Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
9 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1970–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cole's Express v. O'Donnell's Expressgreen2 sentences1970Furthermore, it is undisputed, as appears in Cole’s Express v. O’Donnell’s Express, 1960, 156 Me. 211 , 163 A.2d 360 , as it does in the instant case, that the Commission in clarifying rights under the grandfather clause has not been applying the more-than-2-trips-during-any-30-day-period standard in the test year literally but merely has considered the same as one of the evidentiary facts within the totality of circumstances disclosed by the evidence to determine whether the carrier has made a comprehensive showing of transportation of certain types of commodities within certain territorial l 1970Furthermore, it is undisputed, as appears in Cole’s Express v. O’Donnell’s Express, 1960, 156 Me. 211 , 163 A.2d 360 , as it does in the instant case, that the Commission in clarifying rights under the grandfather clause has not been applying the more-than-2-trips-during-any-30-day-period standard in the test year literally but merely has considered the same as one of the evidentiary facts within the totality of circumstances disclosed by the evidence to determine whether the carrier has made a comprehensive showing of transportation of certain types of commodities within certain territorial l | 1 | 2 |
Turbat Creek Preservation, LLC v. Town of Kennebunkportgreen2 sentences2001See Turbat Creek Pres., LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2000 ME 109, ¶ 13 , 753 A.2d 489, 492 . 2001See Turbat Creek Pres., LLC v. Town of Kennebunkport, 2000 ME 109, ¶ 13 , 753 A.2d 489, 492 . | 1 | 1 |
Shackford & Gooch, Inc. v. Town of Kennebunkgreen1 sentence2001Shackford & Gooch, Inc. v. Town of Kennebunk, 486 A.2d 102, 105 (Me.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Inhabitants of Boothbay v. National Advertising Co.green2 sentences1995The provision applies uniformly to all buildings in the Town, with a grandfather clause exception for existing buildings. 4 Because the ordinance regulates in a general and uniform city- or town-wide manner, it does not constitute zoning, which is the “particularistic division of the city into zones for the purpose of applying different proscriptions and ‘reasonable application of different regulations’ in the different zones.” Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48, 49 (Me.1981) (quoting language *266 from zoning definition in statutory predecessor to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 430K15-A) (Supp. 1994)) (holding 1995A building code is a valid exercise of the Town’s police power, 5 provided it does not offend due process under the United States and Maine Constitutions. 6 See Town of Boothbay, 347 A.2d at 422 . | 1 | 1 |
Benjamin v. Houlegreen1 sentence1995The provision applies uniformly to all buildings in the Town, with a grandfather clause exception for existing buildings. 4 Because the ordinance regulates in a general and uniform city- or town-wide manner, it does not constitute zoning, which is the “particularistic division of the city into zones for the purpose of applying different proscriptions and ‘reasonable application of different regulations’ in the different zones.” Benjamin v. Houle, 431 A.2d 48, 49 (Me.1981) (quoting language *266 from zoning definition in statutory predecessor to 30-A M.R.S.A. § 430K15-A) (Supp. 1994)) (holding | 1 | 1 |
Clardy v. Town of Livermoregreen1 sentence1995See id. | 1 | 1 |
Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Commissiongreen2 sentences1994The Commission argues that its treatment of the prompt payment differential is consistent with the general purposes of the Commission's enabling statute, pointing to our observation in Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Reg. Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475, 480 (Me.1982), that we will interpret a statute "in light of its evident purpose so that all of its provisions are read in harmony and are effectuated." At issue in Seven Islands was the timberland owners' effort to use a grandfather clause to defeat the purposes of the enabling statute of the Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC). 1994The Commission argues that its treatment of the prompt payment differential is consistent with the general purposes of the Commission’s enabling statute, pointing to our observation in Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Reg. Comm’n, 450 A.2d 475, 480 (Me.1982), that we will interpret a statute “in light of its evident purpose so that all of its provisions are read in harmony and are effectuated.” At issue in Seven Islands was the timberland owners’ effort to use a grandfather clause to defeat the purposes of the enabling statute of the Land Use Regulation Commission (LURC). | 1 | 1 |
