ATHLETIC ASS'N, INC. v. Nashgreen1 sentence2016Ga. 2000) (acknowledging that this Court uses a four-part test, and reciting test so as to make clear that defendant must have “actual knowledge” as to the first three prongs); Ex parte City of Geneva, 707 So2d 626, 629 n.2 (Ala. 1997) (construing Alabama’s recreational-use statute and observing that “the four-part ‘actual knowledge’ test of [Ala. Code] § 35-15-24 [(which applies ‘actual knowledge’ to the first three prongs of test)] appears likely to be a codification of the test employed by the state courts of Georgia when determining whether a noncommercial recreational landowner may be lia | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Georgia Department of Natural Resourcesgreen1 sentence2016Ga. 2000) (acknowledging that this Court uses a four-part test, and reciting test so as to make clear that defendant must have “actual knowledge” as to the first three prongs); Ex parte City of Geneva, 707 So2d 626, 629 n.2 (Ala. 1997) (construing Alabama’s recreational-use statute and observing that “the four-part ‘actual knowledge’ test of [Ala. Code] § 35-15-24 [(which applies ‘actual knowledge’ to the first three prongs of test)] appears likely to be a codification of the test employed by the state courts of Georgia when determining whether a noncommercial recreational landowner may be lia | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mirquetgreen1 sentence2006Rev. 761 , 781-783 (1980). 28 Model Penal Code § 1.07 cmt. 5, p. 130 (1985). 29 See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 SW2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) (statute precluding multiple convictions where crime is established by proof of same or less than all the facts is “simply a codification of the rule laid down in Blockburger”); Hackett v. State, 569 A2d 79 (Del. 1990); People v. Abiodun, 111 P3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005); State v. Wood, 868 P2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P2d 1144, 1147, n. 2 (Utah 1996). 30 2 49 Ga. at 121. 31 Id. at 123. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abiodungreen1 sentence2006Rev. 761 , 781-783 (1980). 28 Model Penal Code § 1.07 cmt. 5, p. 130 (1985). 29 See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 SW2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) (statute precluding multiple convictions where crime is established by proof of same or less than all the facts is “simply a codification of the rule laid down in Blockburger”); Hackett v. State, 569 A2d 79 (Del. 1990); People v. Abiodun, 111 P3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005); State v. Wood, 868 P2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P2d 1144, 1147, n. 2 (Utah 1996). 30 2 49 Ga. at 121. 31 Id. at 123. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodgreen1 sentence2006Rev. 761 , 781-783 (1980). 28 Model Penal Code § 1.07 cmt. 5, p. 130 (1985). 29 See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 SW2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) (statute precluding multiple convictions where crime is established by proof of same or less than all the facts is “simply a codification of the rule laid down in Blockburger”); Hackett v. State, 569 A2d 79 (Del. 1990); People v. Abiodun, 111 P3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005); State v. Wood, 868 P2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P2d 1144, 1147, n. 2 (Utah 1996). 30 2 49 Ga. at 121. 31 Id. at 123. | 1 | 1 |
Polk v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2006Rev. 761 , 781-783 (1980). 28 Model Penal Code § 1.07 cmt. 5, p. 130 (1985). 29 See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 SW2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) (statute precluding multiple convictions where crime is established by proof of same or less than all the facts is “simply a codification of the rule laid down in Blockburger”); Hackett v. State, 569 A2d 79 (Del. 1990); People v. Abiodun, 111 P3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005); State v. Wood, 868 P2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P2d 1144, 1147, n. 2 (Utah 1996). 30 2 49 Ga. at 121. 31 Id. at 123. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burgessgreen1 sentence2006See also Burgess, 263 Ga. at 145 . 32 The “required evidence” test applies strictly within the context of determining whether multiple convictions are precluded because one of the crimes was “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts” that were required to establish the other crime under OCGA § 16-1-6 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hospital Inc.green2 sentences1990It is a codification of a principle stated in Williams v. West Point, 68 Ga. 816 [1882], which is applicable generally to legislative or governmental bodies.” Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga. 126, 140 ( 5 SE2d 356 ) (1939). 1990It is a codification of a principle stated in Williams v. West Point, 68 Ga. 816 [1882], which is applicable generally to legislative or governmental bodies.” Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga. 126, 140 ( 5 SE2d 356 ) (1939). | 1 | 1 |
East Tenn., Va. & Ga. Railway Co. v. Kanegreen2 sentences1969Co. v. Kane, 92 Ga. 187, 192 ( 18 SE 18 , 22 LRA 315) and a number of prior cases, in which it was asserted that “certainly a party should be relieved from proving that which his adversary distinctly alleges,” and this he may do “without formally tendering the [pleading] in evidence.” “An admission in the pleadings . . . is to be taken as true, and the record should not be burdened by proof of the fact admitted.” Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 (5) ( 88 SE 569 ). 1969Co. v. Kane, 92 Ga. 187, 192 ( 18 SE 18 , 22 LRA 315) and a number of prior cases, in which it was asserted that "certainly a party should be relieved from proving that which his adversary distinctly alleges," and this he may do "without formally tendering the [pleading] in evidence." "An admission in the pleadings . . . is to be taken as true, and the record should not be burdened by proof of the fact admitted." Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 (5) ( 88 SE 569 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Larey v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Savannah, Florida & Western Railway v. Graygreen | 1 | 1 |
