25 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Haschgreen2 sentences2026Under a “‘straight’ reckless homicide theory, . . . the defendant acts without the specific intent to kill and in doing so, fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions could cause the victim’s death.” Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Ky. 2013) (citing KRS 507.050(1) and KRS 501.020(4)). “[F]ailure to perceive that risk must be ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,’” and “the victim’s death supplies the element of recklessness necessary to sustain a reckless homicide conviction.” Id. at 356 (q 2026Under a “‘straight’ reckless homicide theory, . . . the defendant acts without the specific intent to kill and in doing so, fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his actions could cause the victim’s death.” Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Ky. 2013) (citing KRS 507.050(1) and KRS 501.020(4)). “[F]ailure to perceive that risk must be ‘a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,’” and “the victim’s death supplies the element of recklessness necessary to sustain a reckless homicide conviction.” Id. at 356 (q | 3 | 3 |
Brown v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2017As we noted in Brown v. Commonwealth, “to be convicted of Wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b), Appellant must have had a more egregious mental state than mere wantonness.” 174 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Ky. 12005). >“It is the element of ‘extreme indifference to'»hu|man life’ that elevates wanton homicide to the same level of culpability as intentional homicide.” Id. 2017As we noted in Brown v. Commonwealth, “to be convicted of Wanton murder under KRS 507.020(1)(b), Appellant must have had a more egregious mental state than mere wantonness.” 174 S.W.3d 421, 425 (Ky. 12005). >“It is the element of ‘extreme indifference to'»hu|man life’ that elevates wanton homicide to the same level of culpability as intentional homicide.” Id. | 3 | 3 |
Robertson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024That the risk of Kamari Harris dying in a house fire during her absence was of such a nature and degree that her failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. -16- Furthermore, though the instructions were “bare bones” and did not specify the exact risk of death by fire,4 we note the Robertson specimen instructions likewise did not specify an exact risk of death by plummeting into a body of water, but rather stated only “caused the death of Michael Partin by unlawfully fleeing from police apprehension[.]” 2021The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. -6- “Thus, wantonness is the awareness of and conscious disregard of a risk that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have disregarded.” Robertson v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Ky. 2002) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2 |
Young v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025Our Supreme Court has interpreted the language of KRS 502.020(1) to be “broad enough to embrace acts . . . and every form of participation in concerted criminal activity.” Young v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.3d 577, 582 (Ky. 2014) (quoting GEORGE G. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025This Court has held that a conviction of wanton murder is generally “reserved exclusively for offenders who manifest virtually no concern for the value of human life.” Johnson v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Ky. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Lofthouse v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024To arrive at this conclusion, the Supreme Court summarized that the Commonwealth needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that there was a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [the victim] would die if he ingested the cocaine and heroin furnished to him by Appellant, and that the risk of [the victim’s] death was of such nature and degree that Appellant’s failure to perceive it constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation . . . i.e., that [the victim’s] death as a result of ingestion of the cocaine and heroin was either for 2024See also id. at 243 (Stumbo, J., concurring) (“[I]n order to sustain a conviction for reckless homicide, the Commonwealth must prove that the act of providing controlled substances to 2 Three Justices joined the plurality opinion, two concurred by separate opinion, one dissented, and one did not sit. -8- another, in and of itself, creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the recipient will die as a result.”). | 1 | 1 |
Hayes v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason 2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason | 1 | 1 |
Wells v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason 2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason | 1 | 1 |
Saylor v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015We made clear .in Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812 (Ky.2004), that there are only two theories under which a second-degree-manslaughter conviction may be obtained: "(1) the defendant acted without an intent to kill but with an awareness and conscious disregard of-a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his action would result in the victim’s death; and (2) the defendant acted either with or without an intent to kill but under an actual but mistaken belief that the circumstances then existing required the , use of physical force (or deadly physical force) in self-protection, and with an 2015We made clear .in Saylor v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 812 (Ky.2004), that there are only two theories under which a second-degree-manslaughter conviction may be obtained: "(1) the defendant acted without an intent to kill but with an awareness and conscious disregard of-a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his action would result in the victim’s death; and (2) the defendant acted either with or without an intent to kill but under an actual but mistaken belief that the circumstances then existing required the , use of physical force (or deadly physical force) in self-protection, and with an | 1 | 1 |
