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11 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1910–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
John T. Patzer v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System and State Department of Administrationgreen2 sentences2005Patzer v. Board of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985). 2005"Wisconsin law does not treat [claim preclusion] as an ironclad rule which must be implacably applied whenever its literal requirements are met, regardless of any countervailing considerations." Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 38 Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harv. | 3 | 3 |
Tesar v. Andersongreen2 sentences2026Generally speaking, the application of the public policy factors turns on the specific facts of the case, and we have previously explained that in public policy cases, “prior decisions seldom dictate the result in subsequent cases.” Tesar v. Anderson, 2010 WI App 116, ¶12, 329 Wis. 2d 240, 789 N.W.2d 351; see also Erdmann v. Progressive N. Ins. 2026Generally speaking, the application of the public policy factors turns on the specific facts of the case, and we have previously explained that in public policy cases, “prior decisions seldom dictate the result in subsequent cases.” Tesar v. Anderson, 2010 WI App 116, ¶12, 329 Wis. 2d 240, 789 N.W.2d 351; see also Erdmann v. Progressive N. Ins. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ericksongreen2 sentences2005State v. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, ¶¶ 7-8 , 248 Wis. 2d 120 , 635 N.W.2d 673 (an issue waived under Escalona-Naranjo may still be addressed by the court in its discretion); see also State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766 , 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (waiver is a rule of judicial administration, not jurisdiction and courts have discretion to make exceptions). 2005State v. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, ¶¶ 7-8 , 248 Wis. 2d 120 , 635 N.W.2d 673 (an issue waived under Escalona-Naranjo may still be addressed by the court in its discretion); see also State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766 , 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (waiver is a rule of judicial administration, not jurisdiction and courts have discretion to make exceptions). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.
green
2 sentences2005"Wisconsin law does not treat [claim preclusion] as an ironclad rule which must be implacably applied whenever its literal requirements are met, regardless of any countervailing considerations." Sopha, 230 Wis. 2d at 235 (quoting Patzer v. Bd. of Regents, 763 F.2d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 1985)). 38 Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harv. 2004Sopha v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 230 Wis. 2d 212, 235 , 601 N.W.2d 627 (1999). 1 "Wisconsin law does not treat [claim/issue preclusion] as an ironclad rule which must be implacably applied whenever its literal requirements are met, regardless of any countervailing considerations." Id. (citation omitted). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
State v. Ziegler
green
2 sentences2025“A term such as ‘shall’ or ‘may’ does not have an exclusive, fixed, or inviolate connotation, and its meaning in particular cases is determined from . . . the context within which the word appears.” SINGER, supra, § 57:10; State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶43 , 342 Wis. 2d 256 , 816 N.W.2d 238 (“[A]scertaining the plain meaning of a statute requires more than focusing on a single sentence or portion thereof.” (citing Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. 2025“A term such as ‘shall’ or ‘may’ does not have an exclusive, fixed, or inviolate connotation, and its meaning in particular cases is determined from . . . the context within which the word appears.” SINGER, supra, § 57:10; State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶43 , 342 Wis. 2d 256 , 816 N.W.2d 238 (“[A]scertaining the plain meaning of a statute requires more than focusing on a single sentence or portion thereof.” (citing Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Daniel Marx v. Richard L. Morris
green
2 sentences2021An ironclad rule, that a 5 In addressing the LLC standing issue, we have considered the impact of Marx v. Morris, 2019 WI 34, ¶¶37-46 , 386 Wis. 2d 122 , 925 N.W.2d 112 , in which LLC members were permitted to sue other LLC members (and, since the members were themselves LLCs, their members) for injury to the LLC. 2021An ironclad rule, that a 5 In addressing the LLC standing issue, we have considered the impact of Marx v. Morris, 2019 WI 34, ¶¶37-46 , 386 Wis. 2d 122 , 925 N.W.2d 112 , in which LLC members were permitted to sue other LLC members (and, since the members were themselves LLCs, their members) for injury to the LLC. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Crockett
green
2 sentences2005State v. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, ¶¶ 7-8 , 248 Wis. 2d 120 , 635 N.W.2d 673 (an issue waived under Escalona-Naranjo may still be addressed by the court in its discretion); see also State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766 , 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (waiver is a rule of judicial administration, not jurisdiction and courts have discretion to make exceptions). 2005State v. Crockett, 2001 WI App 235, ¶¶ 7-8 , 248 Wis. 2d 120 , 635 N.W.2d 673 (an issue waived under Escalona-Naranjo may still be addressed by the court in its discretion); see also State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 766 , 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (waiver is a rule of judicial administration, not jurisdiction and courts have discretion to make exceptions). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. Winchenbach
green
1 sentence2004In United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 1999), the court held that where the police are lawfully on the suspect's premises by virtue of a valid search warrant, they may make a warrantless arrest of the suspect prior to the search if the arrest is supported by probable cause. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Charmley v. Charmley
neutral
2 sentences1916Charmley v. Charmley, 125 Wis. 297 ( 103 N. W. 1106 ) and cases cited at page 302. 1916Charmley v. Charmley, 125 Wis. 297 ( 103 N. W. 1106 ) and cases cited at page 302. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Ackerman v. Lyman
neutral
1 sentence1910This statute was under consideration in Ackerman v. Lyman, 20 Wis. 454 , which was an action for use and occupation of lands by one who was originally .a trespasser, and it was held that the action for use and occupation in this state rests on this section, and that the section requires that there must be an agreement, express or implied, and that it may be implied from the defendant’s entering into possession by permission of the plaintiff, or from acts showing the assent of the defendant after a tortious entry to hold under the permission of the plaintiff. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.