Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Martinez-Salazargreen2 sentences2026See Browning v. State, 2006 OK CR 8, ¶ 9 (“While Martinez-Salazar is the law in cases involving federal criminal procedure, it is not . . . law which requires any change of course from this [c]ourt.”); see also State v. Talbott, 521 P.3d 948 , 955 (Wash. 2022)(The part of Martinez- Salazar pertinent to this issue “is not based on any legal principle that applies to the states.”); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 2d 563 , 584 n.9 (Fla. 2021)(Lawson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)(“Martinez-Salazar may have left open the issue of whether, under federal law, ‘normal principles of w 2014See Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316 , 120 S.Ct. 774 (the "principal reason for peremptories" is "to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury"); Novotny, ¶22 ("The Supreme Court ... has now expressly rejected the notion that peremptory challenges have any constitutional dimension or purpose, other than as a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury." (citations omit ted); Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.1999) (the right to challenge a prospective juror for cause is an integral part of the right to a fair trial). ¶ 18 Nor are we persuaded that such | 2 | 3 |
State v. Lindellgreen1 sentence2026See Browning v. State, 2006 OK CR 8, ¶ 9 (“While Martinez-Salazar is the law in cases involving federal criminal procedure, it is not . . . law which requires any change of course from this [c]ourt.”); see also State v. Talbott, 521 P.3d 948 , 955 (Wash. 2022)(The part of Martinez- Salazar pertinent to this issue “is not based on any legal principle that applies to the states.”); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 2d 563 , 584 n.9 (Fla. 2021)(Lawson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)(“Martinez-Salazar may have left open the issue of whether, under federal law, ‘normal principles of w | 1 | 1 |
Browning v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Browning v. State, 2006 OK CR 8, ¶ 9 (“While Martinez-Salazar is the law in cases involving federal criminal procedure, it is not . . . law which requires any change of course from this [c]ourt.”); see also State v. Talbott, 521 P.3d 948 , 955 (Wash. 2022)(The part of Martinez- Salazar pertinent to this issue “is not based on any legal principle that applies to the states.”); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 2d 563 , 584 n.9 (Fla. 2021)(Lawson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)(“Martinez-Salazar may have left open the issue of whether, under federal law, ‘normal principles of w | 1 | 1 |
People v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2019People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 831, 835 (citing People v. Wise, 2014 COA 83 , ¶¶ 28–29, 348 P.3d 482, 489 ); People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 23 , 356 P.3d 956, 963 (quoting Wise, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d at 489 ); Wise, ¶¶ 28–29, 28 n.6, 348 P.3d at 489 & n.6. ¶18 Although in Novotny we focused on the propriety of automatic reversal for what we had previously considered to be the “forced” use of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, our reliance not only on developments in the harmless error doctrine, but also on more recent Supre 2019People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 831, 835 (citing People v. Wise, 2014 COA 83 , ¶¶ 28–29, 348 P.3d 482, 489 ); People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 23 , 356 P.3d 956, 963 (quoting Wise, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d at 489 ); Wise, ¶¶ 28–29, 28 n.6, 348 P.3d at 489 & n.6. ¶18 Although in Novotny we focused on the propriety of automatic reversal for what we had previously considered to be the “forced” use of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, our reliance not only on developments in the harmless error doctrine, but also on more recent Supre | 1 | 1 |
People v. Marcianogreen1 sentence2019People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 831, 835 (citing People v. Wise, 2014 COA 83 , ¶¶ 28–29, 348 P.3d 482, 489 ); People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 23 , 356 P.3d 956, 963 (quoting Wise, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d at 489 ); Wise, ¶¶ 28–29, 28 n.6, 348 P.3d at 489 & n.6. ¶18 Although in Novotny we focused on the propriety of automatic reversal for what we had previously considered to be the “forced” use of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, our reliance not only on developments in the harmless error doctrine, but also on more recent Supre | 1 | 1 |
