policy underlying rule in Michigan

1978Otherwise the policy underlying the rule requiring that all the elements of the offense be established independently of a confession— consistently enforced in many Michigan cases — would be eroded in the category of cases where the stakes are the highest, where the accused person has the most to lose and where one would think that the law would be the most solicitous of his rights.” (Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich App at 503-504 .

1978Otherwise the policy underlying the rule requiring that all the elements of the offense be established independently of a confession — consistently enforced in many Michigan cases — would be eroded in the category of cases where the stakes are the highest, where the accused person has the most to lose and where one would think that the law would be the most solicitous of his rights." (Footnote omitted.) 39 Mich App at 503-504 .

2025An act is done under duress when it is done in response to a compulsion that is “present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done.” Hubbard, 115 Mich App at 78 .

2025The policy underlying the defense is that “it is better for a person to choose to commit a crime than to face a greater evil threatened by another person.” People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 372 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2025The policy underlying the defense is that “it is better for a person to choose to commit a crime than to face a greater evil threatened by another person.” People v Chapo, 283 Mich App 360, 372 ; 770 NW2d 68 (2009).

2022The policy underlying the requirement that the original judge retain jurisdiction over the entirety of probation proceedings is “to insure that revocation will be considered by the judge who is most acquainted with the matter.” Clemons, 116 Mich App at 604 .

2010As aptly stated in Justice BRICKLEY'S Electro-Tech dissent, "a principled decision to apply, or not to apply, the finality requirement requires us to look beyond the label attached to a constitutional land use claim to the policy underlying the requirement and to the nature of the governmental conduct under attack." Electro-Tech, 433 Mich. at 100 , 445 N.W.2d 61 .

2010As aptly stated in Justice BRICKLEY’s Electro-Tech dissent, “a principled decision to apply, or not to apply, the finality requirement requires us to look beyond the label attached to a constitutional land use claim to the policy underlying the requirement and to the nature of the governmental conduct under attack.” Electro-Tech, 433 Mich at 100 .

2007Harvey, supra at 438-439 .

1998The rules do not countenance a plaintiff's action in failing to plead a theory in a federal court with the hope of later litigating the theory in a state court as a second string to his bow."); Anderson, supra at 1169 (holding that it is not enough that federal court possibly or probably would have dismissed the pendent state claims); Hayes v. Town of Orleans, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 682, 686 , 660 N.E.2d 383 (1996) ("Their voluntary choice of timing and their failure to amend cannot be permitted to subvert the strong policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata."); Blazer Corp. v. New Jersey Sports

1998The rules do not countenance a plaintiff's action in failing to plead a theory in a federal court with the hope of later litigating the theory in a state court as a second string to his bow."); Anderson, supra at 1169 (holding that it is not enough that federal court possibly or probably would have dismissed the pendent state claims); Hayes v. Town of Orleans, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 682, 686 , 660 N.E.2d 383 (1996) ("Their voluntary choice of timing and their failure to amend cannot be permitted to subvert the strong policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata."); Blazer Corp. v. New Jersey Sports

1998The rules do not countenance a plaintiff’s action in failing to plead a theory in a federal court with the hope of later litigating the theory in a state court as a second string to his bow.”); Anderson, supra at 1169 (holding that it is not enough that federal court possibly or probably would have dismissed the pendent state claims); Hayes v Town of Orleans, 39 Mass App Ct 682, 686; 660 NE2d 383 (1996) (“Their voluntary choice of timing and their failure to amend cannot be permitted to subvert the strong policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata.”); Blazer Corp v New Jersey Sports & Expo

1998The rules do not countenance a plaintiff’s action in failing to plead a theory in a federal court with the hope of later litigating the theory in a state court as a second string to his bow.”); Anderson, supra at 1169 (holding that it is not enough that federal court possibly or probably would have dismissed the pendent state claims); Hayes v Town of Orleans, 39 Mass App Ct 682, 686; 660 NE2d 383 (1996) (“Their voluntary choice of timing and their failure to amend cannot be permitted to subvert the strong policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata.”); Blazer Corp v New Jersey Sports & Expo

1989The policy underlying this rule is to prevent the supporting parent from, in effect, unilaterally modifying the support decree and thereby affecting the expectations of the custodial parent as to support payments. [Citations omitted.] In Haycraft v Haycraft, 176 Ind App 211, 215-216; 375 NE2d 252 (1978), the court refused to recognize án overpayment credit, reasoning as follows: Since [the parties] had no power to modify the terms of the original support order by means of an extrajudicial agreement, any excess payment made under that supposed agreement had to be considered a gratuity or at lea

1989The policy underlying this rule is to prevent the supporting parent from, in effect, unilaterally modifying the support decree and thereby affecting the expectations of the custodial parent as to support payments. [Citations omitted.] In Haycraft v Haycraft, 176 Ind App 211, 215-216; 375 NE2d 252 (1978), the court refused to recognize an overpayment credit, reasoning as follows: Since [the parties] had no power to modify the terms of the original support order by means of an extrajudicial agreement, any excess payment made under that supposed agreement had to be considered a gratuity or at lea

1982In Chimel v California, 395 US 752, 762-763 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.

1982In Chimel v California, 395 US 752, 762-763 ; 89 S Ct 2034 ; 23 L Ed 2d 685 (1969), the Supreme Court of the United States said: "When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.

1975An excellent discussion of the policy underlying the rule is found in Rueda v Union Pacific R Co, 180 Ore 133; 175 P2d 778 (1946).

1960Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power in the field of labor relations affecting interstate commerce, completely displaced State power to deal with matters entrusted to the national labor relations board, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 US 1 ( 77 S Ct 598, 609 , 1 L ed 2d 601), and acts of a State court intruding-upon the jurisdiction of the board are nullities and vulnerable collaterally.

1960Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power in the field of labor relations affecting interstate commerce, completely displaced State power to deal with matters entrusted to the national labor relations board, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 US 1 ( 77 S Ct 598, 609 , 1 L ed 2d 601), and acts of a State court intruding-upon the jurisdiction of the board are nullities and vulnerable collaterally.