policy underlying rule (Washington) · Go Syfert
← Washington issues

policy underlying rule in Washington

15 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
Lejeune v. Clallam Countygreen
washctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1995–1997
2 sentences

1997Lejeune, 64 Wn.

1995McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 303 ; Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 395-96 , 429 P.2d 207 (1967); see Lejeune v. Clallam County, 64 Wn.

12
State v. Mauricegreen
washctapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008A lighter sentence is required whenever the jury unanimously finds the offense was committed by the [alternative with a lesser penalty] or is split between [the greater and lesser alternatives].' State v. Maurice, 79 Wash.App. 544, 550 , 903 P.2d 514, 517 (1995)."). ¶ 55 Because there was no confusion as to any of the means by which the jury found Mr. Brown guilty, the rule of lenity does not apply and the trial court was required to sentence Mr. Brown under the higher sentencing range. ¶ 56 Generally, a sentencing court is afforded wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limit

2008A lighter sentence is required whenever the jury unanimously finds the offense was committed by the [alternative with a lesser penalty] or is split between [the greater and lesser alternatives].' State v. Maurice, 79 Wash.App. 544, 550 , 903 P.2d 514, 517 (1995)."). ¶ 55 Because there was no confusion as to any of the means by which the jury found Mr. Brown guilty, the rule of lenity does not apply and the trial court was required to sentence Mr. Brown under the higher sentencing range. ¶ 56 Generally, a sentencing court is afforded wide discretion in imposing a sentence within statutory limit

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (13)

CaseCitedYears
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Company green
wash · 1984
2 sentences

2000"The policy underlying the exception is that the common law doctrine cannot be used to shield an employer's action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy." Id. at 231 , 685 P.2d 1081 .

2000"The policy underlying the exception is that the common law doctrine cannot be used to shield an employer's action which otherwise frustrates a clear manifestation of public policy." Id. at 231 , 685 P.2d 1081 .

42000–2013
State v. Henderson green
wash · 1990
2 sentences

1999Id. at 868 .

1999Id. at 868 [ 792 P.2d 514 ].

31997–1999
State v. Jackson green
washctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2008The policy underlying the rule of lenity is to "place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are." State v. Jackson, 61 Wash.App. 86, 93 , 809 P.2d 221 (1991) (citing State v. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. 426, 432 , 730 P.2d 738 (1986)). ¶ 54 The trial court also interpreted Maurice to mean that when the jury finds the defendant acted in a manner consistent with all of the alternatives, which has been found by the statute to constitute more and less relatively culpable means, t

2008The policy underlying the rule of lenity is to “place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are.” State v. Jackson, 61 Wn.

22008–2008
State v. Knowles green
washctapp · 1986
2 sentences

2008The policy underlying the rule of lenity is to "place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are." State v. Jackson, 61 Wash.App. 86, 93 , 809 P.2d 221 (1991) (citing State v. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. 426, 432 , 730 P.2d 738 (1986)). ¶ 54 The trial court also interpreted Maurice to mean that when the jury finds the defendant acted in a manner consistent with all of the alternatives, which has been found by the statute to constitute more and less relatively culpable means, t

2008The policy underlying the rule of lenity is to "place the burden squarely on the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally warn people of the actions that expose them to liability for penalties and what those penalties are." State v. Jackson, 61 Wash.App. 86, 93 , 809 P.2d 221 (1991) (citing State v. Knowles, 46 Wash.App. 426, 432 , 730 P.2d 738 (1986)). ¶ 54 The trial court also interpreted Maurice to mean that when the jury finds the defendant acted in a manner consistent with all of the alternatives, which has been found by the statute to constitute more and less relatively culpable means, t

22008–2008
Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green
wash · 1977
2 sentences

2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)).

2000We explained "The exception has been utilized in instances where application of the terminable at will doctrine would have led to a result clearly inconsistent with a stated public policy and the community interest it advances." Id. (citing Roberts v. ARCO, 88 Wash.2d 887, 897 , 568 P.2d 764 (1977)).

22000–2000
McDaniels v. Carlson green
wash · 1987
2 sentences

1997McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 303 , 738 P.2d 254 (1987).

1997McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wn.2d 299, 303 , 738 P.2d 254 (1987).

21995–1997
State v. Scott green
wash · 1988
2 sentences

2017State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)(citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

2017State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)(citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

12017–2017
State v. O'Hara green
wash · 2009
2 sentences

2017State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (quoting State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

2017State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)(citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

12017–2017
State v. O'HARA green
wash · 2009
2 sentences

2017State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (quoting State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

2017State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)(citing State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685 , 757 P.2d 492 (1988)).

12017–2017
Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc. green
wash · 1996
1 sentence

2013Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 231 , 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). ¶48 A WTVP claim requires the plaintiff to establish four elements: (1) “the existence of a clear public policy (the clarity element),” (2) that “discouraging the conduct in which [the plaintiff] engaged would jeopardize the public policy {the jeopardy element),” (3) that the protected conduct “caused the dismissal (the causation element),” and (4) that the employer-defendant does not have a “justification for the dismissal (the absence of justification element).” Gardner, 128 Wn.2d at 941 .

12013–2013
Bordeaux v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. green
wash · 1967
2 sentences

1995McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 303 ; Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 395-96 , 429 P.2d 207 (1967); see Lejeune v. Clallam County, 64 Wn.

1995McDaniels, 108 Wn.2d at 303 ; Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn.2d 392, 395-96 , 429 P.2d 207 (1967); see Lejeune v. Clallam County, 64 Wn.

11995–1995
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont green
wva · 1978
1 sentence

1984For example, in Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.

11984–1984
The Marckel Co. v. Zitzow green
minn · 1944
1 sentence

1980The policy underlying the doctrine was expressed in Marckel v. Zitzow, supra 218 Minn, at 308, 15 N.W.2d at 779 : Important official acts were actually performed by the judge of the court created under a statute apparently regularly enacted by the branch of the government to which the power to make laws has been delegated by the constitution.

11980–1980

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 42u.s.c.1983 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 46.61.506 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 80 (1948–2026) PA 59 (1980–2026) OH 40 (1978–2025) IL 29 (1965–2025) NY 27 (1956–2024) CT 25 (1986–2018) MA 19 (1968–2016) TX 18 (1988–2025) WA 15 (1980–2017) IN 14 (1989–2020) MD 14 (1977–2014) MI 11 (1960–2025) TN 10 (1978–2018) FL 10 (1974–2015) LA 9 (1979–2023) NJ 9 (1979–2025) ME 8 (1976–2013) MN 8 (1983–2010) UT 7 (1991–2019) OR 7 (1978–2008) CO 6 (1996–2026) DC 5 (1982–1996) VA 5 (1993–2016) WI 5 (1982–2024) IA 5 (1980–2011) KY 5 (1982–2006) AK 5 (1981–2001) HI 4 (2001–2022) KS 4 (1981–1988) NV 4 (1978–2013) SC 4 (2008–2012) WV 4 (1983–2018) NE 3 (1983–2003) VT 3 (2006–2010) NC 3 (1999–2016) MO 3 (1979–2008) AL 2 (1979–2017) NH 2 (1990–1993) NM 2 (2000–2016) ND 2 (1977–2000) AZ 2 (1994–2010) MT 2 (1948–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check