absurdity doctrine in Utah

2024However, an equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11 , 165 P.3d 1206 (cleaned up); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27 , 387 P.3d 1000 (explaining that the absurdity doctrine “reforms unambiguous statutory language where the language would lead to an absurd result” (cleaned up)).

2024However, an equally well-settled caveat to the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result.” In re Z.C., 2007 UT 54, ¶ 11 , 165 P.3d 1206 (cleaned up); see also Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 27 , 387 P.3d 1000 (explaining that the absurdity doctrine “reforms unambiguous statutory language where the language would lead to an absurd result” (cleaned up)).

2026Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-804(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2022). 20230738-CA 8 2026 UT App 1 State v. Allred 2017 UT 41, ¶ 47 , 424 P.3d 46 (Voros, J., dissenting) (“A relatively non-controversial use of the absurdity doctrine is to correct obvious linguistic errors, [such as when] the error in the statute is so unthinkable that any reasonable reader would know immediately both (1) that it contains a technical or ministerial mistake, and (2) the correct meaning of the text.” (cleaned up)). ¶19 This standard is met here.

2026Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-804(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2022). 20230738-CA 8 2026 UT App 1 State v. Allred 2017 UT 41, ¶ 47 , 424 P.3d 46 (Voros, J., dissenting) (“A relatively non-controversial use of the absurdity doctrine is to correct obvious linguistic errors, [such as when] the error in the statute is so unthinkable that any reasonable reader would know immediately both (1) that it contains a technical or ministerial mistake, and (2) the correct meaning of the text.” (cleaned up)). ¶19 This standard is met here.

2026In this case, the court of appeals applied the absurdity doctrine after concluding that the plain language of the intervention provision was “clear” with “no ambiguity.” In re Adoption of R.P., 2024 UT App 149, ¶ 12 , 559 P.3d 977 . 14 Cite as: 2026 UT 9 Opinion of the Court maintaining her adoption petition while leaving Paternal Grandfather free to maintain his.

2024And that is what Paternal Grandmother contends here—that 20230120-CA 8 2024 UT App 149 In re adoption of R.P. applying the plain meaning of the Intervention Provision leads to an absurd and unsupportable result. 3 ¶14 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine and read a statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 28 .

2026“Even if we can conceive of scenarios where the statute the Legislature enacted might produce an absurd result, we do not stray from the statute’s text in a case where the application of the Act in the case before us does not lead to an absurd result.” Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶ 61 , 529 P.3d 319 (applying the absurd consequences canon); see State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25 , ¶ 54 & n.13, 445 P.3d 453 (rejecting an absurdity doctrine argument based on “hypothetical circumstances” that were not grounded in the facts of the case).

2026“Even if we can conceive of scenarios where the statute the Legislature enacted might produce an absurd result, we do not stray from the statute’s text in a case where the application of the Act in the case before us does not lead to an absurd result.” Scott v. Benson, 2023 UT 4, ¶ 61 , 529 P.3d 319 (applying the absurd consequences canon); see State v. Sanders, 2019 UT 25 , ¶ 54 & n.13, 445 P.3d 453 (rejecting an absurdity doctrine argument based on “hypothetical circumstances” that were not grounded in the facts of the case).

2026“When the meaning of a statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed.” Anderson v. Utah Dep’t of Com., 2025 UT 19, ¶ 14 , 572 P.3d 373 (cleaned up). ¶38 But in rare cases, “the absurdity doctrine dictates that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result.” Arnold, 2021 UT 27, ¶ 11 (cleaned up). 4 This doctrine has been described as “a drastic step” or “strong __________________________________________________________ 4 We note here the distinction between the absurd consequences canon of statutory i

2026That subsection provided, A continuous protective order is permanent . . . and may include: (continued…) 20230738-CA 7 2026 UT App 1 State v. Allred the CPO could extend to household members based on its determination that the statute suffered from the infirmity just described, noting that the legislature intended to reference subsection 804(3)(d) instead of subsection 804(3)(c) since “it would make no sense to say that an order could include [certain] items and then not point to the section that includes those items.” The district court’s conclusion was correct. ¶18 Where, as here, a statute’

2026Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-804(3)(d) (LexisNexis 2022). 20230738-CA 8 2026 UT App 1 State v. Allred 2017 UT 41, ¶ 47 , 424 P.3d 46 (Voros, J., dissenting) (“A relatively non-controversial use of the absurdity doctrine is to correct obvious linguistic errors, [such as when] the error in the statute is so unthinkable that any reasonable reader would know immediately both (1) that it contains a technical or ministerial mistake, and (2) the correct meaning of the text.” (cleaned up)). ¶19 This standard is met here.

2026We agree. 8 Cite as: 2026 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶24 We begin our analysis by interpreting the plain language of the intervention provision as applied to Paternal Grandmother.

2026In this case, the court of appeals applied the absurdity doctrine after concluding that the plain language of the intervention provision was “clear” with “no ambiguity.” In re Adoption of R.P., 2024 UT App 149, ¶ 12 , 559 P.3d 977 . 14 Cite as: 2026 UT 9 Opinion of the Court maintaining her adoption petition while leaving Paternal Grandfather free to maintain his.

