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19 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jeter v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind.2008), ce rt. denied — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 645 , 172 L.Ed.2d 626 ), trans. denied. 2011"The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. 2008), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 645 , 172 L.Ed.2d 626 ), trans. denied. | 7 | 7 |
Powers v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1994See Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (a criminal defendant may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors based on their race whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (1991), 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (the race-based exelusion of jurors by a private litigant in a civil case violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors). 1994See Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (a criminal defendant may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors based on their race whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (1991), 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (the race-based exelusion of jurors by a private litigant in a civil case violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors). | 2 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2019Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. 2008) (citing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2182 | May 2, 2019 Page 4 of 9 Batson, 476 U.S. at 79 )). 2015“The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 5 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). | 1 | 11 |
Killebrew v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind.2008), ce rt. denied — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 645 , 172 L.Ed.2d 626 ), trans. denied. 2011"The use of a peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely on the basis of race violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." Killebrew v. State, 925 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (citing Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257, 1262 (Ind. 2008), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 645 , 172 L.Ed.2d 626 ), trans. denied. | 1 | 2 |
Addison v. Stategreen1 sentence2020Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1208 (Ind. 2012); see also Jeter v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1257 , 1262–63 (Ind. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia v. McCollumgreen2 sentences2006The Court of Appeals explained that, "(allthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ("In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accid 2006The Court of Appeals explained that, "(allthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ("In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accid | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2006The Court of Appeals explained that, "(allthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ("In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accid | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hodgegreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., Hodge, 726 A.2d at 553 . 2005See, e.g., Hodge, 726 A.2d at 553 . | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Bondgreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 4 Blackf. 458 , 1838 WL 1875 (Ind.1838) (citing R.C, 1831, p. 408, “forty-second section of the practice act” for the statutory right of “each party” in a civil case to make “peremptory challenge to three jurors”); and see current Ind.Code § 34-36-3-3 (“Each party in a civil case has three (3) peremptory challenges.”). 2002See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 4 Blackf. 458 , 1838 WL 1875 (Ind.1838) (citing R.C., 1831, p. 408, "forty-second section of the practice act" for the statutory right of "each party" in a civil case to make "peremptory challenge to three jurors"); and see current Ind.Code § 34-36-3-3 ("Each party in a civil case has three (3) peremptory challenges."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Snyder v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2014Id. (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 ). 2014Id. (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Johnson v. California
green
1 sentence2014Id. (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477 , 128 S.Ct. 1203 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
green
2 sentences1994See Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (a criminal defendant may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors based on their race whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (1991), 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (the race-based exelusion of jurors by a private litigant in a civil case violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors). 1994See Powers v. Ohio (1991), 499 U.S. 400 , 111 S.Ct. 1364 , 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (a criminal defendant may object to the use of a peremptory challenge to exclude jurors based on their race whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (1991), 500 U.S. 614 , 111 S.Ct. 2077 , 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (the race-based exelusion of jurors by a private litigant in a civil case violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Schroer v. Funk & Sons, Inc.
neutral
2 sentences1994In Schroer v. Funk (1968), Ind., 237 N.E.2d 247 , Justice Jackson stated unequivocally: "The right of the litigant to the use of a peremptory challenge is absolute, there is no area of discretion on the part of the trial court wherein and whereby such right can be denied or abrogated. s * * a ik * The language of the Appellate court relative to the statement that the denial of a peremptory challenge of a juror 'primarily involves the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court' is hereby totally disapproved and is deleted." Id. at 248 . 1994In Schroer v. Funk (1968), Ind., 237 N.E.2d 247 , Justice Jackson stated unequivocally: "The right of the litigant to the use of a peremptory challenge is absolute, there is no area of discretion on the part of the trial court wherein and whereby such right can be denied or abrogated. s * * a ik * The language of the Appellate court relative to the statement that the denial of a peremptory challenge of a juror 'primarily involves the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court' is hereby totally disapproved and is deleted." Id. at 248 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Phillips v. State
green
1 sentence1990Batson, supra; Phillips v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 87 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.