| O'Kelley v. Gholstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
DeKalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Ass'ngreen2 sentences2000But see DeKalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Assn., 269 Ga. 619 ( 502 SE2d 719 ) (1998); Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519 ( 265 SE2d 811 ) (1980) (special interest needed to contest zoning determinations). 2000But see DeKalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Assn., 269 Ga. 619 ( 502 SE2d 719 ) (1998); Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519 ( 265 SE2d 811 ) (1980) (special interest needed to contest zoning determinations). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Martin v. State
green
2 sentences1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that " [t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused." (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the State's case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence derived from Martin v. State of Ga., 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872 1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the state’s case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, derived from Martin v. State, 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872); and | 4 | 1993–1993 |
Carter v. State
neutral
2 sentences1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that " [t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused." (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the State's case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence derived from Martin v. State of Ga., 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872 1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the state’s case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, derived from Martin v. State, 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872); and | 4 | 1993–1993 |
Simmons v. State
green
2 sentences1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the state’s case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, derived from Martin v. State, 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872); and 1993The general law regarding circumstantial evidence is codified at OCGA § 24-4-6, which provides that “[t]o warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statute represents a codification of the rule requiring a charge on circumstantial evidence where the state’s case depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence, derived from Martin v. State, 38 Ga. 293 (1868); Carter v. State, 46 Ga. 637 (1872); and | 4 | 1993–1993 |
Williams v. City Council of West Point
green
2 sentences1990It is a codification of a principle stated in Williams v. West Point, 68 Ga. 816 [1882], which is applicable generally to legislative or governmental bodies.” Aven v. Steiner Cancer Hosp., 189 Ga. 126, 140 ( 5 SE2d 356 ) (1939). 1983Code § 69-202 (now OCGA § 36-30-3) provides: “One council may not by an ordinance bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters of municipal government.” This is a codification of the principle enunciated in Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816 . | 4 | 1939–1990 |
M. J. Atkins & Co. v. Cobb
green
2 sentences1918It is true that the Civil Code, § 4137, provides: “After acceptance of goods purchased, the presumption is that they are of the quality ordered, and the burden is on the buyer to prove the contrary, and partial payments with knowledge of the defective condition will not estop the buyer from pleading partial failure of consideration.” This section of the code is but a codification of the principle announced in Atkins v. Coll, 56 Ga. 86 (5), 89, which was a case of express warranty. 1906Civil Code, § 3557, provides: “After acceptance of goods purchased, the presumption is that they are of the quality ordered, and the burden is on the buyer to ¡Drove the contrary. ' Partial payment, with knowledge of the •defective condition, will not estop the buyer from pleading partial failure of consideration.” This section of the code is but a codification of the principle announced in Atkins v. Cobb, 56 Ga. 86 , which was a case of express warranty. | 2 | 1906–1918 |
Hackett v. State
green
1 sentence2006Rev. 761 , 781-783 (1980). 28 Model Penal Code § 1.07 cmt. 5, p. 130 (1985). 29 See, e.g., Polk v. Commonwealth, 679 SW2d 231, 233 (Ky. 1984) (statute precluding multiple convictions where crime is established by proof of same or less than all the facts is “simply a codification of the rule laid down in Blockburger”); Hackett v. State, 569 A2d 79 (Del. 1990); People v. Abiodun, 111 P3d 462, 465 (Colo. 2005); State v. Wood, 868 P2d 70, 90-91 (Utah 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mirquet, 914 P2d 1144, 1147, n. 2 (Utah 1996). 30 2 49 Ga. at 121. 31 Id. at 123. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Board of Commissioners v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stephens v. Moran
green
2 sentences2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Tate v. Stephens
green
2 sentences2000But see DeKalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Assn., 269 Ga. 619 ( 502 SE2d 719 ) (1998); Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519 ( 265 SE2d 811 ) (1980) (special interest needed to contest zoning determinations). 2000But see DeKalb County v. Druid Hills Civic Assn., 269 Ga. 619 ( 502 SE2d 719 ) (1998); Tate v. Stephens, 245 Ga. 519 ( 265 SE2d 811 ) (1980) (special interest needed to contest zoning determinations). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Head v. Browning
green
2 sentences2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Arneson v. Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System
green
2 sentences2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
League of Women Voters of Atlanta-Fulton County, Inc. v. City of Atlanta
green
