use of a peremptory challenge in Ohio

2008II. {¶ 35} In his second assignment of error, appellant maintains that the trial court failed to conduct a proper constitutional analysis as outlined in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 in determining that the State was not racially motivated in excluding an African-American from the jury through the use of a peremptory challenge.

2007THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL." I. {¶ 26} In his first assignment of error, the appellant maintains that the trial court failed to conduct a proper constitutional analysis as outlined in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79 in determining that the State was not racially motivated in excluding an African American from the jury through the use of a peremptory challenge.

2004Therefore, an objection to the use of a peremptory challenge "is untimely if made after the jury is sworn." Id. {¶ 7} In this case, Ms. Groce-Hopson did not contest the exclusion of this potential juror until after the jury was duly impaneled, accepted, and sworn by the court.

2000If one wishes to challenge the use of a peremptory challenge, one "must object to the racially motivated use of peremptory challenges prior to the jury's being sworn." State v. Robertson (1993), 90 Ohio App.3d 715 , 719 .

2024State v. Garrett, 2022-Ohio-4218, ¶ 68 .

2020Jefferson No. 05-JE-21, 2006-Ohio-1472 , in support of the proposition that “the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude a single prospective juror, without more, can establish a prima facie cause of discrimination.” While this is an accurate statement of the law, it has no bearing on the present case. {¶55} In Barker, the Seventh District found that the appellant, who was African American, had met his burden of making a prima facie case of discrimination in that the state wished to exercise its peremptory challenge to excuse the only African-American juror, and as such, the prosecutor’s use

2015However, we need not decide that issue because “‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’” Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d 1310 , quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 .2 Even assuming May had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination (such that the burden shifted to the state), we find that the record supports

2015However, we need not decide that issue because “‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’” Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d 1310 , quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 .2 Even assuming May had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination (such that the burden shifted to the state), we find that the record supports

2015However, we need not decide that issue because “‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’” Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d 1310 , quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 .2 Even assuming May had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination (such that the burden shifted to the state), we find that the record supports

2015However, we need not decide that issue because “‘[o]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made a prima facie showing becomes moot.’” Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d at 583 , 589 N.E.2d 1310 , quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. 352, 359 , 111 S.Ct. 1859 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 .2 Even assuming May had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination (such that the burden shifted to the state), we find that the record supports

2012“A trial court's finding of no discriminatory intent will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448 , 2008-Ohio-2762 , 890 N.E.2d 263 , ¶ 61 (Citations omitted.) {¶ 39} The trial court found that the use of a peremptory challenge on the last African-American juror established a prima facie case of discrimination.

2008See, Hicks v. Westinghouse Materials Co. (1997), 78 Ohio St. 3d 95 , 98 ; State v. Toland , Stark App. No. 2006-CA-0162, 2007-Ohio-644 .

2007State v. Bryan , 101 Ohio St.3d 272 , 2004-Ohio-971 , ¶ 106 .

2003Id.

1998"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated." Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81 , 88 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 90 .

1998"So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated." Ross v. Oklahoma (1988), 487 U.S. 81 , 88 , 101 L.Ed.2d 80 , 90 .