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37 California opinions name it 3 courts 1927–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd.green2 sentences1984The subdivision has been well characterized as “a codification of the principle set forth in \AMA\ . . . ‘that a tortfeasor who has entered into a “good faith” settlement [citation] with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.’ ” (Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; accord Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 323, 326-327 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 78 ].) Notably, section 877.6 does not provide or specify a procedure whereby the rul 1984The subdivision has been well characterized as “a codification of the principle set forth in \AMA\ . . . ‘that a tortfeasor who has entered into a “good faith” settlement [citation] with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.’ ” (Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; accord Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 323, 326-327 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 78 ].) Notably, section 877.6 does not provide or specify a procedure whereby the rul | 2 | 2 |
Trident Labs, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Commercial Finance Corp.green2 sentences2019Forum Non Conveniens A. Applicability of Sections 410.30 and 418.10 "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the *675 interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." ( § 410.30, subd. (a).) " Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens [citation], but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based on forum non conveniens. [¶] In 2019Forum Non Conveniens A. Applicability of Sections 410.30 and 418.10 "When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the *675 interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just." ( § 410.30, subd. (a).) " Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens [citation], but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based on forum non conveniens. [¶] In | 1 | 3 |
Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014(Great Lakes Dredge, supra, at pp. 77-79 .) For the first time in their reply brief, appellants argue the clause at issue in this case is an invalid venue 4 “Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens [citation], but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based on forum non conveniens. [¶] In California, ‘forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court’s discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.’ (Smith, Valent 2011In California, “forum selection clauses are valid and may be given effect, in the court’s discretion and in the absence of a showing that enforcement of such a clause would be unreasonable.” (Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 496 [ 131 Cal.Rptr. 374 , 551 P.2d 1206 ] (Smith Valentino) [“courts possess discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in recognition of the parties’ free and voluntary choice of a different forum”; policy favoring access to Cal. courts by resident plaintiffs “is satisfied in those cases where ... a plaintiff has freely and volunt | 1 | 2 |
People Ex Rel. Department of Public Works v. Dunngreen2 sentences1997Furthermore, inasmuch as we conclude Berkson’s income approach was fatally flawed, we need not further address SMTDB’s argument about improper use of the developer’s approach. 5 Notwithstanding the “value attributable to the land and existing improvements thereon” language of Evidence Code section 819, Cushman argues that Berkson’s income approach was authorized under the statute because it is a codification of the rule pronounced in People v. Dunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 639 [ 297 P.2d 964 ]. 1997Furthermore, inasmuch as we conclude Berkson’s income approach was fatally flawed, we need not further address SMTDB’s argument about improper use of the developer’s approach. 5 Notwithstanding the “value attributable to the land and existing improvements thereon” language of Evidence Code section 819, Cushman argues that Berkson’s income approach was authorized under the statute because it is a codification of the rule pronounced in People v. Dunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 639 [ 297 P.2d 964 ]. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Marriage of Montigreen2 sentences2010(In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] (Monti); In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 719 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 ] (Vryonis).) “Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe they were validly married.” (Vryonis, at p. 719, italics added.) After the codification of the doctrine, this court held that the term “good faith” in the putative spouse statute meant an objective good faith, and not merely a subjective good faith. 2010(In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] (Monti); In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 719 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 ] (Vryonis).) “Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe they were validly married.” (Vryonis, at p. 719, italics added.) After the codification of the doctrine, this court held that the term “good faith” in the putative spouse statute meant an objective good faith, and not merely a subjective good faith. | 1 | 1 |
