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26 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Freegreen2 sentences2020In Free, our supreme court reasoned: “To be sure, section 122-3 is not an ironclad bar on multiple post-conviction petitions, but in those cases in which the court has allowed the filing of successive post- conviction petitions, the proceedings on the original petitions were deficient in some fundamental way.” People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988). 2000While section 122-3 of the Act is not an ironclad bar to multiple postconviction petitions ( People v. Free , 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 , 522 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (1988)), we can understand how defendant, a pro se petitioner, might believe that he was without recourse to file another postconviction petition because his first postconviction petition is dismissed "with prejudice." Postconviction relief constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of a conviction. | 4 | 6 |
People v. Nicholsgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). 1998See, e.g. , People v. Nichols , 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins , 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter , 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Hollinsgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). 1998See, e.g. , People v. Nichols , 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins , 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter , 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Bowmangreen2 sentences2017While not an ironclad rule, it is necessary in order for a representative system of litigation to function.” People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1990). ¶ 17 We note the existence of authority holding that the failure to comply with section 122-2 is not a ground for a second-stage dismissal. 2017While not an ironclad rule, it is necessary in order for a representative system of litigation to function.” People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 141 (1990). ¶ 17 We note the existence of authority holding that the failure to comply with section 122-2 is not a ground for a second-stage dismissal. | 2 | 6 |
People v. Barkesgreen2 sentences2017People v. Barkes, 399 Ill. 2017People v. Barkes, 399 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hallgreen2 sentences2003See People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 328 , 743 N.E.2d 521, 535 (2000). 2003See People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 328 , 743 N.E.2d 521, 535 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2024Defendant further contends People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , authorizes this court to review his claims in the interest of judicial economy because the record is sufficiently developed regarding his as-applied constitutional challenge. ¶ 25 First, defendant is correct that our supreme court in Jones stated, “the [forfeiture] language contained in section 122-3 [of the Act] has never been viewed as an ironclad bar.” Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 505 . 2022See Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 505 . ¶ 16 Regardless, we recognize that “the waiver language contained in section 122-3 [of the Act] has never been viewed as an ironclad bar.” Id. | 1 | 5 |
People v. Cordellgreen1 sentence2022Therefore, we also address the merits of defendant’s argument on appeal. ¶ 17 “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2022Therefore, we also address the merits of defendant’s argument on appeal. ¶ 17 “To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced defendant such that he was deprived of a fair trial.” People v. Cordell, 223 Ill. 2d 380, 385 (2006) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences1996Section 122-3 provides that "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 122-3.) Consistent with section 122-3, this court has held that a ruling on a post-conviction petition has res judicata effect with respect to all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the initial petition. ( People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill.2d 367, 375-76 , 119 Ill.Dec. 325 , 522 N.E.2d 1184 ; see also Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 274 , 180 Ill.Dec. 1 , 606 N.E.2d 1078 .) Nonetheless, section 122-3 is not a 1996(People v. Free (1988), 122 Ill. 2d 367, 375-76 ; see also Flores, 153 Ill. 2d at 274 .) Nonetheless, section 122 — 3 is not an ironclad bar to multiple post-conviction petitions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The PEOPLE v. Slaughter
green
2 sentences1998See, e.g., People v. Nichols, 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins, 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). 1998See, e.g. , People v. Nichols , 51 Ill. 2d 244, 246 (1972); People v. Hollins , 51 Ill. 2d 68, 70 (1972); People v. Slaughter , 39 Ill. 2d 278 (1968). | 3 | 1988–1998 |
INTER. ASS'N OF FIRE. v. Spokane Airports
green
2 sentences2005In short, we see little sense in an ironclad rule that has the effect of denying relief to members of an association based upon an overly technical application of the standing rules.” Spokane Airports, 146 Wash. 2d at 215-16 , 45 P.3d at 190 . 2005In short, we see little sense in an ironclad rule that has the effect of denying relief to members of an association based upon an overly technical application of the standing rules.” Spokane Airports , 146 Wash. 2d at 215-16 , 45 P.3d at 190 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1789 v. Spokane Airports
green
2 sentences2005In short, we see little sense in an ironclad rule that has the effect of denying relief to members of an association based upon an overly technical application of the standing rules.” Spokane Airports, 146 Wash. 2d at 215-16 , 45 P.3d at 190 . 2005In short, we see little sense in an ironclad rule that has the effect of denying relief to members of an association based upon an overly technical application of the standing rules.” Spokane Airports , 146 Wash. 2d at 215-16 , 45 P.3d at 190 . | 2 | 2005–2005 |
The PEOPLE v. Hamby
green
2 sentences1988Moreover, even if, contrary to the majority's admission, the defendant had not raised the issue of the constitutionality of the admission of victim impact testimony in his first post-conviction petition, section 122-3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as the majority concedes, "is not an ironclad bar on multiple post-conviction petitions." ( 122 Ill.2d at 376 .) Although waiver is a useful *390 principle, "we have not hesitated to relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires." ( People v. Hamby (1965), 32 Ill.2d 291, 294 .) This court has repeatedly relaxed the requirements o 1988Moreover, even if, contrary to the majority’s admission, the defendant had not raised the issue of the constitutionality of the admission of victim impact testimony in his first post-conviction petition, section 122 — 3 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, as the majority concedes, “is not an ironclad bar on multiple post-conviction petitions.” (122 Ill. 2d at 376.) Although waiver is a useful principle, “we have not hesitated to relax its application where fundamental fairness so requires.” (People v. Hamby (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 291, 294 .) This court has repeatedly relaxed the requirements of se | 2 | 1972–1988 |
People v. Norris
green
2 sentences1979App. 3d 490 , 356 N.E.2d 1288 .) However, the waiver principle “is not an ironclad rule.” (People v. Norris (1972), 8 Ill. 1979(People v. Norris (1972), 8 Ill. | 2 | 1979–1979 |
People v. Holman
green
1 sentence2024Defendant further contends People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655 , authorizes this court to review his claims in the interest of judicial economy because the record is sufficiently developed regarding his as-applied constitutional challenge. ¶ 25 First, defendant is correct that our supreme court in Jones stated, “the [forfeiture] language contained in section 122-3 [of the Act] has never been viewed as an ironclad bar.” Jones, 213 Ill. 2d at 505 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
The PEOPLE v. Brown
green
1 sentence1990(People v. Brown (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 307, 310 .) In criminal proceedings, an attorney is authorized to act for his client and determine for him procedural matters and decisions involving trial strategy and tactics. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences1986App. 3d 825, 828 , 387 N.E.2d 806 ), neither is the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applicable to all evidence discovered in an illegal search (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 9 L. 1986Although the waiver rule “ ‘is not an ironclad rule’ [citation]” (People v. Dickerson (1979), 69 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1986App. 3d 825, 828 , 387 N.E.2d 806 ), neither is the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applicable to all evidence discovered in an illegal search (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 9 L. 1986App. 3d 825, 828 , 387 N.E.2d 806 ), neither is the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applicable to all evidence discovered in an illegal search (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 , 9 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
People v. Foster
green
1 sentence1979App. 3d 490 , 356 N.E.2d 1288 .) However, the waiver principle “is not an ironclad rule.” (People v. Norris (1972), 8 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.