Peacher v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2014Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 841-42 (Ky.2013). .As an aside, it is simply immaterial that the sole evidence placing R.S. at the scene is his own admission. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hagergreen1 sentence2004Thus, the self-protection instruction was. substantially the same as specimen Instruction No. 7 recommended in Hager, 41 S.W.3d at 846-47 (though Hager was decided after the trial of this case). | 1 | 1 |
Tharp v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2001As pointed out in Tharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2000), homicide is a "result" offense, thus triggering the provisions of KRS 502.020(2), i.e., "complicity to the result." Harper could be convicted of complicity to second-degree manslaughter if the jury believed she actively participated in the actions *269 of the principal actors, Burden and Vanover, without the intent that those actions would result in Phillips's death, but with an awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result, if her disregard of that risk constituted a gr 2001As pointed out in Tharp v. Commonwealth, Ky., 40 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2000), homicide is a “result” offense, thus triggering the provisions of KRS 502.020(2), ie., “complicity to the result.” Harper could be convicted of complicity to second-degree manslaughter if the jury believed she actively participated in the ac tions of the principal actors, Burden and Vanover, without the intent that those actions would result in Phillips’s death, but with an awareness and conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that death would result, if her disregard of that risk constituted a gross d | 1 | 1 |
Skinner v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2000NOTES [1] "The Supreme Court has described the requirement as one of `active participation' [ citing Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290, 300 (1993) and Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376, 380 (1991)] in the commission of an offense, a description widely embraced by courts in other jurisdictions." Lawson and Fortune, supra, § 3-3(b)(4), at 110 (footnote omitted). [2] Pursuant to the definitions of wantonly and recklessly, KRS 501.020(3) and (4), manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide is committed only if the failure to perceive or the conscious disregard of t | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Benham
green
2 sentences2019As to the risk, it “must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. 2018The substantial and unjustifiable disregarded risk must be “of such a nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Mitchell
green
1 sentence2024The Kentucky Supreme Court held that failing to secure the child in a car seat, without any other evidence of recklessness, “is not sufficient to constitute the standard of recklessness required by KRS 507.050, which is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Mitchell, 41 S.W.3d at 435-36 . -7- Bingham also relies on Lofthouse. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Travis v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason 2022Seaman seems to argue that shooting an unarmed man at near point blank range, and then instructing Thomas—under threat of Seaman shooting Amanda—to drive away as that unarmed man lay bleeding on the side of the road did not: (1) clearly pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk of killing Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584 (Ky. 1981); Wells v. 29 Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Ky. 1978). 30 Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 , 459–60 (Ky. 2010). 15 another person, and that, (2) he did not show an extreme indifference to the possibility of killing another person such that a reason | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Walker v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2020The risk “must be of such nature and degree that failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Sawhill
green
1 sentence2020Furthermore, “[t]he risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Harper v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2014Further, "[t]he risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” Id. . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Pinckney
green
2 sentences2006In overruling the defendant’s pre-trial motions to dismiss, the county court distinguished People v. Pinckney, 38 A.D.2d 217 , 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y.App.Div.1972), which had held that the mere sale of heroin by the defendant to the victim who died after self-injecting it into his own body was insufficient to sustain a homicide conviction, and held that the jury could consider the following factors in determining whether the defendant was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk that death would result from the injection (equivalent to our offense of manslaughter in the second degree), or wh 2006In overruling the defendant’s pre-trial motions to dismiss, the county court distinguished People v. Pinckney, 38 A.D.2d 217 , 328 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y.App.Div.1972), which had held that the mere sale of heroin by the defendant to the victim who died after self-injecting it into his own body was insufficient to sustain a homicide conviction, and held that the jury could consider the following factors in determining whether the defendant was aware of and disregarded a substantial risk that death would result from the injection (equivalent to our offense of manslaughter in the second degree), or wh | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Cruciani
green
1 sentence2006Cruciani 334 N.Y.S.2d at 520-23 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael MAIN, Defendant-Appellant