In Re the Marriage of Vryonisgreen2 sentences2010(In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] (Monti); In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 719 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 ] (Vryonis).) “Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe they were validly married.” (Vryonis, at p. 719, italics added.) After the codification of the doctrine, this court held that the term “good faith” in the putative spouse statute meant an objective good faith, and not merely a subjective good faith. 2010(In re Marriage of Monti (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 50, 54-55 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 72 ] (Monti); In re Marriage of Vryonis (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 712, 719 [ 248 Cal.Rptr. 807 ] (Vryonis).) “Instead, the Legislature contemplated the continued protection of innocent parties who believe they were validly married.” (Vryonis, at p. 719, italics added.) After the codification of the doctrine, this court held that the term “good faith” in the putative spouse statute meant an objective good faith, and not merely a subjective good faith. | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Wilsongreen2 sentences2000(See Estate of Wilson (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 786, 801-802 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 749 ].) PG&E invokes Evidence Code section 622 in noting that the ordinances passed under the Franchise Act of 1937 included statements that PG&E held constitutional franchises in those cities. 2000(See Estate of Wilson (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 786, 801-802 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 749 ].) PG&E invokes Evidence Code section 622 in noting that the ordinances passed under the Franchise Act of 1937 included statements that PG&E held constitutional franchises in those cities. | 1 | 1 |
San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992In San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1, 7, 14 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 593 P.2d 838 ], a case arising under the EERA, the court annulled contempt orders against a union and its president who conducted a strike in violation of a restraining order and an injunction obtained by a school district. 1992In San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 1, 7, 14 [ 154 Cal.Rptr. 893 , 593 P.2d 838 ], a case arising under the EERA, the court annulled contempt orders against a union and its president who conducted a strike in violation of a restraining order and an injunction obtained by a school district. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Murakamigreen2 sentences1991(See Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 121 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 813 P.2d 1348 ].) Sellers urge the only deadline imposed by section 3295, subdivision (d) is that the motion be made before the trier of fact delivers a verdict finding a defendant liable for acts worthy of assessing punitive damages. 1991(See Adams v. Murakami (1991) 54 Cal.3d 105, 121 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 813 P.2d 1348 ].) Sellers urge the only deadline imposed by section 3295, subdivision (d) is that the motion be made before the trier of fact delivers a verdict finding a defendant liable for acts worthy of assessing punitive damages. | 1 | 1 |
Sun-Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co.green1 sentence1986Co., v. Kaye-Halbert Corp. (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 664 [ 272 P.2d 886 ].) Similarly, another California Court of Appeal has concluded that section 2715, subdivision (2)(a) “is merely a codification of the rule that the buyer must attempt to minimize damages. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, §§ 639-640, 670-674).)” (Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 787, 792 [194 CaLRptr. 612].) Thus, adoption of the UCC did nothing to alter preexisting California law on the right to recover consequential damages and the duty to mitigate such losses. | 1 | 1 |
Kohn v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1984The subdivision has been well characterized as “a codification of the principle set forth in \AMA\ . . . ‘that a tortfeasor who has entered into a “good faith” settlement [citation] with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.’ ” (Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; accord Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 323, 326-327 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 78 ].) Notably, section 877.6 does not provide or specify a procedure whereby the rul 1984The subdivision has been well characterized as “a codification of the principle set forth in \AMA\ . . . ‘that a tortfeasor who has entered into a “good faith” settlement [citation] with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.’ ” (Turcon Construction, Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 280, 283 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 580 ]; accord Kohn v. Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 323, 326-327 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 78 ].) Notably, section 877.6 does not provide or specify a procedure whereby the rul | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cowmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mickelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hood v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tonini v. Cevascogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schomberg v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In re Friend
green
2 sentences2024(Friend I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 741 .) Before reaching this conclusion, the court set the stage with an in- depth discussion of pre-Proposition 66 law. 2024(Friend I, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 741 .) Before reaching this conclusion, the court set the stage with an in- depth discussion of pre-Proposition 66 law. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Schmir v. Schmir
green
1 sentence2025(In re Marriage of Schmir, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 55 .) It provides a trial court discretion to determine whether to issue a Gavron warning. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
