codification rule in New York

2004This is in contrast to CPL § 240.45 (1) (a), the codification of the rule set forth under People v. Rosario , 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961), cert. denied , sub nom. , Rosario v. New York , 368 U.S. 866 , 82 S.Ct. 117 , 7 L.Ed.2d 64 (1961), which is based upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.

1987CPL 240.45 (1) (a), which is the codification of the rule set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 ), provides that the prosecution shall make available to defendant: "[a]ny written or recorded statement * * * made by a person whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial, and which relates to the subject matter of the witness’s testimony”.

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 , affd 18 AD2d 921 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area variance application (see, Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area-variance application (Matter of Budget Estates v Roth, 203 AD2d 287 , citing Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 , affd 18 AD2d 921 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area variance application (see, Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area-variance application (Matter of Budget Estates v Roth, 203 AD2d 287 , citing Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

2006Although certainly protective of a patient’s confidential information, there is nothing in these core objectives “indicating a legislative intent to confer a constitutionally derived ‘substantial right’, such that the violation of [the] statute, without more, would justify invocation of the exclusionary rule” (Patterson, 78 NY2d at 716 ).

2006County ( 98 NY2d at 529 ), the Court of Appeals identified three vital policy objectives underlying the codification of the privilege in CPLR 4504 (a): (1) “to maximize unfettered patient communication with medical professionals, so that any potential embarrassment arising from public disclosure will not ‘deter people from seeking medical help and securing adequate diagnosis and treatment,’ ” (2) to encourage “medical professionals to be candid in recording confidential information in patient medical records,” and (3) to protect “patients’ reasonable privacy expectations against disclosure of

2004This is in contrast to CPL § 240.45 (1) (a), the codification of the rule set forth under People v. Rosario , 9 N.Y.2d 286 (1961), cert. denied , sub nom. , Rosario v. New York , 368 U.S. 866 , 82 S.Ct. 117 , 7 L.Ed.2d 64 (1961), which is based upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.

1994In applying those factors here, we find that the Board’s determination was not arbi trary, capricious, illegal or an abuse of discretion (see, CPLR 7803 [3]; Matter of Sakrel, Ltd. v Roth, 182 AD2d 763, 764 ).

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area-variance application (Matter of Budget Estates v Roth, 203 AD2d 287 , citing Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

1994These five factors, which are a codification of the factors set forth in Matter of Wachsberger v Michalis ( 19 Misc 2d 909 , affd 18 AD2d 921 ), have been cited by this Court as valid criteria for determining the merit of an area variance application (see, Matter of Vilardi v Roth, 192 AD2d 662, 664 ).

1994In applying those factors here, we find that the determination of the Zoning Board to grant the applications has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence in the record (see, Matter of Doyle v Amster, 79 NY2d 592, 595-596 ).

1985CPLR 8004 (b) is a codification of the exception to the rule, and allows the court to impose on the party who moved for a receiver’s appointment the obligation to compen sate the receiver if special circumstances exist (see, East Chatham Corp. v Iacovone, 25 AD2d 622 , appeal dismissed 19 NY2d 687 ; Benlian v Vartabedian, 96 Misc 2d 63 ; see also, Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Abrams, 248 App Div 595 ; Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Koralek, 247 App Div 915 ; Idan Holding Corp. v 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 NYS2d 396 ).

1985CPLR 8004 (b) is a codification of the exception to the rule, and allows the court to impose on the party who moved for a receiver’s appointment the obligation to compen sate the receiver if special circumstances exist (see, East Chatham Corp. v Iacovone, 25 AD2d 622 , appeal dismissed 19 NY2d 687 ; Benlian v Vartabedian, 96 Misc 2d 63 ; see also, Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Abrams, 248 App Div 595 ; Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Koralek, 247 App Div 915 ; Idan Holding Corp. v 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 NYS2d 396 ).

1985CPLR 8004 (b) is a codification of the exception to the rule, and allows the court to impose on the party who moved for a receiver’s appointment the obligation to compen sate the receiver if special circumstances exist (see, East Chatham Corp. v Iacovone, 25 AD2d 622 , appeal dismissed 19 NY2d 687 ; Benlian v Vartabedian, 96 Misc 2d 63 ; see also, Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Abrams, 248 App Div 595 ; Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Koralek, 247 App Div 915 ; Idan Holding Corp. v 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 NYS2d 396 ).