2 sentences2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 2000The statute is the codification of a principle set out in Bd. of Commrs. of Manchester v. Montgomery, 170 Ga. 361 ( 153 SE 34 ) (1930) (see Head v. Browning, 215 Ga. 263 (2) ( 109 SE2d 798 ) (1959)), whereby a citizen/resident/taxpayer whose “interest” is in having the laws executed and a public duty enforced may turn to the judicial branch to seek to compel or enjoin 4 the actions of one who discharges public duties “where the question is one of public right and the object is to procure the enforcement of a public duty. . . .” See, e.g., Arneson v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lovell v. Frankum
green
2 sentences1969Co. v. Kane, 92 Ga. 187, 192 ( 18 SE 18 , 22 LRA 315) and a number of prior cases, in which it was asserted that "certainly a party should be relieved from proving that which his adversary distinctly alleges," and this he may do "without formally tendering the [pleading] in evidence." "An admission in the pleadings . . . is to be taken as true, and the record should not be burdened by proof of the fact admitted." Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 (5) ( 88 SE 569 ). 1969Co. v. Kane, 92 Ga. 187, 192 ( 18 SE 18 , 22 LRA 315) and a number of prior cases, in which it was asserted that "certainly a party should be relieved from proving that which his adversary distinctly alleges," and this he may do "without formally tendering the [pleading] in evidence." "An admission in the pleadings . . . is to be taken as true, and the record should not be burdened by proof of the fact admitted." Lovell v. Frankum, 145 Ga. 106 (5) ( 88 SE 569 ). | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Weitman v. Thiot neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Tritt v. Roberts
green
1 sentence1962The Code section is merely a codification of the rule announced in several decisions of the Supreme Court that public recordation of the deed is such adequate notice to the true owner as to invest the constructive possession with the element of notoriety essential to its being adverse. [Citing James v. Patterson, 62 Ga. 527, 531 ; Weitman v. Thiot, 64 Ga. 11 (3), 17; Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156 (2); Anderson v. Dodd, 65 Ga. 402 ; Kilpatrick v. Strozier, 67 Ga. 247, 251 ; Johnson v. Simerly, 90 Ga. 612 ( 16 SE 951 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Janes v. Patterson green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Anderson v. Dodd
neutral
1 sentence1962The Code section is merely a codification of the rule announced in several decisions of the Supreme Court that public recordation of the deed is such adequate notice to the true owner as to invest the constructive possession with the element of notoriety essential to its being adverse. [Citing James v. Patterson, 62 Ga. 527, 531 ; Weitman v. Thiot, 64 Ga. 11 (3), 17; Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156 (2); Anderson v. Dodd, 65 Ga. 402 ; Kilpatrick v. Strozier, 67 Ga. 247, 251 ; Johnson v. Simerly, 90 Ga. 612 ( 16 SE 951 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Kilpatrick v. Strozier neutral | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Johnson v. Simerly
neutral
2 sentences1962The Code section is merely a codification of the rule announced in several decisions of the Supreme Court that public recordation of the deed is such adequate notice to the true owner as to invest the constructive possession with the element of notoriety essential to its being adverse. [Citing James v. Patterson, 62 Ga. 527, 531 ; Weitman v. Thiot, 64 Ga. 11 (3), 17; Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156 (2); Anderson v. Dodd, 65 Ga. 402 ; Kilpatrick v. Strozier, 67 Ga. 247, 251 ; Johnson v. Simerly, 90 Ga. 612 ( 16 SE 951 ). 1962The Code section is merely a codification of the rule announced in several decisions of the Supreme Court that public recordation of the deed is such adequate notice to the true owner as to invest the constructive possession with the element of notoriety essential to its being adverse. [Citing James v. Patterson, 62 Ga. 527, 531 ; Weitman v. Thiot, 64 Ga. 11 (3), 17; Tritt v. Roberts, 64 Ga. 156 (2); Anderson v. Dodd, 65 Ga. 402 ; Kilpatrick v. Strozier, 67 Ga. 247, 251 ; Johnson v. Simerly, 90 Ga. 612 ( 16 SE 951 ). | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Terrell v. McLean green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Bowman v. Owens green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Lawson v. City of Moultrie green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Smith v. Ouzts green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Ezzell v. Maltbie neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Hill v. Freeman neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| National Bank v. Southern Porcelain Manufacturing Co. neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Papworth v. City of Fitzgerald neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Draper v. Medlock green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| First National Bank v. Atlanta Rubber Co. neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Stevenson v. State green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Hammond v. County of Richmond green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Smith v. Wilkes & McDuffie Counties green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Cumming v. Cumming green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Craigmiles v. Gamble green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Harrell v. Broxton neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Railway Postal Clerks Investment Ass'n v. Wells neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| White v. State green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Schlosburg v. Tanenbaum neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Burns v. Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. green | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Georgia Co-Operative Fire Ass'n v. Borchardt & Co. green | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.