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19 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1968–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Borman v. Bormangreen2 sentences2009“The policy underlying this rule is that ‘a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant.” Id. at 521 , quoting from Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979). 2002The policy underlying this rule is that ‘a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant’ Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979), quoting Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560 , 563 n.1 (1946). | 4 | 4 |
Fabre v. Waltongreen2 sentences2015“The policy underlying this rule is that a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant.” Fabre, supra at 521 (quotations and citation omitted). 2014“The policy underlying this rule is that a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant.” Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 521 (2002) (citation omitted). | 3 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Monicogreen2 sentences2016The defense promotes “the social desirability of encouraging people to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as the result of the unlawful actions of others.” Commonwealth v. Monico, 373 Mass. 298, 303 (1977). 2016The defense promotes "the social desirability of encouraging people to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as the result of the unlawful actions of others." Commonwealth v. Monico, 373 Mass. 298, 303 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Ollie LATTIMORE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. POLAROID CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellantgreen1 sentence2009Cf. Fisher v. Lint, supra at 366, 369 . 5 “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding which pertain to that proceeding are, of course, absolutely privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation, even if uttered with malice or in bad faith.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319 (1991). 6 Moreover, Caulfield complied with the policy underlying the requirement of filing administrative charges with the EEOC prior to commencing a civil action, which is to provide “an opportunity for early conciliation.” Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Lintgreen1 sentence2009Cf. Fisher v. Lint, supra at 366, 369 . 5 “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding which pertain to that proceeding are, of course, absolutely privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation, even if uttered with malice or in bad faith.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319 (1991). 6 Moreover, Caulfield complied with the policy underlying the requirement of filing administrative charges with the EEOC prior to commencing a civil action, which is to provide “an opportunity for early conciliation.” Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Ahanotu v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authoritygreen1 sentence2009Ahanotu v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authy., 466 F. Supp. 2d 378, 391 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Correllas v. Viveirosgreen1 sentence2009Cf. Fisher v. Lint, supra at 366, 369 . 5 “Statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding which pertain to that proceeding are, of course, absolutely privileged and cannot support a claim of defamation, even if uttered with malice or in bad faith.” Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 319 (1991). 6 Moreover, Caulfield complied with the policy underlying the requirement of filing administrative charges with the EEOC prior to commencing a civil action, which is to provide “an opportunity for early conciliation.” Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Huckins v. Huntgreen1 sentence2006See Duane v. Merchants’ Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 466, 468-469 (1917); Huckins v. Hunt, 138 Mass. 366, 366-367 (1885); Atwood v. Fisk, supra. b. | 1 | 1 |
Duane v. Merchants Legal Stamp Co.green1 sentence2006See Duane v. Merchants’ Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 466, 468-469 (1917); Huckins v. Hunt, 138 Mass. 366, 366-367 (1885); Atwood v. Fisk, supra. b. | 1 | 1 |
Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestregreen1 sentence2005For reasons of fairness, any attorney-client privilege asserted over Wallace’s draft reports has been waived “The attorney-client privilege ‘was intended as a shield, not a sword.’ ” Sax v. Sax 136 F.R.D. 542, 543 (D.Mass. 1991) (quoting Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D.Fla. 1980}). | 1 | 1 |
Sax v. Saxgreen1 sentence2005For reasons of fairness, any attorney-client privilege asserted over Wallace’s draft reports has been waived “The attorney-client privilege ‘was intended as a shield, not a sword.’ ” Sax v. Sax 136 F.R.D. 542, 543 (D.Mass. 1991) (quoting Pitney-Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446 (S.D.Fla. 1980}). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Walkergreen1 sentence1997Commonwealth v. Walker, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 14, 16 (1997). | 1 | 1 |
CRIBERG v. Raymondgreen1 sentence1994The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity “would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’ ” Sullivan, supra at 368 (citation omitted) , 3 The doctrine applies to statements by a “party, counsel or witness in the institution of, or during the course of, a judicial proceeding... provided such statements relate to that proceeding.” Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Robert L. Sullivan, D.D.S., P.C. v. Birminghamgreen1 sentence1994The policy underlying the doctrine of absolute immunity “would be severely undercut if the absolute privilege were to be regarded as less than a bar to all actions arising out of the ‘conduct of parties and/or witnesses in connection with a judicial proceeding.’ ” Sullivan, supra at 368 (citation omitted) , 3 The doctrine applies to statements by a “party, counsel or witness in the institution of, or during the course of, a judicial proceeding... provided such statements relate to that proceeding.” Sriberg v. Raymond, 370 Mass. 105, 108 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Alad Corp.green1 sentence1991Ray, supra at 31. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vincent v. Plecker
green
2 sentences2002The policy underlying this rule is that ‘a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant’ Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979), quoting Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560 , 563 n.1 (1946). 2002The policy underlying this rule is that ‘a party ought not to have the power to interrupt the progress of the litigation by piecemeal appeals that cause delay and often waste judicial effort in deciding questions that will turn out to be unimportant’ Borman v. Borman, 378 Mass. 775, 779 (1979), quoting Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560 , 563 n.1 (1946).” Fahre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517, 520-521 (2002). | 4 | 1979–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Young
green
1 sentence2016The policy underlying the defense of another defense is "to discourage indifference to the plight of strangers." Young, 461 Mass. at 208 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Atwood v. Fisk
green
2 sentences2006The policy underlying this rule is that “[t]he suppression of illegal contracts is far more likely in general to be accomplished, by leaving the parties without remedy against each other.” Atwood v. Fisk, supra. Accordingly, the general rule is that a court leaves parties to an illegal contract in the same position as it finds them. 2006See Duane v. Merchants’ Legal Stamp Co., 227 Mass. 466, 468-469 (1917); Huckins v. Hunt, 138 Mass. 366, 366-367 (1885); Atwood v. Fisk, supra. b. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Scott
green
1 sentence2002We would exalt form over substance if we impressed a constitutional imperative on a proceeding which “scarcely [demonstrates] a picture of an all-powerful [S]tote relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, supra at 96 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulation
green
1 sentence1994The policy underlying this rule is the fear that allowing taxpayers to litigate their tax liabilities prior to payment “might threaten a government’s financial security,” by creating “unpredictable interim revenue shortfalls” and making the “ultimate collection of validly imposed taxes more difficult.” Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Clinton v. Norfolk Mutual Fire Insurance
green
1 sentence1992Id. at 488 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Commonwealth v. Cote
green
1 sentence1987Commonwealth v. Cote, 386 Mass. 354 , 361 n.11 (1982) . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Eisel v. Columbia Packing Company
green
1 sentence1968James, supra, commenting on the case, says, "The New York rule seems to be that one not a party to the first action may use the judgment defensively against one who was a party to the first action and had his day in court upon the issues which the judgment decided." P. 601. *454 Again, in the case of Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co. 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Israel v. Wood Dolson Co.
green
1 sentence1968In 1956, in the case of Israel v. Wood Dolson Co. Inc. 1 N.Y.2d 116 , Chief Judge Conway engaged in an elaborate discussion making reference to the fact "that under certain circumstances a rigid adherence to the mutuality concept would defeat the policy underlying the doctrine of res judicata, viz., interest republicae ut sit finis litium. " P. 119. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.