In Re Marriage of Fellows
green
1 sentence2024Section 4, subdivision (h), provides an exception for circumstances where “application of a particular provision of the new law or of the old law in the manner required by this section or by the new law would substantially interfere with the effective conduct of the proceedings or the rights of the parties or other interested persons in connection with an event that occurred or circumstance that existed before the operative date.” This exception is characterized by Fellows as the codification of the rule that, “[e]ven in the face of specific legislative intent, retrospective application is imp | 1 | 2024–2024 |
National Football League v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
green
1 sentence2024(NFL, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 922–933.) This is how the court put it: “NFL’s contention that the moving party’s burden of proof in a forum non conveniens motion includes proving California is a ‘seriously inconvenient’ forum also relies heavily on the Ford case . . . . [I]n Ford the Court of Appeal overturned a trial court dismissal of a coverage action filed by a nonresident corporate plaintiff where the underlying issue was liability for cleaning up polluted California properties where the plaintiff and its subsidiary had operated for lengthy periods in the recent past. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
INTERSHOP COMMUNICATIONS, AG v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2022(See Trident Labs, Inc., at p. 156 [citing Intershop Communications AG, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 196, 198 for this proposition].) In fact, Trident Labs, Inc. tacitly acknowledged that section 410.30 governed the defendant’s motion to enforce the mandatory forum selection clause in that case, and observed that this statute “is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . .” (See Trident Labs, Inc., at pp. 150, 153–155.) 20 2. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Marriage of Lucas
green
1 sentence2020(See Lucas, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 813–815 [discussing history of this enactment].) This presumption was later added to Civil Code section 5110 without substantive change. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466 , 471, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ( Animal Film ).) No matter what standard of review we apply, we conclude the trial court properly granted the motion. 2019Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466 , 471, 123 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ( Animal Film ).) No matter what standard of review we apply, we conclude the trial court properly granted the motion. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Quanta Computer Inc. v. Japan Commc'ns Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Forum Non Conveniens A. Applicability of Sections 410.30 and 418.10 “When a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” (§ 410.30, subd. (a).) “Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens [citation], but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based on forum non conveniens. [¶] In Califo | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2016(See Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 720-721 .) 18 individual city council representatives who voted to deny conditional use permit and variance].)11 Thus, on statutory immunity grounds, alone, the Yees failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.12 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting the City’s special motion to strike as to the fifth and sixth causes of action. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Freeny v. City of San Buenaventura
green
1 sentence2016(See Freeny v. City of San Buenaventura (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1333 , 1341–1345 [allegations of fraud, corruption and malice did not preclude statutory immunities, including section 821.2, protecting is a codification of that immunity. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Banos
green
2 sentences2014(People v. Banos (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 501 .)7 7 The court in People v. Banos, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 483 acknowledged the codification of the doctrine in the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing such forfeiture when the defendant " ' "engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." ' " (Id. at p. 500.) It also noted that Evidence Code section 1350 includes a similar limitation. 2014(People v. Banos (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 483, 501 .)7 7 The court in People v. Banos, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 483 acknowledged the codification of the doctrine in the Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing such forfeiture when the defendant " ' "engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." ' " (Id. at p. 500.) It also noted that Evidence Code section 1350 includes a similar limitation. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Estate of Martin
green
1 sentence2014As explained in In re Estate of Martin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1438 , 1443: Probate Code “[s]ection 9880 provides that ‘[e]xcept as provided in this chapter,’ an executor may neither ‘(a) Purchase any property of the estate . . ., directly or indirectly,’ nor ‘(b) Be interested in any such purchase.’ This statute is a codification of the principle that executors may not deal with themselves, or 16 place themselves in a position antagonistic to the estate's beneficiaries. [Citation.]”5 After Cobo purchased the South Gate property through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, William brought an action a | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Regina E. v. Dorothy G.