green
1 sentence2002Id. (emphasis added). . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bennett v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2001Under the evidence presented in this case, a jury could also have found Harper guilty of homicide under the modified "felony murder" doctrine described in Bennett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 322 (1998), i.e., that she was an accomplice to an armed robbery during which the victim was killed by another participant in the robbery. 2001Under the evidence presented in this case, a jury could also have found Harper guilty of homicide under the modified “felony murder” doctrine described in Bennett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 978 S.W.2d 322 (1998), i.e., that she was an accomplice to an armed robbery during which the victim was killed by another participant in the robbery. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Robinson v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2001Cf. Robinson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d 183 (1978). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bouie v. City of Columbia
green
2 sentences2000NOTES [1] "The Supreme Court has described the requirement as one of `active participation' [ citing Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290, 300 (1993) and Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376, 380 (1991)] in the commission of an offense, a description widely embraced by courts in other jurisdictions." Lawson and Fortune, supra, § 3-3(b)(4), at 110 (footnote omitted). [2] Pursuant to the definitions of wantonly and recklessly, KRS 501.020(3) and (4), manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide is committed only if the failure to perceive or the conscious disregard of t 2000NOTES [1] "The Supreme Court has described the requirement as one of `active participation' [ citing Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290, 300 (1993) and Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376, 380 (1991)] in the commission of an offense, a description widely embraced by courts in other jurisdictions." Lawson and Fortune, supra, § 3-3(b)(4), at 110 (footnote omitted). [2] Pursuant to the definitions of wantonly and recklessly, KRS 501.020(3) and (4), manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide is committed only if the failure to perceive or the conscious disregard of t | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Gilbert v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2000NOTES [1] "The Supreme Court has described the requirement as one of `active participation' [ citing Skinner v. Commonwealth, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 290, 300 (1993) and Gilbert v. Commonwealth, Ky., 838 S.W.2d 376, 380 (1991)] in the commission of an offense, a description widely embraced by courts in other jurisdictions." Lawson and Fortune, supra, § 3-3(b)(4), at 110 (footnote omitted). [2] Pursuant to the definitions of wantonly and recklessly, KRS 501.020(3) and (4), manslaughter in the second degree or reckless homicide is committed only if the failure to perceive or the conscious disregard of t | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences1996While our review of the case law of sister states revealed arguments concerning the legal and logical weakness underlying a charge of complicity based upon a principal’s negligent or reckless commission or omission of an act, we do not understand Ann West’s argument to include such an objection to having been convicted as a "com-plicitor to reckless homicide.” See, Colorado v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo.1989); Connecticut v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520 , 522 A.2d 277 (1987); Weidler v. State, 624 So.2d 1090 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). 1996While our review of the case law of sister states revealed arguments concerning the legal and logical weakness underlying a charge of complicity based upon a principal’s negligent or reckless commission or omission of an act, we do not understand Ann West’s argument to include such an objection to having been convicted as a "com-plicitor to reckless homicide.” See, Colorado v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo.1989); Connecticut v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520 , 522 A.2d 277 (1987); Weidler v. State, 624 So.2d 1090 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Wheeler
green
1 sentence1996While our review of the case law of sister states revealed arguments concerning the legal and logical weakness underlying a charge of complicity based upon a principal’s negligent or reckless commission or omission of an act, we do not understand Ann West’s argument to include such an objection to having been convicted as a "com-plicitor to reckless homicide.” See, Colorado v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo.1989); Connecticut v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520 , 522 A.2d 277 (1987); Weidler v. State, 624 So.2d 1090 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Weidler v. State
green
1 sentence1996While our review of the case law of sister states revealed arguments concerning the legal and logical weakness underlying a charge of complicity based upon a principal’s negligent or reckless commission or omission of an act, we do not understand Ann West’s argument to include such an objection to having been convicted as a "com-plicitor to reckless homicide.” See, Colorado v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo.1989); Connecticut v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520 , 522 A.2d 277 (1987); Weidler v. State, 624 So.2d 1090 (Ala.Cr.App.1993). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Thomas v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1987In Thomas v. Commonwealth, Ky., 567 S.W.2d 299 (1978), one of two convictions for wanton endangerment in the first degree was based on appellant’s pointing a pistol at a police officer. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.