1985CPLR 8004 (b) is a codification of the exception to the rule, and allows the court to impose on the party who moved for a receiver’s appointment the obligation to compen sate the receiver if special circumstances exist (see, East Chatham Corp. v Iacovone, 25 AD2d 622 , appeal dismissed 19 NY2d 687 ; Benlian v Vartabedian, 96 Misc 2d 63 ; see also, Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Abrams, 248 App Div 595 ; Title Guar. & Trust Co. v Koralek, 247 App Div 915 ; Idan Holding Corp. v 244 Water Realty Corp., 154 NYS2d 396 ).

1984In People v Clayton ( 41 AD2d 204 ), the Appellate Division, Second Department, arguing that the orderly administration of justice would best be accomplished by a codification of those factors appropriately considered by the nisi prius court, set forth a list of criteria upon which this relief should properly be based.

1984As stated in Matter of Tyease “J”. ( 83 Misc 2d 1044, 1047 ), “Without such representation [by the Law Guardian], the natural parent vigorously focuses on parental rights and claims.

1984(See, also, Family Ct Act, § 241.) Section 249 of the Family Court Act is a codification of the rule established in Matter of Orlando F. ( 40 NY2d 103, 112 ).

1980LEGISLATIVE HISTORY The warranty of habitability was enacted in 1975 and represented a codification of the rule announced in Tonetti v Penati ( 48 AD2d 25 ).

1979The judgment of the Legislature, reflected in the codification of the privilege, expresses the long-standing social policy that the injury to domestic harmony and marital privacy occasioned by the unrestricted search for relevant information is too great to endure (see People v Hayes, 140 NY 484, 496 , supra; Common Law Commission, Second Report 13 [1853], quoted in 8 Wigmore, at § 2332).

1968Co., 26 N. Y. 422 ); and whether the origin of the rule be found in the theory that 1 ‘ A policy is a contract of indemnity ’ ’ so that in the absence of an interest in the property “ the holder of the policy sustains no loss ” (Peabody 3 Riggs v. Washington County Mut.

1944(King v. Barnes, supra, p. 285 ; Marston v. Gould, supra, p. 225 .) On the matter of laches the plaintiffs’ right to redress is not barred by this claim; the defendants were not prejudiced thereby; the plaintiffs acted with reasonable despatch upon discovery of the true facts.

1944(King v. Barnes, supra, p. 285 ; Marston v. Gould, supra, p. 225 .) On the matter of laches the plaintiffs’ right to redress is not barred by this claim; the defendants were not prejudiced thereby; the plaintiffs acted with reasonable despatch upon discovery of the true facts.

1943(Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439 ; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 .) It is contended that the 1917 amendment to section 188, subdivision 7, was a codification of the rule as declared in the Union Trust Company case but it is clear from a study of the case and a reading of the amendment that that is not a correct interpretation of the statute.

1943(Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439 ; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 .) It is contended that the 1917 amendment to section 188, subdivision 7, was a codification of the rule as declared in the Union Trust Company case but it is clear from a study of the case and a reading of the amendment that that is not a correct interpretation of the statute.

1939(See People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, at p. 331 , citing People v. Mondon, 103 id. 211.) It is held in these cases that the provisions of section 188 apply to the rights of a person accused of crime who is brought for examination before a coroner.

1908Park Bank of N. Y., 98 N. Y. 87 .) The notes purported to be made in Hew York State and were payable there, and by the express provisions of the negotiable Instruments Law (Laws of 1897, chap. 612, § 91, subd. 1) one can be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument only where the instrument is “ complete and regular upon its face.” This statutory provision is but a codification of the rule of the law merchant, which was that a party buying commercial paper which remains in some essential particular incomplete and imperfect, doés not acquire the character of a bona fide holder. ' (Davis

1908Park Bank of N. Y., 98 N. Y. 87 .) The notes purported to be made in Hew York State and were payable there, and by the express provisions of the negotiable Instruments Law (Laws of 1897, chap. 612, § 91, subd. 1) one can be a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument only where the instrument is “ complete and regular upon its face.” This statutory provision is but a codification of the rule of the law merchant, which was that a party buying commercial paper which remains in some essential particular incomplete and imperfect, doés not acquire the character of a bona fide holder. ' (Davis