Carrillo v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2014See Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. at 316 , 120 S.Ct. 774 (the "principal reason for peremptories" is "to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury"); Novotny, ¶22 ("The Supreme Court ... has now expressly rejected the notion that peremptory challenges have any constitutional dimension or purpose, other than as a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury." (citations omit ted); Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478, 486 (Colo.1999) (the right to challenge a prospective juror for cause is an integral part of the right to a fair trial). ¶ 18 Nor are we persuaded that such | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Daniel Chalan, Jr.green1 sentence1992See, e.g., U.S. v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir.1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Castillo v. County Wide Commercial Laundries, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2026See Browning v. State, 2006 OK CR 8, ¶ 9 (“While Martinez-Salazar is the law in cases involving federal criminal procedure, it is not . . . law which requires any change of course from this [c]ourt.”); see also State v. Talbott, 521 P.3d 948 , 955 (Wash. 2022)(The part of Martinez- Salazar pertinent to this issue “is not based on any legal principle that applies to the states.”); Deviney v. State, 322 So. 2d 563 , 584 n.9 (Fla. 2021)(Lawson, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)(“Martinez-Salazar may have left open the issue of whether, under federal law, ‘normal principles of w | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2025Batson, 476 U.S. at 86 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Wise
green
2 sentences2019People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 831, 835 (citing People v. Wise, 2014 COA 83 , ¶¶ 28–29, 348 P.3d 482, 489 ); People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 23 , 356 P.3d 956, 963 (quoting Wise, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d at 489 ); Wise, ¶¶ 28–29, 28 n.6, 348 P.3d at 489 & n.6. ¶18 Although in Novotny we focused on the propriety of automatic reversal for what we had previously considered to be the “forced” use of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, our reliance not only on developments in the harmless error doctrine, but also on more recent Supre 2019People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2, ¶ 10, 411 P.3d 831, 835 (citing People v. Wise, 2014 COA 83 , ¶¶ 28–29, 348 P.3d 482, 489 ); People v. Wilson, 2014 COA 114, ¶ 23 , 356 P.3d 956, 963 (quoting Wise, ¶ 28, 348 P.3d at 489 ); Wise, ¶¶ 28–29, 28 n.6, 348 P.3d at 489 & n.6. ¶18 Although in Novotny we focused on the propriety of automatic reversal for what we had previously considered to be the “forced” use of a defendant’s peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, our reliance not only on developments in the harmless error doctrine, but also on more recent Supre | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Novotny
green
2 sentences2019Id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 320 P.3d at 1196 . 2019Id. at ¶¶ 1–2, 320 P.3d at 1196 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of Iowa v. Jerin Douglas Mootz
green
1 sentence2014That analysis, apart from being inherently conjectural, see Mootz, 808 N.W.2d at 225 , would be further complicated by well-established law restricting inquiry into the validity of verdicts, see 22 Stephen A. Hess & Sheila K. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Skilling v. United States
green
2 sentences2011The use of a peremptory challenge "to effect an instantancous cure of the [trial court's] error" in denying a challenge for cause "exemplifies 'a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury." Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 , 395 n. 31, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 2923 n. 31, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 , 120 S.Ct. 774 , 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000); see also Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 Am.Crim. 2011The use of a peremptory challenge "to effect an instantancous cure of the [trial court's] error" in denying a challenge for cause "exemplifies 'a principal reason for peremptories: to help secure the constitutional guarantee of trial by an impartial jury." Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 , 395 n. 31, 130 S.Ct. 2896 , 2923 n. 31, 177 L.Ed.2d 619 (2010) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 316 , 120 S.Ct. 774 , 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000); see also Jury Selection Errors on Appeal, 38 Am.Crim. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. MacRander
red
2 sentences1993In People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo.1992), we held that a defendant must show: (1) an erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause, (2) the use of a peremptory challenge by the defense to remove the offending juror, and (3) the defendant’s exhaustion of all available peremptory challenges. 1993In People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo.1992), we held that a defendant must show: (1) an erroneous *844 ruling on a challenge for cause, (2) the use of a peremptory challenge by the defense to remove the offending juror, and (3) the defendant's exhaustion of all available peremptory challenges. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.