policy underlying privilege in Connecticut

1996"Whether a defamatory communication implicates an interest worthy of protection is a question of law for the trial court to determine. . . ." Bleich v. Ortiz, 196 Conn. 498 , 501 , 493 A.2d 236 (1985).

1996"Whether a defamatory communication implicates an interest worthy of protection is a question of law for the trial court to determine. . . ." Bleich v. Ortiz, 196 Conn. 498 , 501 , 493 A.2d 236 (1985).

1995"The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false statements." Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, [99 New. 56, 60, 657 P.2d 101 (1983)], supra, 61; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 512-13 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

1995"The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false statements." Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, [99 New. 56, 60, 657 P.2d 101 (1983)], supra, 61; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 512-13 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

2016See, e.g., id., 628 (‘‘in expanding the doc- trine of absolute immunity to bar claims beyond defamation, this court has sought to ensure that the conduct that absolute immunity is intended to protect, namely, participation and candor in judicial proceed- ings, remains protected regardless of the particular tort alleged in response to the words used during participa- tion in the judicial process’’); Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 466 , 935 A.2d 103 (2007) (‘‘The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public inter- est in having people speak freely outweighs the risk

2016See, e.g., id., 628 (‘‘in expanding the doc- trine of absolute immunity to bar claims beyond defamation, this court has sought to ensure that the conduct that absolute immunity is intended to protect, namely, participation and candor in judicial proceed- ings, remains protected regardless of the particular tort alleged in response to the words used during participa- tion in the judicial process’’); Gallo v. Barile, 284 Conn. 459, 466 , 935 A.2d 103 (2007) (‘‘The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public inter- est in having people speak freely outweighs the risk

2009“Whether a communication is published in the course of a judicial proceeding, so as to obtain the benefit of the absolute privilege, is a question of law for the court to decide, and our review is, therefore, plenary.” McManus v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. App. 327, 334 , 827 A.2d 708 (2003).

2009“Whether a communication is published in the course of a judicial proceeding, so as to obtain the benefit of the absolute privilege, is a question of law for the court to decide, and our review is, therefore, plenary.” McManus v. Sweeney, 78 Conn. App. 327, 334 , 827 A.2d 708 (2003).

2009The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and malicious statements." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 855-56, 825 A.2d 827 ; see also Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 245-46, 251-52 , 510 A.2d 1337 (1986).

2005Thus, [e]xtending the benefit of the [federal [s]tatute of [limitations to purchasers of defaulted assets furthers the statute’s purpose because it enhances the marketability of these assets by permitting purchasers a longer period of time to bring suit . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 73-75 .

2003Thus, the privilege “applies to statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with a court proceeding. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Preston v. O’Rourke, 74 Conn. App. 301, 312 , 811 A.2d 753 (2002). “[L]ike the privilege which is generally applied to pertinent statements made in formal judicial proceedings, an absolute privilege also attaches to relevant statements made during administrative proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature. . . .

2003Thus, the privilege “applies to statements made in pleadings or other documents prepared in connection with a court proceeding. ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Preston v. O’Rourke, 74 Conn. App. 301, 312 , 811 A.2d 753 (2002). “[L]ike the privilege which is generally applied to pertinent statements made in formal judicial proceedings, an absolute privilege also attaches to relevant statements made during administrative proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature. . . .

2002The reasoning which underpins the privilege was also explained in Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc, 37 Conn. Sup. 38 , 43 , 429 A.2d 492 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Conn. 558 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984), cited with approval in Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 247 : "From earliest times, this state has recognized that the absolute privilege is to be extended for the protection of those participating in judicial proceedings and extends to judges, counsel mid witnesses.

2002The reasoning which underpins the privilege was also explained in Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc, 37 Conn. Sup. 38 , 43 , 429 A.2d 492 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Conn. 558 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984), cited with approval in Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 247 : "From earliest times, this state has recognized that the absolute privilege is to be extended for the protection of those participating in judicial proceedings and extends to judges, counsel mid witnesses.

2002The reasoning which underpins the privilege was also explained in Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc, 37 Conn. Sup. 38 , 43 , 429 A.2d 492 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Conn. 558 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984), cited with approval in Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 247 : "From earliest times, this state has recognized that the absolute privilege is to be extended for the protection of those participating in judicial proceedings and extends to judges, counsel mid witnesses.

2002The reasoning which underpins the privilege was also explained in Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc, 37 Conn. Sup. 38 , 43 , 429 A.2d 492 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 193 Conn. 558 , 479 A.2d 781 (1984), cited with approval in Petyan v. Ellis, supra, 200 Conn. 247 : "From earliest times, this state has recognized that the absolute privilege is to be extended for the protection of those participating in judicial proceedings and extends to judges, counsel mid witnesses.

1998Halpern v. Board of Education, 196 Conn. 647, 652-53 , 495 A.2d 264 (1985); militates in favor of abstaining without regard to any possible exceptions to that doctrine.

1998Halpern v. Board of Education, 196 Conn. 647, 652-53 , 495 A.2d 264 (1985); militates in favor of abstaining without regard to any possible exceptions to that doctrine.

1997"While no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements." DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225 , 264 , 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (While parties and their counsel who bring unfounded actions for personal motives are subject to liability for vexatious suit or abuse of process, "[t]heir statements in pleadings or in court . . . cannot independently be made the basis for an action in libel . . . or . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress.").

1997"While no civil remedies can guard against lies, the oath and the fear of being charged with perjury are adequate to warrant an absolute privilege for a witness' statements." DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225 , 264 , 597 A.2d 807 (1991) (While parties and their counsel who bring unfounded actions for personal motives are subject to liability for vexatious suit or abuse of process, "[t]heir statements in pleadings or in court . . . cannot independently be made the basis for an action in libel . . . or . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress.").

1997"Were it otherwise, and municipalities were charged with notice of defects which the future should develop upon the strength alone of their knowledge of such conditions as were CT Page 8493 calculated to produce them, the expansion of municipal liability for highway defects would be enormous." 93 Conn. at 628 -29 .

1995"The policy underlying the privilege is that in certain situations the public interest in having people speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will occasionally abuse the privilege by making false statements." Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, [99 New. 56, 60, 657 P.2d 101 (1983)], supra, 61; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 512-13 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978).

1994In Giglio v. Connecticut Light Power Co. , 180 Conn. 230 , 249 (1980), our Supreme Court recognized that the relation back doctrine "is akin to rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . .," and that the policy underlying the doctrine is that "a party, once notified of litigation based upon a particular transaction or occurrence, has been provided with all the notice that statutes of limitation are intended to afford." 2 cf. Gurliacci v. Mayer , supra at p. 547.