LaPointe v. City of Sacogreen1 sentence1984We have consistently held that “the meaning of terms or expressions in zoning ordinances calls for the construction of legislation and is a question of law for the court.” Singal v. City of Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me.1982), citing LaPointe v. City of Saco, 419 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1980); Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 A.2d 311, 318 (Me.1967). | 1 | 1 |
Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appealsgreen1 sentence1984We have consistently held that “the meaning of terms or expressions in zoning ordinances calls for the construction of legislation and is a question of law for the court.” Singal v. City of Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me.1982), citing LaPointe v. City of Saco, 419 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1980); Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 A.2d 311, 318 (Me.1967). | 1 | 1 |
Singal v. City of Bangorgreen1 sentence1984We have consistently held that “the meaning of terms or expressions in zoning ordinances calls for the construction of legislation and is a question of law for the court.” Singal v. City of Bangor, 440 A.2d 1048, 1050 (Me.1982), citing LaPointe v. City of Saco, 419 A.2d 1013, 1015 (Me.1980); Moyer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 233 A.2d 311, 318 (Me.1967). | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. Municipal Officers of the Town of Gorhamgreen1 sentence1982Under the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions, a town ordinance must “bear a reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” and “must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory based upon the reasonably foreseeable future development of the community.” Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, Me., 431 A.2d 624, 627 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Public Utilities Commission v. Johnson Motor Transportgreen2 sentences1970See, Public Utilities Commission v. Johnson Motor Transport, 1951, 147 Me. 138, 146 , 84 A.2d 142, 146 . 1970See, Public Utilities Commission v. Johnson Motor Transport, 1951, 147 Me. 138, 146 , 84 A.2d 142, 146 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Inhabitants of Town of Durham
green
1 sentence2015Stewart v. Town of Durham, 451 A.2d 308 , 311 & n. 6 (Me.1982). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Camplin v. Town of York
green
2 sentences2006Hinman contends that Lot 7 did not become a lot of record until it was separated from the larger parcel in 1980 and its own boundaries were described in a recorded document. [¶ 24] In Camplin v. Town of York, 471 A.2d 1035 (Me.1984), we interpreted a grandfather clause that exempted "lots of record" from complying with an amendment to the zoning ordinance. 2006Hinman contends that Lot 7 did not become a lot of record until it was separated from the larger parcel in 1980 and its own boundaries were described in a recorded document. [¶ 24] In Camplin v. Town of York, 471 A.2d 1035 (Me.1984), we interpreted a grandfather clause that exempted “lots of record” from complying with an amendment to the zoning ordinance. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
City of New Orleans v. Dukes
green
2 sentences1982Under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, once a legislative classification has been found not to “[trammel] fundamental personal rights” or be “drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), it need only be shown to be rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. 1982Under the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, once a legislative classification has been found not to “[trammel] fundamental personal rights” or be “drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage,” New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516-17 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), it need only be shown to be rationally related to a legitimate public purpose. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Public Utilities Commission v. Gallop
green
2 sentences1970We are then besieged to infuse more flexibility into our judicial analysis of contract carrier legislation, and particularly to liberalize our attitude respecting the grandfather clause by a unilateral withdrawal from the so-called “hard-line” standards set by this Court in Public Utilities Commission v. Gallop, 1948, 143 Me. 290 , 62 A.2d 166 , and Cole’s Express v. O’Donnell’s Express, 1960, 156 Me. 211 , 163 A.2d 360 . 1970We are then besieged to infuse more flexibility into our judicial analysis of contract carrier legislation, and particularly to liberalize our attitude respecting the grandfather clause by a unilateral withdrawal from the so-called “hard-line” standards set by this Court in Public Utilities Commission v. Gallop, 1948, 143 Me. 290 , 62 A.2d 166 , and Cole’s Express v. O’Donnell’s Express, 1960, 156 Me. 211 , 163 A.2d 360 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.