absurdity doctrine in Texas

2025While we will not construe a statute’s language to produce “patently nonsensical results,” the absurdity bar “is high, and should be,” because “mere oddity does not equal absurdity.” City of Forth Worth v. Rylie, 602 S.W.3d 459 , 467 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Combs, 401 S.W.3d at 630 ).

2023Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623, 630 (Tex. 2013); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 238 (2012) (noting that the absurdity doctrine applies to obvious technical or ministerial errors, not to what a court might view as a “substantive error[] arising from a drafter’s failure to appreciate the effect of certain provisions”).

2021Moreover, to apply the absurdity doctrine as the Attorney General requests when the law is otherwise clear and unambiguous would require this Court to “devolve[] into purposive interpretation of statutes,” which “always tempts but rarely tempers.” Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 574 (Tex. 2014) (Willett, J., concurring).

2015Op, at 183 (citing Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.021(3), to the effect that courts should presume that "a just and reasonable result is intended” when a law is enacted); see also Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556, 574 (Tex.2014) (discussing the limited applicability of the absurdity doctrine). .Discovery "may” be permitted, but the phrasing of the statute commits this to the discretion of the trial court.

2025Id.

2015See Boykin, 818 S.W2d at 785 ; see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s lan- guage is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the dispo- sition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”).

2018See BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC, 519 S.W.3d at 85 (affirming that although the Code Construction Act expressly permits judges to consider a host of extrinsic statutory construction aids, regardless of whether the statute is ambiguous, “we have resolutely refused the Act’s entreaties to disregard plain language” because an unambiguous statute “forbids open-ended improvisation, including the nontextual purposivism and consequentialism winked at in the Code Construction Act”); Combs v. Health Care Servs.

2017Accord In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 477-78 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, orig. proceeding) (Pemberton, J., Concurring) (suggesting that the , catch-all portion of the "legal action" definition functions "primarily as a safeguard against creative repleading of what are substantively lawsuits, causes of action, petitions, complaints, counterclaims, or cross-claims so as to avoid the TCPA’s. dismissal mechanisms”).

2015See Boykin, 818 S.W2d at 785 ; see also Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“[W]hen the statute’s lan- guage is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the dispo- sition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”).

2015But rather than clarifying the error in the previous analysis, the Court compounds its mistake by adding a footnote in response to Petitioner’s argument pointing out the same contradiction that TCJL asserts here.7 In this footnote the Court claims that no contradiction exists in its reading of §16.009 because Petitioner was a “designer” of the acid addition system, a category distinct from “owner” and 7 See Jenkins v. Occidental Chemical Corporation, 415 S.W.3d 14, 27 (Tex.App— Houston [1st Dist.]), footnote 11.

1999See Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th] 1994, pet. ref'd).

1999Eventually, the absurdity of the presumption was recognized and expressly overruled by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Gipson v. State, 844 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

1967Art. 1195. [15] 78 S.W.2d at 949 . [16] Id. at 948. [16a] The absurdity of the doctrine that the unborn child is but a part of its mother is obvious.

1967Art. 1195. [15] 78 S.W.2d at 949 . [16] Id. at 948. [16a] The absurdity of the doctrine that the unborn child is but a part of its mother is obvious.