neutral
1 sentence2012It relied on Code of Civil Procedure section 906, a codification of the rule that “ ‘a respondent may assert a legal theory which, if found to be sound, should result in affirmance notwithstanding appellant’s contentions.’ ” ( 182 Cal.App.3d at p. 218 .) Because L.R.’s claim that the trial court erred in finding father to be a Kelsey S. father, if found to be valid, would result in affirmance notwithstanding father’s contention that the trial court erred in determining his unfitness, we now address the issue of whether father was properly found to be a Kelsey S. father. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Furda v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011Under subdivision (a) of that section, “[w]hen a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens (see Furda v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 418 , 425 & fn. 3 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 646 ] (Furda)), but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based 2011Under subdivision (a) of that section, “[w]hen a court upon motion of a party or its own motion finds that in the interest of substantial justice an action should be heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall stay or dismiss the action in whole or in part on any conditions that may be just.” Section 410.30 is a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens (see Furda v. Superior Court (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 418 , 425 & fn. 3 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 646 ] (Furda)), but the principles governing enforcement of a forum selection clause are not the same as those applicable to motions based | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Daniels
green
2 sentences2007That subdivision provides, “This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” This language is a codification of a rule set forth in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 ] (Daniels). 4 To better understand the requirements of the asportation element, it is important to recognize the rationale motivating the Daniels court. 2007That subdivision provides, “This subdivision shall only apply if the movement of the victim is beyond that merely incidental to the commission of, and increases the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in, the intended underlying offense.” This language is a codification of a rule set forth in People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 ] (Daniels). 4 To better understand the requirements of the asportation element, it is important to recognize the rationale motivating the Daniels court. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Cooper v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1997Furthermore, courts interpreting Public Resources Code section 21169 have recognized that it “in part constitute[s] a codification of the doctrine of ‘vested rights,’ which doctrine has been recognized as permitting a landowner to complete a project in the face of a new law purporting to prohibit the development of the project where the landowner, in reliance upon governmental action, has in good faith suffered substantial detriment thereby acquiring a ‘vested right’ to proceed to develop the property.” (Cooper v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 34, 42 .) The Porter-Cologne Water Q | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission
green
2 sentences1990Decedent *1269 was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma which is by definition a cancer of the peritoneum, the lining of the abdominal cavity. 4 This is a codification of the rule judicially announced by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933) 217 Cal. 338 [ 18 P.2d 933 , 86 A.L.R. 563 ], Marsh determined that in the event of a latent and progressive disease, it cannot reasonably be said that the injury dates from the last date of exposure, but rather the injury dates from the time when the accumulated effects of the disease culminate in a disability traceable to the latent 1990Decedent *1269 was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma which is by definition a cancer of the peritoneum, the lining of the abdominal cavity. 4 This is a codification of the rule judicially announced by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1933) 217 Cal. 338 [ 18 P.2d 933 , 86 A.L.R. 563 ], Marsh determined that in the event of a latent and progressive disease, it cannot reasonably be said that the injury dates from the last date of exposure, but rather the injury dates from the time when the accumulated effects of the disease culminate in a disability traceable to the latent | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Combs v. City of Long Beach
neutral
1 sentence1986Co., v. Kaye-Halbert Corp. (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 664 [ 272 P.2d 886 ].) Similarly, another California Court of Appeal has concluded that section 2715, subdivision (2)(a) “is merely a codification of the rule that the buyer must attempt to minimize damages. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, §§ 639-640, 670-674).)” (Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 787, 792 [194 CaLRptr. 612].) Thus, adoption of the UCC did nothing to alter preexisting California law on the right to recover consequential damages and the duty to mitigate such losses. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Roberts Distributing Co. v. Kaye-Halbert Corp.
green
1 sentence1986Co., v. Kaye-Halbert Corp. (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 664 [ 272 P.2d 886 ].) Similarly, another California Court of Appeal has concluded that section 2715, subdivision (2)(a) “is merely a codification of the rule that the buyer must attempt to minimize damages. (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, §§ 639-640, 670-674).)” (Sun Maid Raisin Growers v. Victor Packing Co. (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 787, 792 [194 CaLRptr. 612].) Thus, adoption of the UCC did nothing to alter preexisting California law on the right to recover consequential damages and the duty to mitigate such losses. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Stott v. Johnston green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Sparks v. L. D. Folsom Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Winther v. Industrial Accident Commission green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Laskey Bros. Of W. Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros, Pictures, Inc. (In Dissolution), Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. (In Dissolution) green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Boston & Providence Railroad Corp. Stockholders v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Collins v. American Buslines, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Laskey Bros. of West Virginia, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Vincenty-Martínez v. Vázquez-Sánchez neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| City Carpet Beating Etc. Works v. Jones green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Dobbins v. Los Angeles green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Anderson v. City Council green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Spindler Realty Corp. v. Monning green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Paxton v. Paxton green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Treadwell v. Reynolds neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Say v. Crocker First National Bank neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Farnum v. Phoenix Insurance green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.