inverse condemnation claim in Michigan

2024Under the stabilization doctrine, if an inverse condemnation claim is based on a taking “via a continuous wrong, the statute of limitations does not begin to run ‘until the consequences of the condemnor’s actions have stabilized.’ ” Mays, 506 Mich at 185 n 10 (opinion by BERNSTEIN, J.), quoting Hart, 416 Mich at 504 .6 The doctrine originates from United States v Dickinson, 331 US 745, 748-751 ; 67 S Ct 1382 ; 91 L Ed 1789 (1947).

2020In Hart, this Court recognized that with regard to an inverse-condemnation claim in which plaintiffs allege that their property was taken via a continuous wrong, the statute of limitations does not begin to run “until the consequences of the condemnor’s actions have stabilized.” Id. at 504 .

2015This Court held that the defendants’ inverse condemnation claim “must fail as a matter of law for two reasons.” Id. at 561 .

2004The Court stated the two elements of an inverse condemnation claim are “(1) ‘that the government’s actions were a substantial cause of the decline of his property’s value,’ and (2) ‘that the government abused its legitimate powers in affirmative actions directly aimed at the plaintiffs property.’ ” Ankersen, supra at 561 , quoting Heinrich, supra at 700 .

2026Attorney General v Ankersen, 148 Mich App 524, 562 ; 385 NW2d 550 (1986); see also, e.g., Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club, 283 Mich App 264, 296 ; 769 NW2d 234 (2009); Hinojosa v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 263 Mich App 537, 549-550 ; 688 NW2d 550 (2004).

2023On the inverse condemnation claim, the trial court concluded that the “plaintiffs had not alleged a ‘taking’ of property that required just compensation.” Id.

2025An inverse condemnation claim may be based upon the government’s ‘regulatory taking’ of private property.” Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich App 638, 646 ; 714 NW2d 350 (2006).

2022“An inverse condemnation claim may be based upon the government’s ‘regulatory taking’ of private property.” Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich App 638, 646 ; 714 NW2d 350 (2006).

2026Addressing when the inverse condemnation claim accrued, id., the Court stated that the claim was continuous, as opposed to “a single event,” because it involved “the overflow due to rises in the level of the river.” Id. at 749 .

2026Addressing when the inverse condemnation claim accrued, id., the Court stated that the claim was continuous, as opposed to “a single event,” because it involved “the overflow due to rises in the level of the river.” Id. at 749 .

2025An inverse condemnation claim may be based upon the government’s ‘regulatory taking’ of private property.” Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich App 638, 646 ; 714 NW2d 350 (2006).

2022“An inverse condemnation claim may be based upon the government’s ‘regulatory taking’ of private property.” Dorman v Clinton Twp, 269 Mich App 638, 646 ; 714 NW2d 350 (2006).

2023The fact that most previous inverse condemnation cases in Michigan have involved government projects is unsurprising.19 Because an inverse condemnation claim must be brought against the government, see Wiggins, 291 Mich App at 573 , proving sufficient state action will often be easier when the government unilaterally owned and operated a dam.

2023Thus, we held that “the City can have no inverse-condemnation liability arising out of the flow of water through the privately owned drain.” Id. at 573 . 19 Although unpublished, this Court has allowed an inverse condemnation claim to proceed when the claim stemmed from government involvement in a private construction project on private property.

2020Justice MARKMAN argues that “Hart is no longer good law because this Court in Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263 ; 696 NW2d 646 (2005) [(analyzing a discrimination claim)], later abolished the ‘continuing violations’ doctrine because it was inconsistent with the language of the statute of limitations.” In our view, Justice MARKMAN misapplies the continuing-violations doctrine to plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation.

2020Justice MARKMAN argues that “Hart is no longer good law because this Court in Garg v Macomb Co Community Mental Health Servs, 472 Mich 263 ; 696 NW2d 646 (2005) [(analyzing a discrimination claim)], later abolished the ‘continuing violations’ doctrine because it was inconsistent with the language of the statute of limitations.” In our view, Justice MARKMAN misapplies the continuing-violations doctrine to plaintiffs’ claim of inverse condemnation.