2025The City requests that we reform the statute to expand the concept of an “existing billboard” to include a “proposed billboard.” If reformed in this way, the statute would have allowed the City to deny a Section 511 request without paying compensation if a competing request proposed to relocate another billboard to the same side of the freeway and within 500 feet of the other requested relocation site. ¶35 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine 20230838-CA 19 2025 UT App 122 R.O.A.

2025The City requests that we reform the statute to expand the concept of an “existing billboard” to include a “proposed billboard.” If reformed in this way, the statute would have allowed the City to deny a Section 511 request without paying compensation if a competing request proposed to relocate another billboard to the same side of the freeway and within 500 feet of the other requested relocation site. ¶35 Our supreme court “has developed a narrow, exacting standard for determining whether to apply the absurdity doctrine 20230838-CA 19 2025 UT App 122 R.O.A.

2024We decline to do so because Ogden City has not shown that “the operation of the statute is so overwhelmingly absurd that no rational legislator could ever be deemed to have supported a literal application of its text.” See Garfield Cnty. v. United States, 2017 UT 41, ¶ 22 , 424 P.3d 46 (cleaned up). 10 Cite as: 2024 UT 1 Opinion of the Court II.

2021Comm’n, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 , 322 P.3d 712 . 4 It is not clear to us why, in a case where the court of appeals reverses and applies the absurdity doctrine, it would do so in a summary fashion.

2021Comm’n, 2014 UT 3, ¶ 25 , 322 P.3d 712 . 4 It is not clear to us why, in a case where the court of appeals reverses and applies the absurdity doctrine, it would do so in a summary fashion.

2020But applying the absurdity doctrine “is a drastic step, one [our supreme court has] described as strong medicine, not to be administered lightly,” because it requires that we “override the plain language” employed by the legislature by “interpret[ing] the statute contrary to its plain meaning.” Utley v. 20200012-CA 10 2020 UT App 127 Johnson v. Nationstar Mortgage Mill Man Steel, Inc., 2015 UT 75 , ¶¶ 47–48, 357 P.3d 992 (Durrant, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (cleaned up).

2019And the third point implicates an important question about the appropriate standard for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). ¶18 Silva’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim focuses on his trial counsel’s failure to seek to limit the reach of Utah Code section 76-2-402(2)(a)(ii) on the basis of the doctrine of absurdity.

2019A criminal defendant is now permitted to argue perfect self-defense where “the use of force is a reasonable response to factors unrelated to the commission, attempted commission, or fleeing after the commission of th[e] felony.” UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(3)(a)(ii). 6 Cite as: 2019 UT 36 Opinion of the Court defends the conduct of trial counsel on the ground that there was no controlling case law in effect at the time of trial that would have dictated the argument under the doctrine of absurdity.

2017We commonly apply the absurdity doctrine to statutes that have been on the books for decades.68 And the dissent fails to recognize the obvious explanation for why we have not previously reached the conclusion that we _____________________________________________________________ 65Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 , 1241–42 (Utah 1998) (“[O]wnership is a collection of rights to possess, to use and to enjoy property, including the right to sell and transmit it . . . .” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 66 Infra ¶ 39. 67 Infra ¶ 40. 68 See Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 28 (applying th

2017We commonly apply the absurdity doctrine to statutes that have been on the books for decades.68 And the dissent fails to recognize the obvious explanation for why we have not previously reached the conclusion that we _____________________________________________________________ 65Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234 , 1241–42 (Utah 1998) (“[O]wnership is a collection of rights to possess, to use and to enjoy property, including the right to sell and transmit it . . . .” (second alteration in original) (citation omitted)). 66 Infra ¶ 39. 67 Infra ¶ 40. 68 See Tschaggeny, 2007 UT 37, ¶ 28 (applying th

2017Its premise is a presumption that the legislature ‘either prefers not to press the limits of the Constitution in its statutes, or it prefers a narrowed (and constitutional) version of its statutes to a statute completely stricken’ by the courts.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶ 23 , 332 P.3d 900 (quoting Richard L.

2017Its premise is a presumption that the legislature ‘either prefers not to press the limits of the Constitution in its statutes, or it prefers a narrowed (and constitutional) version of its statutes to a statute completely stricken’ by the courts.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, ¶ 23 , 332 P.3d 900 (quoting Richard L.

2015Rather, we apply this canon to reform unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain lan- 15 See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ¶ 12 , 992 P.2d 986 (―Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, . . . . we interpret [the] statute to avoid absurd consequences.‖) 16See Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20 , ¶¶ 71–73, 345 P.3d 689 (Lee, J., concurring) (noting that under ―the doctrine of absurdity,‖ we depart from the plain language of a statute if interpreting the text as written leads to a result ―so overwhelmingly absur

2015Rather, we apply this canon to reform unambiguous statutory language where applying the plain lan- 15 See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, ¶ 12 , 992 P.2d 986 (―Where we are faced with two alternative readings, and we have no reliable sources that clearly fix the legislative purpose, . . . . we interpret [the] statute to avoid absurd consequences.‖) 16See Cox v. Laycock, 2015 UT 20 , ¶¶ 71–73, 345 P.3d 689 (Lee, J., concurring) (noting that under ―the doctrine of absurdity,‖ we depart from the plain language of a statute if interpreting the text as written leads to a result ―so overwhelmingly absur