inverse condemnation claim in Florida

2018However, what the majority fails to mention is the Second District’s statement, “We conclude that the court erred in determining that the District enjoys sovereign immunity from a claim for inverse condemnation.” Id. at 610 ; see also Hansen v. City of Deland, 32 So. 3d 654, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“A property owner can file an inverse condemnation claim to recover the value of property that has been de facto taken by a ∗ Although Appellees alleged a physical taking, it has also been held that the government “may take private property not only by physical occupancy, but also by imposing such

2018However, what the majority fails to mention is the Second District’s statement, “We conclude that the court erred in determining that the District enjoys sovereign immunity from a claim for inverse condemnation.” Id. at 610 ; see also Hansen v. City of Deland, 32 So. 3d 654, 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (“A property owner can file an inverse condemnation claim to recover the value of property that has been de facto taken by a government entity.”); Drake v. Walton Cty., 6 So. 3d 717, 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (“We have previously held that a county takes private property when it 18 directs a concentra

2010See Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So.2d 395, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)(not-ing that “rain is a condition that is reasonably expected to continually re-occur in the future)”; Assoc, of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); cf. Diamond K *656 Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(holding that no taking occurred as a result of flooding of a creek in the appellant’s property because the appellant had not shown that a continuing physical invasion occurred, depriving it of all reasonable use of its property).

2009See Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So.2d 395, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (noting that “rain is a condition that is reasonably expected to continually re-occur in the future)”; Assoc. of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); cf. Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that no taking occurred as a result of flooding of a creek in the appellant’s property because the appellant had not shown that a continuing physical invasion occurred, depriving it of all reasonable use of its property).

2010See Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So.2d 395, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)(not-ing that “rain is a condition that is reasonably expected to continually re-occur in the future)”; Assoc, of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); cf. Diamond K *656 Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(holding that no taking occurred as a result of flooding of a creek in the appellant’s property because the appellant had not shown that a continuing physical invasion occurred, depriving it of all reasonable use of its property).

2009See Elliott v. Hernando County, 281 So.2d 395, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) (noting that “rain is a condition that is reasonably expected to continually re-occur in the future)”; Assoc. of Meadow Lake, Inc. v. City of Edgewater, 706 So.2d 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); cf. Diamond K Corp. v. Leon County, 677 So.2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding that no taking occurred as a result of flooding of a creek in the appellant’s property because the appellant had not shown that a continuing physical invasion occurred, depriving it of all reasonable use of its property).

2019Citing Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission v. Daws, 256 So. 3d 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018), the City maintains that, unless the takings claim is facially sufficient, it is barred by sovereign immunity.

2015This appeal was stayed pending the appeal of Livingston, 150 So.3d 239 , which involved similar questions of law regarding the inverse condemnation claim.

2013We acknowledge the general view that “[ijnverse condemnation jurisprudence, like the direct exercise of eminent domain power, is based to a large extent on in rem concepts,” Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed.Cir.1994), but we cannot accept appellants’ and the dissent’s invitation to turn a generally held concept into a rule of law and agree that the nature of an inverse condemnation claim “demands” that it be treated like an eminent domain proceeding — which, as an action in rem, must be litigated in the county where the land is located.

2013The Fourth District did not address this issue in Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. City of Pompano Beach, 829 So.2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), although that decision, again, supports the logical proposition that an inverse condemnation claim must be brought in the county in which the land is located, as even the majority opinion acknowledges.

2013The Fourth District did not address this issue in Florida Department of Agriculture & Consumer Services v. City of Pompano Beach, 829 So.2d 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), although that decision, again, supports the logical proposition that an inverse condemnation claim must be brought in the county in which the land is located, as even the majority opinion acknowledges.

2013For example, in Levy County v. Diamond, 7 So.3d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the plaintiffs asserted an inverse condemnation claim regarding land located in Levy County, but filed their suit in Leon County.

2013The trial court refused to transfer the action to Levy County, and this court reversed, recognizing that the “property that is the subject of the inverse condemnation claim is situated in Levy County, the official documents relating to the property are on file in the clerk’s office in Levy County and nearly all of the potential witnesses live in Levy County or in the immediate vicinity.” 7 So.3d at 566-67 .

2013In Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Benitez, 200 So.2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), the Second District held that the statute of limitations on an inverse condemnation claim based on increased air traffic noise in proximity to an airport did not accrue until the noise level, which had been gradually increasing for eight years, became stabilized with the nearly constant arrival of jet aircraft.

2012Although the concurring and dissenting opinions in Patchen suggest concern over whether the majority opinion impliedly eliminated the right to pursue an inverse condemnation claim for the destruction of residential citrus trees, the majority opinion limits the scope of its opinion to the certified question posed. 3 See Patchen, 906 So.2d at 1005-09 .

2009See Collins v. Monroe County, 999 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); City of Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 641 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

2008The appellants further argue that it was not until March 9, 1998, that the City was requested to remove the garbage from the property and that the "March 1998 letter was the first and only time the City told the Appellants it would not remove the garbage unless legally ordered to do so." In support of their position, the appellants rely on the stabilization doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 , 67 S.Ct. 1382 , 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947).

2008The appellants further argue that it was not until March 9, 1998, that the City was requested to remove the garbage from the property and that the "March 1998 letter was the first and only time the City told the Appellants it would not remove the garbage unless legally ordered to do so." In support of their position, the appellants rely on the stabilization doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 , 67 S.Ct. 1382 , 91 L.Ed. 1789 (1947).

2008The circumstances here are similar to those at issue in Tanner, 789 So.2d 1148 , where we held the retraction of permission to use property for a particular purpose triggered the accrual of a cause of action for trespass.

2005Kendry v. State Road Dept. [sic] of Florida, 213 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).

2005Kendry v. State Road Dept. [sic] of Florida, 213 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).

2005Kendry v. State Road Dept. [sic] of Florida, 213 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968), Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So.2d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).

2005In support of that argument, FDOT cites Kendry v. State Road Department of Florida, 213 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968).