2016As noted earlier, the proper statute of limitations for an inverse condemnation claim is either six years pursuant to MCL 600.5813 and Hart, 416 Mich at 503 , where the plaintiff does not maintain an interest in the property, or 15 years pursuant to MCL 600.5801(4) and Difronzo, 166 Mich App at 153-154 , where the plaintiff does maintain an ownership interest.

2016In Difronzo v Village of Port Sanilac, 166 Mich App 148 ; 419 NW2d 756 (1988), this Court, relying on the language in Hart, took that next step and applied the 15-year limitations period to a case involving a plaintiff who held ownership of shorefront property at the time he commenced suit.

2025Id. at 22-23 .

2024Therefore, the phrase “jurisdiction otherwise acquired” in MCL 600.5856(b) “more logically refers to the ways of acquiring jurisdiction other than by service of process, such as consent of the defendant.” Mair v Consumers Power Co, 419 Mich 74, 82 ; 348 NW2d 256 (1984).

2024Therefore, the phrase “jurisdiction otherwise acquired” in MCL 600.5856(b) “more logically refers to the ways of acquiring jurisdiction other than by service of process, such as consent of the defendant.” Mair v Consumers Power Co, 419 Mich 74, 82 ; 348 NW2d 256 (1984).

2023Moreover, as the Court of Claims noted, defendants’ position sounds as one attacking the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claims, making MCR 2.116(C)(8) the proper basis under which to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. “[W]here a party brings a summary disposition motion under the wrong subrule, the trial court may proceed under the appropriate subrule as long as neither party is misled.” Blair v Checker Cab Co, 219 Mich App 667, 670-671 ; 558 NW2d 439 (1996).

2023Moreover, as the Court of Claims noted, defendants’ position sounds as one attacking the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs’ claims, making MCR 2.116(C)(8) the proper basis under which to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. “[W]here a party brings a summary disposition motion under the wrong subrule, the trial court may proceed under the appropriate subrule as long as neither party is misled.” Blair v Checker Cab Co, 219 Mich App 667, 670-671 ; 558 NW2d 439 (1996).

2022Merkur Steel Supply, 261 Mich App at 125 .

2022Had they wished to retain the option to pursue an inverse condemnation claim against the state, “[p]roviding such notice would have imposed only a minor procedural burden.” Rusha, 307 Mich App at 312 .

2016Young, 294 Mich App at 144 .

2015Rather, it is to assure that defendant has had the opportunity to make its case against estoppel factually in the context of the three-part standard in Conagra, Inc, 237 Mich App at 141 . -8- other.

2011Electro-Tech, Inc v HF Campbell Co, 433 Mich 57 , 91 n 38; 445 NW2d 61 (1989).

2011Electro-Tech, Inc v HF Campbell Co, 433 Mich 57 , 91 n 38; 445 NW2d 61 (1989).

2010The trial court followed Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 147-149 ; 422 NW2d 205 (1988), overruled by Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675 ; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).

2010The trial court followed Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 147-149 ; 422 NW2d 205 (1988), overruled by Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675 ; 641 NW2d 219 (2002).

2004The Court stated the two elements of an inverse condemnation claim are “(1) ‘that the government’s actions were a substantial cause of the decline of his property’s value,’ and (2) ‘that the government abused its legitimate powers in affirmative actions directly aimed at the plaintiffs property.’ ” Ankersen, supra at 561 , quoting Heinrich, supra at 700 .

1996In short, the Commission's denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision. [10] We need not address the issue whether Paragon has pursued an inverse condemnation claim because we find that Paragon failed to obtain a final decision regarding the full effect of Novi's zoning ordinance on the use of Paragon's land. [11] Williamson supra 193, 105 S.Ct. at 3120 . [12] Id. at 191 , 105 S.Ct. at 3118-3119 .

1996In short, the Commission's denial of approval does not conclusively determine whether respondent will be denied all reasonable beneficial use of its property, and therefore is not a final, reviewable decision. [10] We need not address the issue whether Paragon has pursued an inverse condemnation claim because we find that Paragon failed to obtain a final decision regarding the full effect of Novi's zoning ordinance on the use of Paragon's land. [11] Williamson supra 193, 105 S.Ct. at 3120 . [12] Id. at 191 , 105 S.Ct. at 3118-3119 .