absurdity exception in California

2019(In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 ; L.G. v. M.B. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 211, 227 .) Rather, “[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 .) Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule “should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a ‘super-legislature.’

2015Consequently, the Attorney General would have us create a judicial exception to the statutes for prosecutorial goading claims. “ ‘ “The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results ....”’ [Citations.]” 41 (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] (Unzueta).) But the absurdity doctrine should only be used in “ ‘extreme cases. . . .’ ” (People v. Schoop (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 470 [ 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ], original italics; see People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1507 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ]; Unzueta

2016(Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) “There are few, if any, sources guiding an appellate court on how to apply the absurdity exception to the ‘plain meaning rule.’ ” (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986-987 [ 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.).) “This exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government.

2016(Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) “There are few, if any, sources guiding an appellate court on how to apply the absurdity exception to the ‘plain meaning rule.’ ” (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986-987 [ 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.).) “This exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government.

2023A court is not required to follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would frustrate the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole or otherwise lead to absurd results. [Citations.] However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended

2022Cal.App.5th 116, 129 (Switzer); accord, People v. Popular (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 479, 484 .) “However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better.” (Switzer, at p. 129.) “Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not

2019The “absurdity exception requires much more than [a] showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.’ [Citation.] Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we

2015Consequently, the Attorney General would have us create a judicial exception to the statutes for prosecutorial goading claims. “ ‘ “The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results ....”’ [Citations.]” 41 (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] (Unzueta).) But the absurdity doctrine should only be used in “ ‘extreme cases. . . .’ ” (People v. Schoop (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 470 [ 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ], original italics; see People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1507 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ]; Unzueta

2015Consequently, the Attorney General would have us create a judicial exception to the statutes for prosecutorial goading claims. “ ‘ “The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results ....”’ [Citations.]” 41 (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] (Unzueta).) But the absurdity doctrine should only be used in “ ‘extreme cases. . . .’ ” (People v. Schoop (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 470 [ 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ], original italics; see People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1507 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ]; Unzueta

2015Consequently, the Attorney General would have us create a judicial exception to the statutes for prosecutorial goading claims. “ ‘ “The literal meaning of the words of a statute may be disregarded to avoid absurd results ....”’ [Citations.]” 41 (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614 ] (Unzueta).) But the absurdity doctrine should only be used in “ ‘extreme cases. . . .’ ” (People v. Schoop (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 457, 470 [ 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 ], original italics; see People v. Pecci (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1507 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 43 ]; Unzueta

2022(See, e.g., §§ 733.1 [ward shall not be committed to Division of Juvenile Justice on or after July 1, 2021], 736.5 [legislative intent to close Division of Juvenile Justice], 875 [setting maximum term of commitment in local “secure youth treatment”].) 14 “When statutory language is unambiguous, we must follow its plain meaning ‘ “ ‘whatever may be thought of the wisdom, expediency, or policy of the act, even if it appears probable that a different object was in the mind of the legislature.’ ” ’ ” (D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 .) Although the majority concludes that D.B.’s silence as to se

2019(In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 ; L.G. v. M.B. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 211, 227 .) Rather, “[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 .) Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule “should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a ‘super-legislature.’

2016(Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) “There are few, if any, sources guiding an appellate court on how to apply the absurdity exception to the ‘plain meaning rule.’ ” (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986-987 [ 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.).) “This exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government.

2016(Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 841 , 811 P.2d 1025 ].) “There are few, if any, sources guiding an appellate court on how to apply the absurdity exception to the ‘plain meaning rule.’ ” (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986-987 [ 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 187 ] (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.).) “This exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government.

2022Overview of MDO Act “Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218 .) “[I]t has ‘the dual purpose of protecting the public while treating severely mentally ill offenders.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1122 .) “ ‘The act addresses treatment in three contexts — first, as a condition of parole [citation]; then,

2022(Cf. People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15 [applying the absurdity doctrine to avoid construing section 190.4 to require that the robbery underlying a felony murder must be separately charged as an independent substantive offense, lest the statute of limitations applicable to the robbery operate as a bar to the felony murder, which has no statute of limitations], disapproved on other grounds by In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535 , 543‒545.) For all of these reasons, we conclude section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), limits eligibility to petition for recall and resentencing to juvenile offe

2022The statutory language in section 387 “does not limit the right to intervene to any particular kind or class of actions or proceedings, but is general.” (Robinson v. Crescent City Mill & Transportation Co. (1892) 93 Cal. 316, 319 ; see also Cohn v. County Board of Supervisors (1955) 135 Cal.App.2d 180, 184 [“[a]ny person who is a real party in interest may intervene in any type of action or proceeding”].) Similarly, the wrongful death statute does not set any limitation on intervention in an action for wrongful death filed by the personal representative.

2022(See People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 156 [fair comment for the prosecutor to describe defense evidence as a “total farce” and “ludicrous”].) Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that comments by the attorneys were not evidence (CALCRIM Nos. 104, 222) and that the jury alone had to decide what happened based solely on the trial evidence (CALCRIM No. 200).

2022(D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 947 , citing People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 908 [“We must . . . avoid a construction that would produce absurd consequences, which we presume the Legislature did not intend.”].) I believe we are bound by D.B.’s holding that not even the “certainly troubling” potential consequences the unanimous court foresaw flowing from its reading of section 733(c) entitled the juvenile courts to adopt their own ad hoc remedies.

2022Cal.App.5th 116, 129 (Switzer); accord, People v. Popular (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 479, 484 .) “However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better.” (Switzer, at p. 129.) “Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not

2022Overview of MDO Act “Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218 .) “[I]t has ‘the dual purpose of protecting the public while treating severely mentally ill offenders.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1122 .) “ ‘The act addresses treatment in three contexts — first, as a condition of parole [citation]; then,

2022Overview of MDO Act “Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218 .) “[I]t has ‘the dual purpose of protecting the public while treating severely mentally ill offenders.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Blackburn (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1113, 1122 .) “ ‘The act addresses treatment in three contexts — first, as a condition of parole [citation]; then,

2019(California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340 ; see also, DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [stating rule that plain meaning may be disregarded only when that meaning is repugnant to the general purview of the act or for some other compelling 14. reason].) However, the absurdity exception requires much more than showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better.

2019In the final analysis, we are unable to conclude that the results produced by a literal reading of the statute would be “so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.” (In re D.B., supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 948 [potentially “troubling” consequences not enough]; Bell v. Feibush, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1049 [policy concerns about potential consequences insufficient to overcome statute’s plain wording].) In other words, the potential results of following the unambiguous literal wording of section 496(c) are not so absurd or unreasonable that we would be justified to override i

2019The “absurdity exception requires much more than [a] showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.’ [Citation.] Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we

2019The “absurdity exception requires much more than [a] showing that troubling consequences may potentially result if the statute’s plain meaning were followed or that a different approach would have been wiser or better. [Citations.] Rather, ‘[t]o justify departing from a literal reading of a clearly worded statute, the results produced must be so unreasonable the Legislature could not have intended them.’ [Citation.] Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule ‘should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we

2019In King, the court confronted a “sentencing anomaly” in which “a literal interpretation of interrelated statutes would have meant that some juveniles convicted of first degree murder would be eligible to be committed to the former California Youth Authority (CYA) rather than sentenced to state prison, but the same juveniles who merely attempted to commit first degree murder would be ineligible for such a commitment.” (People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 938, fn. 2 [summarizing King].) Under former 40 section 1731.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, juveniles sentenced to imprisonment for