grandfather clause in California

1968The situation herein is not unlike that presented in Karris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ], We held that a person holding a dual liquor license under a grandfather clause could not transfer that status to a successor in interest.

1968The situation herein is not unlike that presented in Karris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board (1964) 61 Cal.2d 305 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ], We held that a person holding a dual liquor license under a grandfather clause could not transfer that status to a successor in interest.

2010(See Smith, supra , 538 U.S. at p. 94 ["manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures" may reveal intent].) The residency restriction's blanket treatment of all registered sex offenders, lack of a grandfather clause or grace period, and authorization of local ordinances imposing stricter restrictions further suggest a punitive intent.

2008(See Smith, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 94 ["manner of its codification or the enforcement procedures" may reveal intent].) The residency restriction's blanket treatment of all registered sex offenders, lack of a grandfather clause or grace period, and authorization of local ordinances imposing stricter restrictions, further suggest a punitive intent.

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

1964(Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, 61 Cal.2d 305, 309-310 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 409 , 392 P.2d 1 ]; Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 321 [ 223 P.2d 465 ]; People v. Western Fruit Growers, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 494, 508 [ 140 P.2d 13 ]; Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Commission, 189 Cal. 573, 585 [ 209 P. 586 ].) These clauses imply that "through the process of natural attrition, those qualified for the exemption would gradually diminish in numbers until no more existed." (Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage etc. Appeals Board, supra, 61 Cal.2d 305, 310 .) Thus, we upheld the original grandf

2008(See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29-30 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 520 ] ,) 8 Accordingly, we must disregard the legislative history proffered by the Ranch and determine the meaning of the grandfather clause on the basis of its own language, rather than the language of its predecessor clauses.

2008(See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29-30 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 520 ] ,) 8 Accordingly, we must disregard the legislative history proffered by the Ranch and determine the meaning of the grandfather clause on the basis of its own language, rather than the language of its predecessor clauses.

2008(Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 968 P.2d 539 ].) While one can argue about the exact meaning of the grandfather clause, there is no reasonable argument that its plain meaning is identical to that of the grandfather clause of 1937, because the 1943 language plainly excludes subdivision maps that qualified under that earlier provision.

2008(Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1055 [ 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 828 , 968 P.2d 539 ].) While one can argue about the exact meaning of the grandfather clause, there is no reasonable argument that its plain meaning is identical to that of the grandfather clause of 1937, because the 1943 language plainly excludes subdivision maps that qualified under that earlier provision.

2005Reg. 19330 , 19331-19332 (May 7, 1984); see Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 987, fn. 70 .) Because the compromise is based upon policy considerations rather than findings of fact, the grandfather clause does not undermine the findings made by either the BATF or the California Legislature that the use of geographic brand names is misleading when used for wine made from grapes grown outside the named geographic area. *1011 Moreover, contrary to Bronco’s assertion, there is nothing in the federal rulemaking history to suggest the Brands at issue acquired a “secondary meaning” sufficient to d

2005Because the federal regulations do not preempt section 25241 (Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 995-997) and the grandfather clause is based on a policy decision rather than a factual finding, issuance of a COLA does not constitute a finding of fact that overrides a contrary finding by the California Legislature].) 20 Thus, Bronco’s reliance on Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (1990) 496 U.S. 91 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 83 , 110 S.Ct. 2281 ] (designation on letterhead of certification as civil trial specialist facially true); Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S. 626 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 652 ] (advert

2005Because the federal regulations do not preempt section 25241 (Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 995-997) and the grandfather clause is based on a policy decision rather than a factual finding, issuance of a COLA does not constitute a finding of fact that overrides a contrary finding by the California Legislature].) 20 Thus, Bronco’s reliance on Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (1990) 496 U.S. 91 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 83 , 110 S.Ct. 2281 ] (designation on letterhead of certification as civil trial specialist facially true); Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S. 626 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 652 ] (advert

2005Because the federal regulations do not preempt section 25241 (Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 995-997) and the grandfather clause is based on a policy decision rather than a factual finding, issuance of a COLA does not constitute a finding of fact that overrides a contrary finding by the California Legislature].) 20 Thus, Bronco’s reliance on Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n (1990) 496 U.S. 91 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 83 , 110 S.Ct. 2281 ] (designation on letterhead of certification as civil trial specialist facially true); Zauderer, supra, 471 U.S. 626 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 652 ] (advert

2002The court concluded that it had been legally created by an 1891 federal patent, which is simply another form of conveyance. ( Lakeview, supra, at pp. 596-598 , 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 ; see Gomes v. County of Mendocino, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at pp. 982-983, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 93 .) [3] *394 The second issue in Lakeview was whether the three parcels were exempt from the Map Act under the grandfather clause of section 66499.30, subdivision (d), as parcels which were "in compliance with or exempt from any law ... regulating the design and improvement of subdivisions in effect at the time the subdivision

1993In addition to preserving independent significance for the building permit exception, the aforementioned reading of Public Resources Code section 4290 comports with another principle of statutory construction, namely that "`[e]xceptions to the general rule of a statute are to be strictly construed.'" (Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 ; see Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009 ; see also Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Andrews (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1355 [statutes conferring exemptions from regula

1993In addition to preserving independent significance for the building permit exception, the aforementioned reading of Public Resources Code section 4290 comports with another principle of statutory construction, namely that "`[e]xceptions to the general rule of a statute are to be strictly construed.'" (Da Vinci Group v. San Francisco Residential Rent etc. Bd. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 24, 28 ; see Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 1005, 1009 ; see also Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Andrews (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1346, 1355 [statutes conferring exemptions from regula

1991(Charles v. Board of Administration (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1412-1414 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Had Feliciano been hired by the Housing Authority prior to January 1, 1976, he would have been entitled to reclassification and safety member benefits under a grandfather clause contained in section 20020.7.

1991(Charles v. Board of Administration (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1410, 1412-1414 [ 284 Cal.Rptr. 106 ].) Had Feliciano been hired by the Housing Authority prior to January 1, 1976, he would have been entitled to reclassification and safety member benefits under a grandfather clause contained in section 20020.7.

1991(Boxx v. Board of Administration (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 79, 88-89 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 538 ].) 3 However, employees such as Feliciano who were hired after 1976 are subject to their employing agency’s discretionary decision to include them as safety members in its contract with PERS: “The *148 provisions of this section [20020.7] shall not otherwise apply to the employees of any contracting agency nor to such agency unless and until the contracting agency elects to be subject to the provisions of this section by amendment to its contract with the board made as provided in Section 20461.5 or by expres

1991(Boxx v. Board of Administration (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 79, 88-89 [ 170 Cal.Rptr. 538 ].) 3 However, employees such as Feliciano who were hired after 1976 are subject to their employing agency’s discretionary decision to include them as safety members in its contract with PERS: “The *148 provisions of this section [20020.7] shall not otherwise apply to the employees of any contracting agency nor to such agency unless and until the contracting agency elects to be subject to the provisions of this section by amendment to its contract with the board made as provided in Section 20461.5 or by expres

1990(Amador, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 236.) In sum, there is no requirement that property of equal current value must be taxed equally, regardless of its original cost.