ironclad bar in Florida

1974Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91 , 95 So. 115 (1923), and Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683 , 92 So. 569 (1922), supra. While the bar against the use of `on or about' continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date." Numerous citations are set forth in Sparks from the various states which have receded from the old bar against the use of "on or about" as a sufficient basis on which to c

1973While the bar against the use of "on or about" continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date.

1995In fact, any suggestion that a presumption was created would run counter to the Court's express statement that "the facts peculiar to each case govern the decision." Kendall, 88 So.2d at 278 .

1983In this limited circumstance I feel that we should not apply the ironclad rule enunciated in Jenkins v. Wainwright, 322 So.2d 477 (Fla.1975), to the effect that filing a habeas corpus petition in the district court precludes the filing of one here and that we should accept the time-honored petition for habeas corpus and address the merits of the claim.

1982The First District agreed with the reasoning of the Fourth District on this issue and said: The Fourth District Court of Appeal, on the other hand, has held that Jones [ Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1952)] did not set down an ironclad rule against taxing costs of copies of depositions and that such costs may be taxable if the copies served a useful purpose, which is a question within the discretion of the trial court.

1980Freight Forwarders Inst. v. United States, I.C.C., 409 F.Supp. 693 (N.D.Ill.1976); I.

1974Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91 , 95 So. 115 (1923), and Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683 , 92 So. 569 (1922), supra. While the bar against the use of `on or about' continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date." Numerous citations are set forth in Sparks from the various states which have receded from the old bar against the use of "on or about" as a sufficient basis on which to c

1974Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91 , 95 So. 115 (1923), and Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683 , 92 So. 569 (1922), supra. While the bar against the use of `on or about' continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date." Numerous citations are set forth in Sparks from the various states which have receded from the old bar against the use of "on or about" as a sufficient basis on which to c

1974Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91 , 95 So. 115 (1923), and Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683 , 92 So. 569 (1922), supra. While the bar against the use of `on or about' continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date." Numerous citations are set forth in Sparks from the various states which have receded from the old bar against the use of "on or about" as a sufficient basis on which to c

1974Hunter v. State, 85 Fla. 91 , 95 So. 115 (1923), and Straughter v. State, 83 Fla. 683 , 92 So. 569 (1922), supra. While the bar against the use of `on or about' continues to be applied within the State (State v. Chapman, 240 So.2d 491 (Fla.App.3d, 1970)), the exceptions have made the ironclad bar meaningless as a protection of the accused, and CrPR, Rule 3.140(d)(3), has erased the common law requirement of a definite date." Numerous citations are set forth in Sparks from the various states which have receded from the old bar against the use of "on or about" as a sufficient basis on which to c

1969We do interpret it to mean that when a defendant is being interrogated and he indicates that he wishes to remain silent, that interrogation must not then be continued The vice sought to be removed is the evil of continued, incessant harrassment by interrogation which results in breaking the will of the suspect, thereby making his statement involuntary." On this same question, the Supreme Court of Iowa in State v. McClelland, Iowa 1969, 164 N.W.2d 189 , stated: "It is at once apparent the inevitable consequence of [a holding that the subsequent statement was inadmissible] would be an ironclad r