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15 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1976–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Teague v. Campbell Countygreen2 sentences2012Outdoor West of Tenn., Inc. v. City of Johnson City, 39 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (citing Teague v. Campbell County, 920 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995)). 2011Smith County Planning Commission v. Hiwassee Village Mobile Home Park, 304 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Teague v. Campbell County, 920 S.W.2d 219, 221 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)). | 6 | 7 |
Outdoor West of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Johnson Citygreen2 sentences2010"A grandfather clause is defined as ‘an exception to a restriction that allows all those already doing something to continue doing it, even if they would be stopped by the new restriction.' ” Outdoor W. of Tenn., Inc. v. Johnson City, 39 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 629 (5th ed.1979)). 3 . 2010As the party seeking the benefit of the grandfather clause, Hiwassee LLC bears the burden of showing that the mobile home park qualified for the grandfather clause’s protection based on its actual operational status at the time the law changed. 18 Out *317 door W. of Tenn., Inc. v. City of Johnson City, 39 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000); Lamar Adver. of Tenn., Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 905 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). | 5 | 5 |
Lafferty v. City of Winchestergreen2 sentences2012See Lafferty v. City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000). 2010Since “ ‘[property is usually already in use when it is first zoned, and so it is inevitable that ideal zoning theory will clash with the existing use of particular pieces of property,’ ” this grandfather clause “ ‘avoid[s] the legal problems that would attend a local government’s efforts to force a private property owner to discontinue an otherwise permissible use of property.’ ” Custom Land Dev., Inc. v. Town of Coopertown, 168 S.W.3d 764 , 772 n. 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Lafferty v. City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000)). 1. | 3 | 3 |
Smith County Regional Planning Commission v. Hiwassee Village Mobile Home Park, LLCgreen2 sentences2012Smith Cnty., 304 S.W.3d at 310 . 2012Smith Cnty., 304 S.W.3d at 317 ; Rutherford, 2004 WL 1870066 , at *8. | 1 | 2 |
Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weisegreen2 sentences2012Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 , 434 N.Y.S.2d 150 , 414 N.E.2d 651, 654 (1980). 2012Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise, 51 N.Y.2d 278 , 434 N.Y.S.2d 150 , 414 N.E.2d 651, 654 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Lamar Advertising of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Knoxvillegreen1 sentence2010As the party seeking the benefit of the grandfather clause, Hiwassee LLC bears the burden of showing that the mobile home park qualified for the grandfather clause’s protection based on its actual operational status at the time the law changed. 18 Out *317 door W. of Tenn., Inc. v. City of Johnson City, 39 S.W.3d 131, 135 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000); Lamar Adver. of Tenn., Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 905 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Browning-Ferris Industries of Tennessee, Inc. v. Board of Commissionersgreen1 sentence2010Oct.31, 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn.1997); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 806 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) (concluding that the “General Assembly dealt separately and differently with counties and cities insofar as enabling legislation pertaining to zoning is concerned”). | 1 | 1 |
Rives v. City of Clarksvillegreen2 sentences2010In addition to the establishment being "in operation” before the change in zoning regulations, the grandfather clause also requires that the establishment be "permitted to operate under zoning regulations or exceptions thereto.” Rives v. City of Clarksville, 618 S.W.2d 502, 505 (Tenn.Ct.App.1981). 2010See id. at 506 (nonenforcement of zoning regulations at the beginning of a particular use does not give the landowner per *317 mission to operate within the meaning of the grandfather clause). | 1 | 1 |
Southern Railway Company v. Fowlergreen1 sentence1976In the case of Southern Railway Company v. Fowler, 497 S.W.2d 891, 896 (Tenn. 1973), this Court stated: “In construing an Act, it is the duty of a court to save rather than destroy it, and to reconcile different provisions, giving them a consistent meaning rather than otherwise.” Adopting this approach, the Chancellor concluded that the predominant intention of the legislature was to enact a grandfather clause, allowing carriers operating on May 17, 1971 to continue to operate under “grandfather certificates” of public convenience and necessity, but subject to future regulation by the Public S | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Custom Land Development, Inc. v. Town of Coopertown
green
2 sentences2010Since “ ‘[property is usually already in use when it is first zoned, and so it is inevitable that ideal zoning theory will clash with the existing use of particular pieces of property,’ ” this grandfather clause “ ‘avoid[s] the legal problems that would attend a local government’s efforts to force a private property owner to discontinue an otherwise permissible use of property.’ ” Custom Land Dev., Inc. v. Town of Coopertown, 168 S.W.3d 764 , 772 n. 4 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004) (quoting Lafferty v. City of Winchester, 46 S.W.3d 752, 758 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000)). 1. 2010The grandfather clause is “designed to protect ongoing business operations, not to extend the time allowed to develop a nonconforming business.” Custom Land Dev., 168 S.W.3d at 775 . | 2 | 2010–2011 |
421 Corp. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County
green
1 sentence2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Chadwell v. Knox County
green
1 sentence2010Clearly a county is a political subdivision of the State of Tennessee and falls within the contemplation of the legislation.” 14 Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Riggs v. Burson
green
1 sentence2010Oct.31, 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn.1997); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Tenn., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 806 S.W.2d 181, 189 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990) (concluding that the “General Assembly dealt separately and differently with counties and cities insofar as enabling legislation pertaining to zoning is concerned”). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lamar Tennessee, LLC v. City of Hendersonville
green
1 sentence2010A grandfather clause is “‘an exception to a restriction that allows all those already doing something to continue doing it, even if they would be stopped by the new restriction.’” Lamar- Hendersonville, 171 S.W.3d at 835 -36 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 629 (5th ed. 1979)). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Watkins v. Naifeh
green
1 sentence2002Cities may “exercise[ their] express statutory power to ‘fix zones’ by stating the distances which shall be required and defining the points to which the straight-line method of measurement shall be applied.” 635 S.W.2d at 109 . 1 In light of the power of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County to “fix zones” of beer sales, and the manifest intent to apply the straight-line method of measurement between buildings, we hold that, to obtain the benefit of the grandfather clause in § 57-5-109, the building in which the business is located must comply with the one hundred feet | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Dutton
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.