inverse condemnation claim in North Dakota

2006Frank v. County of Mercer, 186 N.W.2d 439, 445-46 (N.D. 1971). [¶10] The district court concluded that to maintain an inverse condemnation claim, "Fargo must have performed some affirmative act similar to exercising the power of eminent domain." The Knutsons argue an affirmative act similar to exercising eminent domain is not required, because a public entity can be liable not only if it acts purposely but also negligently.

2006Frank v. County of Mercer, 186 N.W.2d 439, 445-46 (N.D.1971). [¶ 10] The district court concluded that to maintain an inverse condemnation claim, “Fargo must have performed some affirmative act similar to exercising the power of eminent domain.” The Knutsons argue an affirmative act similar to exercising eminent domain is not required, because a public entity can be liable not only if it acts purposely but also negligently.

2001See Buegel v. City of Grand Forks , 475 N.W.2d 133, 134-35 (N.D. 1991); Eck , 283 N.W.2d at 197-98 ; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 121 S. Ct. 2448 , _____ (2001) (a land-use regulation which falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use may constitute a taking, depending upon a complex of factors) (citing Penn Central Transp.

2001See Buegel v. City of Grand Forks, 475 N.W.2d 133, 134-35 (N.D.1991); Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197-98 ; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, —U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 , (2001) (a land-use regulation which falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use may constitute a taking, depending upon a complex of factors) (citing Penn Central Transp.

2001See Buegel v. City of Grand Forks , 475 N.W.2d 133, 134-35 (N.D. 1991); Eck , 283 N.W.2d at 197-98 ; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 121 S. Ct. 2448 , _____ (2001) (a land-use regulation which falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use may constitute a taking, depending upon a complex of factors) (citing Penn Central Transp.

2001See Buegel v. City of Grand Forks, 475 N.W.2d 133, 134-35 (N.D.1991); Eck, 283 N.W.2d at 197-98 ; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, —U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 2448 , 150 L.Ed.2d 592 , (2001) (a land-use regulation which falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use may constitute a taking, depending upon a complex of factors) (citing Penn Central Transp.

2010“Whether there has been a taking of private property for public use is a question of law which is fully reviewable on appeal.” City of Minot v. Boger , 2008 ND 7 , ¶ 16, 744 N.W.2d 277 . [¶9] There is a distinction between the state’s police power and its power of eminent domain, which is “[c]lear in theory but often cloudy in application.” Eck v. City of Bismarck , 283 N.W.2d 193, 198 (N.D. 1979) “Eminent domain takes property because it is useful to the public, while the police power regulates the use of, or impairs rights in, property to prevent detriment to the public interest, and constit

2001See Buegel v. City of Grand Forks , 475 N.W.2d 133, 134-35 (N.D. 1991); Eck , 283 N.W.2d at 197-98 ; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island , 121 S. Ct. 2448 , _____ (2001) (a land-use regulation which falls short of eliminating all economically beneficial use may constitute a taking, depending upon a complex of factors) (citing Penn Central Transp.

2019Keidel v. Rask , 304 N.W.2d 402 , 403 (N.D. 1981).

2019Keidel v. Rask, 304 N.W.2d 402, 403 (N.D. 1981).

2015Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 , 25 L.Ed. 980 (1879). “[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community— the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.” United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 , 73 S.Ct 200 , 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).

2015Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 , 25 L.Ed. 980 (1879). “[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community— the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.” United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 , 73 S.Ct 200 , 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).

2015Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 , 25 L.Ed. 980 (1879). “[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community— the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.” United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 , 73 S.Ct 200 , 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).

2015Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 , 25 L.Ed. 980 (1879). “[T]he common law had long recognized that in times of imminent peril — such as when fire threatened a whole community— the sovereign could, with immunity, destroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many more could be saved.” United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 154 , 73 S.Ct 200 , 97 L.Ed. 157 (1952).

2006Bell, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 909 (emphasis added). [¶13] Reading these cases together, we conclude an inverse condemnation claim does not hinge on negligence or intent to harm.

2006Bell, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at 909 (emphasis added). [¶ 13] Reading these cases together, we conclude an inverse condemnation claim does not hinge on negligence or intent to harm.

2006That section of the Constitution does not bear upon damages resulting from negligence of public corporations or their agents; it deals with those damages that would normally flow from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 71 N.D. 321, 327 , 300 N.W. 631, 633-34 (1941).

2006That section of the Constitution does not bear upon damages resulting from negligence of public corporations or their agents; it deals with those damages that would normally flow from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 71 N.D. 321, 327 , 300 N.W. 631, 633-34 (1941).