grandfather clause in Florida

1998See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that a State ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the Equal Protection clause, since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (sustaining against an Equal Protection challenge a grandfather clause which exempted two New Orleans vendors from

1998See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that a State ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the Equal Protection clause, since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (sustaining against an Equal Protection challenge a grandfather clause which exempted two New Orleans vendors from

1998See also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 , 101 S.Ct. 715 , 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (holding that a State ban on nonreturnable milk containers while permitting the use of other nonreturnable containers did not offend the Equal Protection clause, since the legislature might have determined that even a limited ban would promote greater use of environmentally desirable alternative containers); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (sustaining against an Equal Protection challenge a grandfather clause which exempted two New Orleans vendors from

1991The grandfather *540 clause unreasonably exempts a portion of an industry from regulation where the potential for abuse does not vary between the regulated portion and the non-regulated portion, appellants continue, and thus creates arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory classifications that bear no reasonable relationship to the object sought by the legislature, citing Shevin v. International Inventors, Inc., 353 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1977).

1991Finally, appellants argue, the purpose of grandfather clauses ordinarily is to excuse professionals who have demonstrated their competence by past experience from having to acquire licenses, citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177 , 30 S.Ct. 644, 646 , 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910); Midstate Hauling Co. v. Mason, 177 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1965); Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959), and the grandfather clause in section 626.988 does not serve such a purpose.

1991Finally, appellants argue, the purpose of grandfather clauses ordinarily is to excuse professionals who have demonstrated their competence by past experience from having to acquire licenses, citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177 , 30 S.Ct. 644, 646 , 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910); Midstate Hauling Co. v. Mason, 177 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1965); Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959), and the grandfather clause in section 626.988 does not serve such a purpose.

1991Finally, appellants argue, the purpose of grandfather clauses ordinarily is to excuse professionals who have demonstrated their competence by past experience from having to acquire licenses, citing Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177 , 30 S.Ct. 644, 646 , 54 L.Ed. 987 (1910); Midstate Hauling Co. v. Mason, 177 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1965); Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959), and the grandfather clause in section 626.988 does not serve such a purpose.

1976Cf. Berger v. Board of Psychological Examiners, 521 F.2d 1056 , 44 USLW 223 .

1975Thus, the Assessor would interpret the word "chapter" to mean "section." However, we believe that the opinion in Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, Fla. 1974, 297 So.2d 556 , issued since the filing of this appeal, makes the determination of that question moot.

1975It has only been necessary for us to construe Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida v. Wood, supra , in order to answer the contention of the Assessor that Plymouth Harbor was not entitled to summary judgment even if its contracts did meet the requirements of the grandfather clause.

1973If the "quota" license was available prior to May 2, 1963, the mere fact that no application was made within that limited time, does not negate the grandfather clause of 63-1561, Section 3, which authorized the renewal of, as said in Keating supra, or a new license for, any license theretofore issued.

1972Greenberg v. Dade County, Fla.App. 1960, 120 So.2d 625 , where the Dade County Board of Electrical Examiners was compelled to issue a countywide certificate of competence to the relator, an electrician, under a grandfather clause of a Dade County ordinance.

1965In Atwater v. City of Sarasota, Fla. 1949, 38 So.2d 681, 683 , it was held that a city ordinance with a grandfather clause for those “engaged in such business for more than one year” did not conflict with chapter 469, Florida Statutes, because it “sets up a system equally as effective as that set up in the statute”.