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7 Arizona opinions name it 1 courts 2002–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Acuna v. Kroackgreen2 sentences2007See Acuna v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104, 110, ¶ 23 , 128 P.3d 221, 227 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law). ¶35 Under the Arizona Constitution, property shall not be “taken or damaged” without just compensation. 2007See Acuna v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104, 110, ¶ 23 , 128 P.3d 221, 227 (App.2006) (reviewing de novo denial of motion for judgment as a matter of law). ¶35 Under the Arizona Constitution, property shall not be “taken or damaged” without just compensation. | 2 | 2 |
Flood Control Dist. v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2014We disagree. ¶11 In Flood Control District. of Maricopa County. v. Gaines, this court upheld the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 12-821 as applied to state constitutional claims “because it regulates rather than abrogates the time within which an action must be filed against a public entity.” 202 Ariz. 248 , 254, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 196 , 202 (App. 2002) (applying A.R.S. § 12-821 to an inverse condemnation claim). 2014We disagree. ¶11 In Flood Control District. of Maricopa County. v. Gaines, this court upheld the constitutionality of A.R.S. § 12-821 as applied to state constitutional claims “because it regulates rather than abrogates the time within which an action must be filed against a public entity.” 202 Ariz. 248 , 254, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d 196 , 202 (App. 2002) (applying A.R.S. § 12-821 to an inverse condemnation claim). | 1 | 2 |
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.green2 sentences2013City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 547, ¶ 8 , 105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005). ¶ 7 Cook initially argues that § 12-821 does not apply to his claim against the Town, a claim he characterizes on appeal as an inverse condemnation claim. 2013City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 547, ¶ 8 , 105 P.3d 1163, 1166 (2005). ¶ 7 Cook initially argues that § 12-821 does not apply to his claim against the Town, a claim he characterizes on appeal as an inverse condemnation claim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mabery Ranch, Co., L.L.C.green2 sentences2013See State v. Mabery Ranch Co., 216 Ariz. 233, 249, ¶ 74 , 165 P.3d 211 , 227 (App.2007) (noting “there is a significant distinction between a cause of action for damages ... and a cause of action to quiet title, which seeks a judicial determination of title, rather than damages”). 2013An inverse condemnation claim requires the claimant to allege “the government either assumes actual possession of the property or places a legal constraint upon the property that substantially diminishes or destroys the owner’s right to, and use [ ] of, the property.” Mabery Ranch, 216 Ariz. at 242, ¶ 35 , 165 P.3d at 220 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaffgreen2 sentences2013See Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty. v. Gaines, 202 Ariz. 248, 251, ¶ 6 , 43 P.3d 196, 199 (App.2002); Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227 Ariz. 336, 342, ¶ 24 , 258 P.3d 154, 160 (App.2011). 2013See Flood Control Dist. of Maricopa Cnty. v. Gaines, 202 Ariz. 248, 251, ¶ 6 , 43 P.3d 196, 199 (App.2002); Canyon Del Rio Investors, L.L.C. v. City of Flagstaff, 227 Ariz. 336, 342, ¶ 24 , 258 P.3d 154, 160 (App.2011). | 1 | 1 |
State v. MABERY RANCH, CO., LLCgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Mabery Ranch Co., 216 Ariz. 233, 249, ¶ 74 , 165 P.3d 211 , 227 (App.2007) (noting “there is a significant distinction between a cause of action for damages ... and a cause of action to quiet title, which seeks a judicial determination of title, rather than damages”). 2013An inverse condemnation claim requires the claimant to allege “the government either assumes actual possession of the property or places a legal constraint upon the property that substantially diminishes or destroys the owner’s right to, and use [ ] of, the property.” Mabery Ranch, 216 Ariz. at 242, ¶ 35 , 165 P.3d at 220 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Commissiongreen2 sentences2006After oral argument the court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding appellants’ inverse condemnation claims. ¶ 6 In their supplemental briefing, appellants argued that the enactment of the Ordinance constituted an “as-applied” taking pursuant to the three-pronged test derived from Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 3 *162 ¶ 7 Treating the City’s motion as one for summary judgment because both parties presented materials beyond the pleadings, see Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 196 Ar 2006After oral argument the court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding appellants’ inverse condemnation claims. ¶ 6 In their supplemental briefing, appellants argued that the enactment of the Ordinance constituted an “as-applied” taking pursuant to the three-pronged test derived from Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 3 *162 ¶ 7 Treating the City’s motion as one for summary judgment because both parties presented materials beyond the pleadings, see Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 196 Ar | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dawson
neutral
1 sentence2020Miller v. Dawson, 175 Ariz. 610 (1993) is contrary to the ruling that the inverse condemnation claim belonged to the former owners because Dawson allowed subsequent property owners to press an inverse condemnation claim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City
green
2 sentences2006After oral argument the court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding appellants’ inverse condemnation claims. ¶ 6 In their supplemental briefing, appellants argued that the enactment of the Ordinance constituted an “as-applied” taking pursuant to the three-pronged test derived from Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 3 *162 ¶ 7 Treating the City’s motion as one for summary judgment because both parties presented materials beyond the pleadings, see Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 196 Ar 2006After oral argument the court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding appellants’ inverse condemnation claims. ¶ 6 In their supplemental briefing, appellants argued that the enactment of the Ordinance constituted an “as-applied” taking pursuant to the three-pronged test derived from Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 , 98 S.Ct. 2646 , 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). 3 *162 ¶ 7 Treating the City’s motion as one for summary judgment because both parties presented materials beyond the pleadings, see Blanchard v. Show Low Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 196 Ar | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Klopping v. City of Whittier
green
2 sentences2002Judge Pillinger concluded that there was no taking of DUWA’s property under Arizona law because Tempe neither physically invaded DUWA’s property nor substantially interfered with its ingress or egress. 3 The court was not persuaded by a California case relied upon by DUWA, Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 500 P.2d 1345 (1972), that allowed an inverse condemnation claim arising out of pre-condemnation announcements by a public entity that reduced property values. 2002Judge Pillinger concluded that there was no taking of DUWA’s property under Arizona law because Tempe neither physically invaded DUWA’s property nor substantially interfered with its ingress or egress. 3 The court was not persuaded by a California case relied upon by DUWA, Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39 , 104 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 500 P.2d 1345 (1972), that allowed an inverse condemnation claim arising out of pre-condemnation announcements by a public entity that reduced property values. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Uvodich v. Arizona Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2002DUWA contends that the broader language of the Arizona Constitution provides for recovery in cases, such as this one, where the governing authority’s acts have “damaged” the value of the property even though the government has not initiated an eminent domain proceeding or otherwise asserted control over the property. ¶ 18 This court previously rejected a similar inverse condemnation claim for “depreciation in value.” Uvodich v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 9 Ariz.App. 400 , 453 P.2d 229 (1969). 2002DUWA contends that the broader language of the Arizona Constitution provides for recovery in cases, such as this one, where the governing authority’s acts have “damaged” the value of the property even though the government has not initiated an eminent domain proceeding or otherwise asserted control over the property. ¶ 18 This court previously rejected a similar inverse condemnation claim for “depreciation in value.” Uvodich v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 9 Ariz.App. 400 , 453 P.2d 229 (1969). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.